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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation describes a problem in contem-
porary American civilization concerning Mexican migrant 
agricultural workers and United States immigration history. 
It discusses the development of a governmental policy 
sponsored in Washington, D. c., yet hemispheric in appli-
cation, designed to solve that problem. It points out 
some implications, international as well as national, 
for the American future. The problem and the policy, 
both emerging during the last thirty years, are indige-
nous to the Southwest. 
As a youngster living in South Central Texas, the 
writer regarded the itinerant Mexican simply as a farm 
laborer and not as a subject of international controversy. 
Each year in July, during the 1930's, as the cotton bolls 
began to open, small bands of Mexicans appeared on the 
highways traveling from farm to farm to pick cotton. In 
that decade they walked or rode on freight trains to 
farms where they might find work. In the 1940's they were 
able to buy second-hand trucks, which probably had been 
used to haul cattle. They carried small bedding rolls 
with them and slept in the open under huisache trees. 
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They bathed in small creeks before going to town on Satur-
days. They were hard-working, quiet, and unobtrusive. 
During the early 1930's the writer lived on a 
six-hundred acre farm and ranch in Lavaca County, Texas. 
A Negro family of six assisted with the heavy farm and 
ranch work the year around and resided on the farm as 
tenants, but made extra money as farm hands. In 1934 
the Negro family moved to Houston, Texas, about 120 
miles away, to obtain work first on the w. P. A. (Works 
Progress Administration), then in an oil refinery. 
After the Negroes left the farm, the writer's uncle 
purchased a tractor, sold his·six mules and horses, and 
began to use seasonal Mexican day laborers to chop (thin) 
and pick cotton, grub (clear farm land of trees and 
stumps), and build fences. During the period 1934-1938 
Mexicans were paid about $3.00 per acre for chopping 
cotton, depending on the ~ount of Johnson grass; about 
$15.00 per acre for grubbing land, depending on the thick-
ness of the trees; and about $2.00 and board per day (often 
10 hours) for doing other very hard work, such as digging 
fence-post holes. Negroes were no longer available for 
tough, hard, farm work and the implications of this 
transition were intriguing. 
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In this area of South Texas, which is predominantly 
white, Protestant, and conservative, farmers and ranchers 
began to use more Mexican labor. They never questioned 
whether the Mexicans were born in Texas or were in the 
country illegally. In fact, most people knew that they 
were "wetbacks." Farmers never questioned the moral or 
legal implications of their hiring Mexicans. On an 
annual basis Mexicans were cheaper and that was justi-
fication enough. 
The change had many other facets. Negroes, whom 
most whites trusted, were replaced by seasonal Mexicans, 
whom nobody trusted. Negroes had a veneer of American 
culture, Mexicans brought a "foreign" culture. Negroes 
were always Protestant; Mexicans, nominally Roman Catholic. 
Other questions arose immediately. How widespread was 
this displacement? What was the economic, racial, reli-
gious, social, cultural, legal, and international signi-
ficance of this change which began in the early 1930's? 
What were the antecedents of this transition prior to 
the year 1930? These aspects of the use of Mexican farm 
labor became prominent features of the history of migrant 
farm labor in the United States Southwest. 
The phases of transition noted above, personally 
ob~erved in Texas, had their counterpart in other 
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Southwestern states, and had their roots in the intro-
duction of the restrictive immigration legislation in 
1921. That enactment cut off the sources of cheap 
labor from Europe and Asia. It placed no quotas on 
Mexicans nor much physical restriction on their 
crossing the border. It left the "back door" wide 
open. More recent legislation has refused to close 
that door to the people of Mexico or to most other 
Latin-Americans. The Immigration and Naturalization 
Act of 1952 made little basic change in the restric-
tions in effect since 1921. Mexico and other inde-
pendent countries of this hemisphere remain "non-quota" 
countries. 
The critics have charged that the immigration laws 
of the United States perpetuate racial discrimination, 
because they permit unrestricted entry from Latin-America 
but apply the sharply restrictive quota system to Europe 
and all other parts of the world. Thoughtful writers 
have long since questioned the validity of limitations 
on Europeans when Latin-Americans are exempt from quota 
limitations. A close analysis, however, will reveal that 
only relatively small numbers of Latin-Americans (compared 
to the total United States population) come to the United 
States for permanent residence. Furthermore, the bracero, 
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the Mexican contract worker who comes for a specified 
time, may well be the twentieth century answer to the 
perennial need for cheap labor in the United States. 
This trend indicates an historical shift in immigra-
tion policy. At first glance, it may appear that 
those who approved the 1952 law completely overlooked 
the possible dangers implicit in extensive Mexican 
emigration. Nevertheless, the history of this migra-
tion during the three decades under discussion, as will 
be pointed out, does not give cause for great alarm. 
The forces which dominate the policy may give more 
concern. 
The term "wetback" bas been in use since the 
1930's to designate a person of Mexican origin who 
crossed the Rio Grande and entered the United States 
illegally, since it was supposed that during his in-
formal admission his back became wet while fording the 
river. The word bracero is derived from the Spanish 
word brazo meaning "arm" and is currently applied to 
the Mexican agricultural worker admitted under contract, 
although even in the 1920's the term was in general use 
meaning any Mexican farm worker, not necessarily legally 
admitted. 
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This presentation is limited principally to the 
period after 1930 since the same general subject matter 
prior to 1930 has been covered in two books by Manuel 
Gamio. 1 At that time Gamio was the leading Mexican 
authority on Mexican emigration to the United States. 
He maintained that most Mexican laborers .entering the 
United States for seasonal farm work returned to Mexico 
each year. 
Another American commentator, W. T. Woofter, one 
of the leading United States authorities on racial groups 
in the United States during the 1930's, took sharp issue 
with Gamio on the estimates given of the number of Mexi-
cans who came to the United States eaCh year for temporary 
work and the number who stayed, even though their original 
entry had been illegal. 2 His statistics, simplified, tend 
to verify his finding that large numbers did stay in the 
United States, although their original intent was tempo-
rary migration. After 1933 there .were no general works 
1Manuel Gamio, Maxi~ Immigration to the United 
States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930). 
, The Mexican Immigrant - His Life Story 
(Chicag_o_:~T~h-e University of Chicago Press, I93!). 
2w. T. Woofter, Races and Ethnic Groups in American 
Life (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933}; p. 69. 
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published on the Mexican migratory workers considered 
as an immigration problem of the United States. 
There is always a temptation to divide recent 
history into neat ten-year packages. While this is 
often an artificial arrangement, the thirty-year period 
of Mexican migration presented here had three distinct 
eras, each with special problems though not precisely 
coinciding with the ten-year interval. It is, therefore, 
appropriate to review the three decades with reference 
to immigration policy. 
First of all, the thirty-year period was charac-
terized by economic extremes. The first decade was one 
of great depression, and all immigration to the United 
States reached its lowest point. Many who had not been 
naturalized returned to their homelands. This was 
especially true of Mexicans. In such periods of stress, 
foreigners can actually survive more easily in their own 
countries where they are known. The first ten-year 
period demonstrates the initial step in a general law of 
"push-pull" in Mexican migration_to the United States 
based solely on economic impulse. 
The second decade represented one of world-wide 
war and its aftermath. Here, special features of Mexican 
agricultural worker migration were evident, as there was 
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a worker vacuum in the United States which the migrant 
Mexican filled easily. There were no serious transpor-
tation problems. The general economic recovery of the 
United States in the 1940's, partly due to New Deal 
measures and partly due to military spending, encouraged 
the return of Mexican labor to the United States. 
The third decade (1950-1960) represented one of 
relative peace and prosperity in the United States. There 
was no comparable prosperity in Mexico for the agricultural 
worker, hence the continued "push" to find income in the 
United States. Nevertheless, this third ten-year period 
was a difficult time for the Mexicans. The transition 
to peace brought greater opposition to foreign workers. 
The governments concerned applied controls and supervision. 
A general truce by the contending forces reached at the 
end of the decade was a tenuous one. In 1960 the Demo-
cratic Party won the presidency in the national elections 
in the United States. Although no radical change in 
immi~ration policy as applied to Mexicans was expected, 
the truce then in evidence made a convenient point to 
terminate the present study. Therefore, the three 
decades mentioned, form a distinct unit in the history 
of Mexican immigration to the United States. 
xi 
A majority of current history books concerned 
with the immigration of a race of people starts with 
a chapter on why the people left their homeland and 
continues with another chapter on the reasons they 
went to a particular country. This technique is also 
useful in a work primarily concerned with temporary 
migration. Chapters II and IV are surveys of conditions 
in Mexico and the United States during the thirty-year 
period under study indicating the reasons for the migra-
tion. The basic economic difference between the two 
countries is so well known and documented that this 
thesis presents only a summary of the conditions as 
explained by the recognized authorities. These_chapters 
are introductory to the "wetback"-bracero story. 
Chapter III deals with Mexican acceptance in the 
United States. This presentation is somewhat detailed, 
and necessarily so, because no other race, not even the 
Negro before and after slavery, has met with such public 
hostility despite the usefUlness of its services. This 
attitude toward Mexicans has changed to some extent 
during the three decades 1930-1960. The incidents pre-
sented in the succeeding chapters will be more compre-
hensible with an appreciation of the historical background 
of Mexican-United States relations as set out in Chapter 
III. 
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The remaining chapters relate the specific immi-
gration problems posed by the Mexican migrants. The 
history of the "wetbacks" and the climax reached in 
1954 are presented in Chapter Five. This was an in-
credible era of illegal immigration which gave way to 
the braceros, temporary migrants controlled by contracts. 
The Mexican-United States treaties of 1942-1951 provided 
for these contracts. Chapter Seven states the history 
of all these treaties which eventually brought relative 
peace to the Southwest agricultural labor front. The 
bracero appeared to be in a secure position during the 
period 1955-1960 as stated in Chapter Six. The final 
chapter draws conclusions from the "wetback"-bracero 
history and indicates the practical effect on relevant 
immigration policy of the United States. 
This thesis, therefore, has four main purposes: 
(1) to present a survey of the problems of the Mexican 
migrant in the United States Southwest; (2) to tell the 
history of the "wetback"-bracero metamorphosis which 
took place during a period of three decades; (3) to pre-
sent a history of the treaties between the United States 
and Mexico concerning migrant labor; and (4) to discuss 
the economic and immigration policy relevant to the 
"wetback"-bracero story. In a contemporary historical 
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work there should be no claim to definitiveness and 
none is made here. 
The viewpoint of the writer should also be given 
in fairness to the readers. First of all, contemporary 
history is always subject to some skepticism by the pro-
fessionals. Objectivity is difficult. In this thesis 
the writer claims only that detachment which permits a 
discussion of all sides of the controversial subject. 
Yet, the writer has definite convictions about the end 
results of the policies pursued. For instance, it 
appears that the economic self-interest of the large 
growers in the use of braceros was paramount to the 
international self-interest of the United States and 
the effect that the employment of braceros had on the 
relatively small family farm. Further, the policy of 
not applying a quota to Mexican permanent immigration 
to the United States is inconsistent and may, in time, 
have an adverse affect upon the national racial image 
of the United States. Considering the numbers involved, 
however, this latter argument is not a particularly 
strong one. The writer also believes that mutual eco-
nomic need is the main basis for permitting immigration, 
and, therefore, the present trend of expanding temporary 
immigration only for economic, educational, scientific, 
and cultural needs is the best answer to the critics of 
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the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. 
The basic historical problem was to determine the 
trend of the immigration policy of the United States which 
can be found, the writer feels, in the "wetback"-bracero 
evolution pointing to the increased use, when needed, of 
temporary migration to fill mutual wants. This disser-
tation, therefore, has one central historical lesson. 
During the three decades, 1930-1960, the United States 
pursued ita historical policy of economic need as a 
basis for permitting immigration. Now a policy of 
expanding and contracting temporary migration replaces 
previous large scale permanent immigration in times of 
crisis and fills unusual labor requirements. In a 
large measure, the thesis is a defense of United States 
immigration policy. 
There is nothing radical or unusual in the organi-
zation and method of presenting the subject except the 
Prologue and Epilogue which are fictional innovations. 
These necessary glimpses of our protagonists could not 
be documented in the ordinary manner. 
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PROLOGUE 
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PROLOOUE 
Before you now unfolds a tale, which, though fictitious, 
recounts the probable experiences of a mestizo, 
a "wetback," Paulino Garcia, in 1940 aged twenty-seven, 
a tale related by him to his little son aged eight. 
In north Central Mexico it could have happened 
in any small town in the years from 1935 to 1954. 
The father of the child has been for five months absent 
and now the child asks, "Why were you gone so long?" 
Well, carlos, last summer there was no rain, 
and the corn looked very bad in my field 
and in your grandfather's field also. 
Even Don Florencio's hacienda was suffering from drought. 
and los indios were looking for work on his large hacienda. 
Your-mQther and I knew that we would have no money 
for the harvest festival and for Navidad de Jesus. 
You remember your Tio Juan who came back --
from the Estados Unidos a few years ago. 
Times were hard there, too, then. 
He and I, along with many others crossed the Rio Grande 
to work on the rich farms and make money 
and return with many gifts for you and mama. 
We went first to the pueblo, Santiago, 
and as the train was ready to approach the border, 
about twenty of us raced out of the brush north of town 
and jumped into an empty gondola · 
where we lay quietly to avoid the brakeman. 
After a day and a half we neared the border 
and left the train with no more food and very little money. 
We must find work quickly, but first, to cross the river. 
We had to pay a "guard" a bribe of ten pesos. 
He led us across at a place of lowwater in the river. 
Here there were no gringo border patrols. 
It was then about four oiclock in the morning, 
and the hot sun of noonday found us several miles away. 
That afternoon we met a friendly man, 
a citizen of the Estados Unidos,of Mexican descent. 
He had a truck and knew where to take us to find work. 
He became our leader and made the agreement 
with the owner of the big farm for our wages. 
We also paid him for our transportation. 
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We worked on several haciendas. 
On some we made more money thin on others. 
On one occasion we all lay flat on the ground for one hour, 
while the Immigration Officials made a search of the farm. 
Juan said that the owner had to bribe the officials 
and for that reason our wages would be less. 
We did not make much money at that place. 
On and on we went to other farms, 
first harvesting vegetables, then cotton, and then fruit. 
We worked long hours,,and at night we were very tired. 
Working made us happy, butthinking of home made us sad. 
We sang our favorite songs of Mexico, 
and this made us all the more lonesome. 
On Saturday nights we had a little drink, 
played cards and stayed up late. 
There were no churches for us, 
so we did not go anywhere on Sunday. 
In October the nights began to turn cold. 
We had all made more money than we expected, 
though we were not paid the same as the native Americanos. 
One of our men complained to the Mexican Consul, 
but he only made trouble for-himself 
with the Immigration Officer. 
Our little group was lucky; we found much work. 
We sent our money home by money order 
and made our way back without being arrested. 
Maybe the grin~os do not really want to arrest us 
if we go back ome after the harvest. 
One thing is certain, my son, my little carlos, 
when you are a grown man things will be different. 
You will not have to leave our village to find work. 
The gringos across the river do not like us. 
They are glad to get the work of our backs, 
but in the towns they do not want us to stop. 
There are no toilets for traveling Mexican farm workers. 
There are few doctors or dentists who will treat us. 
Like hunted animals we felt, not legally in that country. 
Even the wages were so uncertain, some good, some bad. 
Americanos are rich and successful, 
but to Mexicans they are hard and cold. 
Even Mexicans who are now Americanos 
say that wages on the farms are lower because of us. 
If we did not need the money so terribly, 
I would not have stayed away trom you so long. 
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No, Carlos, I do not want to return to the Estados Unidos. 
With the money I have and what Juan has earned 
we can buy a second-hand tractor. 
Then we can make an irrigation ditch 
and work all our land and your grandfather's together, 
like Americanos in Texas, Colorado, and California. 
When you are bigger, you can drive·the tractor also. 
Would you like that? You will see, 
we will have a better life. 
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CHAPTER I 
PERSPECTIVE 
The migration of people is a vital part of the 
history of mankind. It is also an interesting part, 
for people take with them their racial characteristics, 
religion, technology, ideas, and language, which become 
modified and fused with other cultures in their new 
environment. Primitive man migrated to find food or to 
avoid glaciers. Later, man migrated in tribal fashion 
for security reasons. There is evidence that the North 
and South American Indians migrated originally from 
Eastern Asia. Large scale migrations of Germanic races 
in Europe began in the fourth century, A.D. Mongol 
hordes ravaged Eastern Europe in the thirteenth century. 
During the period 1500-1900 Europeans (Spanish, French, 
English, Irish, and German) migrated to the Western 
Hemisphere. During the nineteenth century Russia colo-
nized Siberia, and the United States settled a large 
area in the western part of North America. In the twen-
tieth century in Europe (1940-1944) the Nazis uprooted 
over thirty million people from their homes. After 1948 
many Jews migrated to Palestine. In the post-war period 
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(1945-1960) the industrialized countries enjoyed great 
prosperity, and many people migrated from rural to 
urban centers within these countries. Migrations have 
been economic, military, religious, and cultural. Many 
forces have contributed to making migrations succeed or 
fail. 
As important as the urge to migrate is in the 
history of mankind, there is one other force, more sig-
nificant, which has operated to limit migrations, and 
that is nationalism. Modern nationalism started with 
Hugh Capet in France in the tenth century. By the 
twentieth century, nationalistic feeling had become 
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the world's greatest driving force in international 
relations. Therefore, nationality, with all its rami-
fications, is the greatest controlling aspect in current 
immigration problems. 
Each country as a sovereign entity has constructed 
for itself a national image which is sacred and must be 
preserved. For the United States, this national racial 
image is English and North European. The preservation 
of this national entity and image is a natural right. 
Internationalism wisely gives the right-of-way to the 
idols of nationality. Yet, immigration cannot exist 
without toleration between nationalities. The bridge 
for this toleration is the possibility of assimilation 
of the migrant in the host country. 
Assimilation may fail, be superficial, or so 
complete as to erase the identity of the previous 
culture except for the persistence of family names. 
When assimilation fails or is superficial, the national 
image is not supported, and racial prejudice results. 
In the United States, especially during the twentieth 
century, racial prejudice has been particularly notice-
able against Negroes, Orientals, and Mexicans largely 
because of economic reasons, but also due to the failure 
of racial and cultural integration by such immigrants. 
Prejudice to a lesser extent was evident against Slavs, 
Jews, the Irish, Italians, and Greeks. The failure of 
these ethnic groups to assimilate completely and their 
retention of many Old World nationalistic traits caused 
sufficient prejudice for the United States government 
to place restrictions on immigration. 
The history of the control of immigration to the 
United States may be divided into four periods. The 
first was the colonial period extending from the time 
of settlement to 1783 when control was largely in the 
hands of England and the separate colonies. The second 
was a period of free immigration from 1783 to 1830. 
The third period, from 1830 to 1882, was one of state 
control, when the northern Atlantic states imposed the 
most restrictions. The fourth, an era of federal eon-
trol, began in 1882 with the exclusion of the Chinese 
{repealed in 1943 during World War II). In addition, 
certain classes were excluded, such as the insane, 
paupers, criminals, and convicts; and in 1885 contract 
laborers were prohibited. 
Contract workers who disembarked before 1885 
were considered permanent immigrants and were allowed 
to stay. These were the poor and poverty-stricken of 
Europe and Asia looking for the streets which they had 
heard were paved with gold. From these people arose 
the fantasy of "America, the melting-pot," as their 
children became absorbed in the life of their adopted 
country. Because of their gratitude, the now famous 
poem by Emma Lazarus written in 1886 appears on a 
tablet at the main entrance to the Statue of Liberty: 
Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me. 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door! 
Additional class restrictions followed. In 1891, 
4 
prostitutes, idiots, polygamists, and those with contagious 
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diseases were excluded. In 1919, a law requiring a 
literacy test was finally passed over President Wilson's 
veto. 
Prior to 1921, the United States founded her immi-
gration policy on the need for economic growth, and 
inexpensive labor from Europe and Asia was a necessity. 
Thereafter, political influence mounted in behalf of 
the Quota Act of 1921, and a frontier was closed in 
United States immigration history. The country was no 
longer a "haven for the homeless" as envisioned by Emma 
Lazarus. The 1921 restriction on numbers was extended 
in 1923 and 1924. In 1927 the United States limited 
the numbers of emigrants to be admitted from all countries 
to 150,000. 
The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 
incorporates the features of the preceding laws and the 
United States limits immigration to 150,000, fixing a 
quota based on the national origin of the population of 
the United States in 1920. In addition, no person who 
had been or was a communist or a member of certain listed 
organizations, could be admitted as an immigrant. 
In summary, the United States restricted, first, 
the social and economic classes, then the numbers, and, 
in 1952, the political classes that could enter. In the 
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post-war years exceptional provisions were made for war 
brides, displaced persons and adopted children under 
fourteen years of age. 
Since the seventeenth century, the new influx 
of immigrants to the United States has brought different 
contributions and different problems. During the period 
1820 to 1955 the United States admitted 40,413,120 per-
sons for permanent residence.l In addition to numbers, 
the economic, cultural, and political contributions of 
immigrants have been great.2 Therefore, any material 
change in the historical immigration pattern will affect 
so many phases of United States civilization that the 
subject is a continuing one. The administration of the 
immigration laws seriously concerns some racial and 
religious groups. Those limited by the law feel that 
there is prejudice against them tantamount to designating 
certain races as superior. 
This basic distinction giving preference to North 
Europeans prevailed in the United States and was reflected 
---· !Annual Re!ort of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 1955, tin ted ~atei Departmen~o~ustice, Washing-
ton, D. c:;-p. 45. 
2oscar Handlin, Immifiration as a Factor in American 
History (Englewood Cliffs,ew Jersey:- Prentic~Ha11, 
1959), Chapters 3, 5, and 6. 
in the Immigration and Naturalization Law of 1952, and 
was so fundamental that politicians gave lip service to 
liberalizing the law even though there was little hope 
of doing so. There was no inference that the racial 
distinctions would be permitted except in immigration 
law. In education, housing, civil rights, and job 
opportunity, the United States made great progress 
during the period 1930-1960 by eliminating internal 
discrimination against races. Protection of minority 
groups was recognized as the essence of democracy although 
the United States made distinctions as to race in its 
immigration laws and justified the action by a desire to 
preserve the national racial image. Yet, the semantic 
difficulty persisted. Distinction and preference was 
stated in the law. Discrimination was inferred. The 
accusation of "racial superiority" was the emotional 
argument against the immigration laws. 
There were many examples, during the last genera-
tion, outside the United States, of racial distinction, 
prejudice, and implied superiority of races all rooted 
in nationalistic prejudice and directed toward maintain-
ing a national image. Japan had nearly a million unwanted 
Koreans to whom she offered free passage back to Korea. 
Some even returned to Communist North Korea. England in 
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1962 placed restrictions on further immigration of 
Negroes from her own colonies in the West Indies. Jews 
are not particularly welcome as immigrants in Australia. 
South Africa has its apartheid policy. Israel and the 
Arab countries have their differences. China has had a 
long standing xenophobia. By 1960 it appeared that 
after ten centuries the struggle to maintain a national 
image was still a basic drive in world affairs. 
Mexican immigrants admitted to the United States 
during the period 1930-1960 were buffeted by the same 
economic, political, and racial problems of all immi-
grants and to a greater extent than most others, whether 
for temporary or permanent residence. The "wetback" and 
bracero were poor, uneducated farm laborers from Mexico 
who were looking for steady employment. They often 
could not fully appreciate the pressures operating 
against them and were very sensitive to the prejudice 
they encountered in the United States. The growers in 
the United States often took advantage of the "wetbacks" 
and braceros and resented the restrictions and controls 
imposed by the government. They wanted laborers at the 
lowest price possible and showed little sympathy for the 
personal welfare of Mexican workers. "Wetbacks" and 
braceros displaced some indigenous farm labor, United 
States citizens of Mexican descent. Resentment followed. 
Labor unions in the United States have always been 
opposed to "wetbacks" and braceros arguing that the 
presence of such foreign labor lowers the prevailing 
wage. The Mexican government was primarily interested 
in protecting her nationals from abuses. 
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The United States government faced the dilemma 
of maintaining good relations with Mexico and providing 
Mexican workers for producers. Setting a minimum wage 
and forbidding braceros to operate farm machinery, such 
as tractors, presented difficult problems. 
With this perspective now follows, as a case 
study of United States immigration policy, the tortuous 
road of the Mexican worker from "wetback" to bracero, 
from illegality to respectability, from hostility to 
partial acceptance. His impact on United States immi-
gration policy rightfully begins in the small Mexican 
village on the central plateau of Norther Mexico. This 
migration was a primitive one by unarmed people who had 
no intent to claim land for themselves, no ideas to 
propagate, but wanted only to gain sustenance and return 
home. They proceeded with no organized leadership. The 
generally unpromising future faced by farm laborers in 
Mexico was the impetus of the "wetback"-bracero migration 
for the United States. 
CHAPTER II 
CONDITIONS IN MEXICAN AGRICULTURE (1930-1960) 
AFFECTING MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
Mexico's agricultural problems began with her 
modern history when Cortez conquered the Aztecs in 1519. 
The Spaniards who came to New Spain were adventurers, 
not settlers. They came to exploit, not to construct. 
While other European countries were making the 
Renaissance a period of artistic flowering, a 
rebirth of interest in classic antiquity, Spain 
made of it a period of conquest and expansion, and 
the conquistador1 not a man of art, was her proud-est achievement. 
The Spaniards wanted gold, and after taking what wealth 
the Indians had accumulated, the encomienda system en• 
slaved the Indians for work in mines to produce more 
gold. Encomienda means trusteeship and refers to a 
social and economic arrangement from feudal times when 
peasants "commended themselves to a lord of a manor for 
protection in return for services." The encomienda was 
a feudal fief. The system perpetuated ownership and 
control in the hands of a few. The prevailing unit of 
agricultural economy during the nearly three hundred 
!John A. Crow, Mexico Today (New York: Harper 
Brothers, 1957), p. 44. 
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years of colonial rule was, therefore, the encomienda, 
which was a harsh and often extremely cruel system of 
Christianizing the Indians, subjecting them to the 
9 
crown, and rewarding the conquistadors.-
It was the customary procedure for the owners 
of the encomiendas to will some of their property to 
to the Church or grant the Church the use of land in 
perpetuity. The Mexican historian, Lucas Alaman, 
estimates that at the end of the colonial period the 
Church owned or controlled at least half of the real 
property and capital of Mexico.3 
Unfortunately for Mexico, the revolution for 
freedom from Spain started by Hidalgo in 1810 led to 
a political change but no real economic advantages for 
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the people. It is true that Hidalgo and Morelos, between 
1810 and 1815, fought to expel the governors of Spain, 
to abolish military and church privileges, and to restore 
the land to the Indiana. Yet, the first independent 
government, in 1821, with General Iturbide as president, 
only exchanged a new elite of creoles for the governors 
2william P. Tucker, The Mexican Government i§g?~ (Minneapolis: The Universi~or Minnesota Press, , 
P• 10. 
3 Crow, £2• ~., P• 49. 
from Spain. The Mexican governments between 1821 and 
1855 were largely military in character and did little 
for economic development. In 1836, Mexico, under 
General Santa Ana, lost Texas. In 1848, under the 
same leader, Mexico lost two-fifths of her total terri-
tory to the United States and some of her best farm 
land by signing the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
In 1855, Benito Juarez, a full-blooded Zapotec 
Indian from Oaxaca, became Minister of Justice in the 
Alvarez administration. Laws aimed at curbing the 
Church and distributing land to poor Mexicans brought 
on the War of Reform (1858-1861). Juarez led the 
liberals and in 1861 became the first civilian ruler. 
The conservatives, Maximilian, and irresponsible con-
gressional opposition all tended to defeat the Juarez 
reforms. Juarez died in 1871. 
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Four years of ineffective rule by Lerdo and the 
dictatorship of Diaz brought the history of M&xico to 
the next liberal revolt, the revolution of 1910. Madero 
organized a revolt in September after the Congress de-
clared Diaz re-elected. Zapata, a peasant leader, gave 
an agrarian flavor to the revolt. In October bU a 
really free election, Madero was elected president. He, 
too, failed to institute a program of economic and 
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agrarian reform. His liberal platform was political. 
The radicals and the reactionaries destroyed his pro-
gram. Huerta revolted and replaced Madero by treachery. 
There was much strife until 1917. Carranza, in 1915, 
issued decrees for agrarian reform, ordered Indian 
village lands restored, promised to enforce restrictive 
laws against the Church, and to give full political and 
civil rights. 4 Carranza was sincere, yet conservative 
in pursuing the aims of the revolution. 
Carranza called a constitutional convention which 
met during 1916-1917. Two provisions, more liberal than 
Carranza wanted, were included in the constitution which 
retained the liberal and democratic provisions of the 
Constitution of 1857. Article 27, the enabling act for 
the ejido program, defined real property rights, pro-
vided for return of alienated land to peasants, and 
asserted national ownership of the subsoil (which would 
deny mineral rights to foreigners). Article 123 gave 
much protection to labor by providing for an eight hour 
day, a minimum wage, abolishing peonage and child labor, 
workmen's compensation, and the right to organize and 
strike. Traces of Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Marx were 
in this constitution. Carranza proceeded very slowly in 
4Alberto Morales Jimenez, Historia de la Revolucion 
Mexicana (1951), pp. 143-145. ----
transferring land to the peasants and recognized none 
of the rights granted to labor. 
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From 1920 to 1932 Mexico regressed politically 
from relative liberalism to reaction. Obregon, in 1920, 
gave the revolutionary movement its first big push, but 
without drastic excesses. He distributed land, encour-
aged labor, and promoted education. Obregon's successor, 
Calles, continued the program, but also proceeded against 
the Church. Portes Gil (1928-1930) and Ortiz Rubio 
(1930-1932), who succeeded Calles, were controlled by 
"the boss." Calles became reactionary and the revolution 
came to a temporary halt. Calles organized the National 
Revolutionary Party (P. N. R.) which was the official 
party of the revolution. Other parties were not recog-
nized. During the next two years (1932-1934) Rodriguez 
revived the land, labor, and educational program of the 
revolution. 
In 1934, Lazaro Cardenas became president. He 
pushed the revolution forward vigorously, somewhat to 
the dismay of Calles. In 1940, intending to placate 
the semi-fascist, pro-Church Sinarquistas, Avila Camacho 
pursued a very moderate course toward reform.5 In 1946, 
5Mario Gill, Sinarquismo - su origin, su essencia, 
au mission (Mexico City: 1944), p:-67. 
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Miguel Aleman, Mexico's first really non-military presi-
dent, emphasized industrialization. Agriculture was not 
neglected, however, as Aleman encouraged irrigation pro-
jects and technical education. In 1952, Ruiz Continez 
tried to bring more morality to government and balance 
the programs of agricultural reform and industrializa-
tion.6 Therefore, during the period covered by this 
thesis, 1930-1960, except for the administration or 
Lazaro Cardenas, comparatively little has been done, 
consistently, and on a large scale, to bring the agra-
rian features of the revolution into reality. Much of 
the revolution, as far as land reform, labor practice, 
and educational facilities, remained unrealized. In 
1960, haciendas still controlled one-half the arable 
land of Mexico. Consequently, the political and econo-
mic failures of the revolution caused the peasants to 
become discouraged and many sought work in the United 
States after 1940. 
The topography of Mexico has not been kind to the 
peasants either. Mexico is mountainous, the land is poor, 
there are few rivers for irrigation, and there is insuf-
ficient rainfall in the northern portion of the country. 
6 Tucker, 2£• cit., pp. 15-22, 277-281. 
Only one-third of the land area is level, and much of 
this land is situated at comparatively high altitudes 
or plateaus or in the unproductive Yucatan basin.7 
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The central plateau of Northern Mexico can be used only 
for grazing or irrigated farms. The escarpments on the 
east and west of the plateau prevent easy transportation 
routes from east to west. The high level of the plateaus 
and mountains actual]Tgives Mexico a much cooler climate 
in summer than her tropical position on the map indicates. 
The mountains and plateaus also cause the rural part of 
Mexico to be isolated. 
The actual useful acreage of Mexico (1956) was 
as follows:8 
Mexico's total area 
Arable land (total) 
Actually harvested (1956) 
fasture lands (57% hilly) 
Forests (including tropical rain 
forests) 
Desert, unusable mountains, eroded 
494,000,000 
58,000,000 
22,000,000 
135,000,000 
90,000,000 
211,000,000 
Therefore, without considerable capital investment, Mexico 
cannot farm the plateaus, the deserts, nor the tropical 
rain forests. Her agricultural outlook is poor. 
----------------
7Nathan L. Whetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 108-123. 
Bcrow, 2£• cit., P• 315. 
The people of Mexico are also a part of the 
agrarian problem of that nation. Today the rural 
population is mostly Indian, and Indians comprise a 
majority of the total population. In contrast to 
Cuba and other West Indies islands, the Indians in 
Mexico survived the encomienda. Negro slaves, 1m-
ported in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
have mixed with the Indians, and there are few pure 
blooded Negroes in Mexico today. Negroes were freed 
by the War of Independence (1810-1821). 
In the colonial period there were sharp dis-
tinctions of race.9 Spaniards born in Spain were 
referred to as gachupines and were at the top of the 
social and economic ladders. "Creoles" were pure 
blooded Spaniards born in Mexico, but somewhat in-
ferior to the gachupines. Mestizos were those of 
mixed blood of any category and occupied a social 
position between the Creoles and Indians. Negroes 
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rated below the Indians. To a large extent the racial 
pyramiding survived and is still a part of Mexican life. 
In early colonial times, Mexico probably had a 
population of about twenty-five million.lO In 1930, 
9Whetten, ~· ~., PP• 21-71. 
10Andres Molina Enriquez, La Revolution Afria de 
Mexico (5 vola., Mexico City: 1935-1937), Vol. , p.~o. 
Mexico had a population of sixteen million. In 1960, 
the population had doubled. Despite a very high birth 
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rate, Mexico's population grew slowly until very recently. 
Gemio gave the following reasons for the relatively slow 
population growth in Mexico: (1) high mortality from 
disease, poverty, and cultural backwardness, (2) large 
losses of population due to wars and revolutions, (3) 
emigration.11 Her population is now expanding at a 
much higher rate than her economy. In 1950, 58.4 per-
cent of the people were employed in agriculture, down 
from 71.6 percent in 1930. A majority of all agricul-
tural workers exist at the subsistence level. They live 
in shacks, without water or sewerage systems. It is 
this element of the population which is such a drag on 
the economic development of the country.l2 
The social displacement in Mexico which prompted 
the "wetback" invasion of the United States started with 
the village Indians in Mexico. Indians in Mexico live in 
almost self-sufficient groups in the hills and in iso-
lated areas. The displacement which took place after 
1935 was caused by the growing economic disparity between 
llManuel Gamio, Hacia Mexico Nuevo (Mexico City: 
1936), pp 54-55. 
12crow, £2• cit., pp. 306-313. 
the Indians and the mestizos. The Indians began to 
"come down from the hills," seek employment on the 
large haciendas, and do manual labor in the towns and 
cities. While the Indians' economic status improved, 
compared to what it had been, the mestizos were dis-
placed in many unskilled, hard labor jobs. 
Two current books by Oscar Lewis tell the story 
of poverty and hardship experienced by Indians who left 
their villages to find a living in Mexico City. The 
books are: ~ Families, Mexican Studies in the 
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Culture of Poverty, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959) 
and a "best seller," The Children Ef Sanchez (New York: 
Random House, 1961). 
The mestizos, who were farm tenants and already 
at the lower end of the economic scale in Mexico, found 
that even though they had been displaced in their own 
country, their salvation lay in their ability to buy 
farms, work them as owners, and use Indian labor them-
selves, if they could. But the mestizos as tenants did 
not have the money nor the training for such an enter-
prise. Therefore, they looked to the United States and 
the rich farms of the Southwest as a source of ready 
capital for the investment they wanted to make in Mexico. 
The social as well as the economic position of 
the mestizos in Mexico has had much to do with their 
willingness to emigrate, to cause the "wetback" flood 
of migrants during 1944-1952 to the United States, and 
to form the major part of the bracero program of 1960. 
The mestizos,~proud men, have considered themselves 
above the Indians. Indians have anways held their own 
in the mountains, where they have isolated themselves. 
The mestizos have dominated the small farming districts 
of Mexico and especially the states of San Luis Potosi, 
Guanajuato, and Zacatecas. Yet, the mestizos have 
lacked the Indians' sense of' "permanence, security, and 
cultural integrity.nl3 The mestizos, therefore, in 
Mexican agriculture, have remained sharecroppers and 
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plantation laborers. The Indians, who are not assimi-
lated in Mexico, have constantly displaced many mestizos 
on plantations, and this process has caused even greater 
racial conflict and segregation.l4 
While there are modern cities in Mexico, it is 
the rura·l village which predominates in Mexico's agrarian 
13Frank Tannenbaum, Peace ~ Revolution (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. l3-l8. 
14Ibid., PP• 13-29. 
history. Prior to 1910, the encomienda, and after 
independence, the hacienda, devoured village lands and 
reduced the peasants to serfdom. Even whole villages 
were incorporated into haciendas. The ejido program 
(discussed later in this chapter) had as one of its 
goals the restoration of village lands to raise the 
standards of living in the towns. 
The "wetbacks" and braceros emigrated from small 
villages in Northern and Central Mexico. While com-
fortable in some respects, village life in Mexico, by 
United States standards, was dismally poor. The impact 
of the more opulent country at their northern border 
upon Mexican migrant agricultural workers can best be 
understood by a glimpse of typical village life in 
Mexico, the conditions and experiences which these 
workers left behind as they struggled to enter the United 
States. 
In 1955, Huepac, located in north central Sonora, 
wastypical of many small villages and towns dependent 
upon agriculture. All three nundred and fifty families 
lived in adobe houses with flat tops. Nearly all had 
small corrals in the rear. It was common to see peppers 
and tobacco drying in bunches on the house walls. The 
principal crops were wheat, corn, and melons. 
In 1931, when depression paralyzed the United States 
and the copper mines in Northern Mexico closed, the 
original inhabitants returned in such numbers that the 
population rose to thirteen hundred. 
In 1928, floods ruined much of the land near 
Huepac. Two crops a year, with no rotation or use of 
fertilizers, caused a serious depletion of the land. 
The yields per acre were only a fraction of those in 
the United States. In the area surrounding Huepac, 
the average yield was twenty-six bushels of wheat and 
fifteen bushels of corn per acre. (While the wheat 
production compares favorably with that of the United 
States, the corn production is only one-third of the 
United States' average.) In 1935, Huepac had no paved 
streets, all houses were open, and there were no zoning 
laws. The main export was cattle. The chief imports 
were gasoline and old automobiles. Economically, the 
village was largely self-supporting.l5 
The economic situation in Huepac, repeated hun-
dreds of times in Northern and Central Mexico, created 
22 
15L. Hewes, 11 Huepac - An Agricultural Village of 
Sonora, Mexico," Economic Geography (July, 1935), 11: 
284-287. See also Richard H. Hancock, The Role of the 
Bracero in the Economic and CUltural ~-a:Mics-of~ei!Co, 
A Case StUdy of Chihuahua:- Hispanic erican ~ciety, 
Stanford, California, 1959. 
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the basis and impetus for the temporary migration or 
Mexicans to the United States during the next two decades. 
The people yearned to invest in their own villages and to 
improve their status. To them the only answer lay in 
obtaining sufficient capital, and with this ambition they 
left their homes to become migrants to the United States. 
The customs, culture, and emotions of the villagers 
of Hidalgo have been charmingly and understandingly 
depicted in short stories by Josephina Niggli. One inci-
dent concerns wedding shoes. The young groom commissions 
the priest to purchase them in the next town, specifying 
the smallest size. When the bride discovers that her feet 
cannot squeeze into the shoes, she is ready to call off the 
wedding, and the groom will have to return the gift he has 
received--a goat. The situation is desperate, but she is 
finally persuaded to wear the soft shoes on her hands as 
gloves instead of carrying a bouquetll6 Other anecdotes 
show the closely knit lives of these simple people and the 
subtile reasons for their intense loyalty to their homes 
even though their living conditions may be far from ideal 
in material ways. 
lSJosephina Niggli, Un Pueblo Mexicano (New York: 
w. w. Norton& Company, 194~ pp. 47-~1. Note: A paperback 
in Spanish presenting selections from Mexican Village, trans• 
lated and edited by Justina Ruiz-de-Conde, Wellesley College, 
from the original English. See also, Josephina Niggli, Mexi-
can Villaje, (Chapel Hill, The University Press of North----
Carolinaress, copyright, 1945, printed by Van Rees, New 
York) 
A picture of village life, written in 1950 by 
Frank Tannenbaum, a sympathetic but realistic observer 
of an extremely poor state in Mexico, indicates that 
poverty continued to pinch large numbers of Mexican 
peasants: 
The peasant of Chiapas does not spend for 
the purchase of manufactured products more than 
two or three pesos a year, of which only one is 
expended on foreign goods. He buys nothing from 
the national market. From the foreign manufac-
turer he gets his ax, machete and needles; from 
local trade he purchases his salt and occasional 
coffee, tobacco, firecrackers and candles. All 
the rest he produces or acquires by barter. Many 
other Mexican groups live at comparable levels of 
income. In many places they still burn down the 
forests, make holes in the ground with a pointed 
stick, and use a hoe for hilling up cornstalks. 
Many farmers have no plows and leave the land to 
rest for six or seven years t~7recoup its ferti-lity after one or more crops. 
Another realistic account of Mexicans at home 
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comes from the pen of American novelist, John Steinbeck, 
especially well-known for his portrayals of migrants in 
the United States. 18 His narrative takes place in the 
pueblo of "Santiago," a setting typical of Mexico in 
1941 and begins with the superstition and harmful prac-
tices surrounding childbirth. The art of healing is 
17Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico, the Stru,gle for Peace 
and Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950 , p. 176. 
18John Steinbeck, The Forgotten Village (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1941).---
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personified as a "wise woman" - curandera- who uses 
''herbology and magic." For a "fat prophecy" of a fine 
child she expects greater compensation than a skinny 
chicken. Suddenly many children of the village become 
ill. The village teacher, suspecting water contamina-
tion, goes to the distant city for help. A rural medi-
cal unit recommends vaccinations, but when these simple 
people learn that the vaccine is made from horses• blood, 
they react violently. The doctors from the medical unit 
are driven from the village as "poisoners of water." 
From this low point the teacher arises to encourage a 
young man to overcome his environment and continue his 
education in the city. Steinbeck emphasizes the back-
wardness and primitive ignorance of these rural people. 
He concludes that the pueblo desperately needs scientific 
knowledge, the only hope for improvement of their way of 
life. 
A very comprehensive study of an Indian village 
by Oscar Lewis in 1957 indicates the social, racial, eco-
nomic, and educational problems of Mexico.19 Tepoztlan 
19oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan 
Restudied (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 
1951). Note: The original study of this village was by 
Robert Redfield, Tepoztlan - a Mexican Village (Chicago: 
University Press, 1930Y. -
is in the state of Morelos, about sixty miles south 
of Mexico City. The 1940 population was 3,230. The 
town exports corn, charcoal, and plums to Mexico City 
and imports manufactured goods. 
Tepoztlan was an agricultural village. There 
were 267 families that held ejido land, of these, 109 
held some private land, also. Yet, there were 384 
families which owned no private or ejido land. There 
was a shortage of tillable soil. In the steep, rocky 
plots a hoe was the only means of tilling. In other 
areas oxen and a wooden or steel plow were used. There 
were no tractors in the town.20 
About ninety percent of the homes were adobe. 
A very few were the thatched roof type, while a like 
number were more modern showing Spanish influence. 
There was a modern school in the town, and the church 
and stores were of permanent construction. 
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Many of the village men worked for wages. Urban 
centers and haciendas provided employment, but wage levels 
had not kept up with prices. In 1944, wages per day for a 
peon were 3.00 to 3.50 pesos, or less than $1.50 per day.21 
ZOibid., pp. 129-135. 
2libid., P• 112 and 135. 
Many customs and beliefs from primitve times, 
still in practice today, were perpetuating superstition 
and holding back progress. Girls did not attend school 
after puberty. Courtship and marriage were controlled 
by custom. Remedies for illness during pregnancy and 
childbirth indicated the extensive lack of scientific 
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education. For instance, to treat miscarriage the 
midwife would soak an old tortilla in vinegar and place 
it on the patient's back. In normal cases of childbirth, 
the afterbirth was buried under the hearth. The Indians 
believed that if it were left elsewhere, the baby's face 
would swell; if it were eaten by a dog, the mother would 
die. 22 
Tepoztlan was a representative Indian town in 
Mexico, and hundreds more like it, some worse and some 
a little better, existed all over the nation.23 
Perhaps there are further explanations, not easily 
documented, which explain the vast difference between the 
cultures on each side of the Rio Grande. In 1938, the 
writer was an enlisted man in the regular United States 
Army. On an extended maneuver problem to test the use 
22Ibid., 359. 
23Miguel Covarrubia, Mexico South, the Isthmus of 
Tehauntepec (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 342:-
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of trucks in semi-tropical conditions, his regiment 
traversed the three hundred miles between Del Rio and 
Brownsville, Texas. The trip was memorable because of 
the extremely evident contrast between the two countries 
divided only by a natural boundary. On the northern 
side were paved roads, irrigated farms, good homes, and 
modern cities. On the other, were adobe huts, little 
plots with scanty growth, burros munching hay, dirty 
little villages and poorly clad children. The contrast 
was astounding. 
Such differences may be quaint and fascinating 
to tourists or scientifically significant to anthro-
pologists and sociologists, but judged by the standards 
of North American states, life is still dull, poverty-
stricken, static, and a breeding ground for superstition 
and possible revolution. Whatever hold superstition may 
have on the Mexican mind, it has little organized force. 
On the other hand, re~olution, especially in the twen-
tieth century, means to the peasants land reform. 
Reform in land tenure has received wide attention 
in Mexico during the past thirty-five years. Many large 
estates have been broken up for use by villagers on a 
communal basis under the ejido program. Great hope was 
placed in the program. Since 1920, it appeared to be 
the only way to solve Mexico's agrarian problems. The 
ejido policy attempted social andeconomic changes, 
fought for in the revolution. The hacienda,which was 
the Mexican name for large areas of land held by one 
individual owner or by church organizations, was a 
feudalistic institution which bound a sharecropper to 
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work two days a week on the plantation for two hectares 
of farmland for himself. Article 27 of the Constitution 
of 1917 aimed at giving land to farmers by communal 
village ownership, which would destroy the large hold-
ings under foreign influence and also curb the political 
and economic power of the Roman Catholic Church.24 
The ejido program intended to take land from 
large owners, compensate them for the land, and transfer 
title to a village executive committee. Small plots of 
tillable land would be assigned to individual farmers, 
while large areas of pasture would be held in common by 
the village. Especially during the 1930's, when there 
was a world wide depression, villagers expressed great 
enthusiasm for the program. 
Eyler N. Simpson wrote a large and comprehensive 
volume on the ejido in 1937. This book is the standard 
24Tannenbaum, Mexico, the struggle for Peace and 
Bread, £2• ~., pp. 144-146.---
authority, widely quoted. The title of the book was 
more optimistic than the contents. For instance, 
during 1931-1933 the Bank of Agricultural Credit 
could not obtain sufficient funds from the government 
to aid the ejidos. The bank did not get funds from 
irrigation projects nor appropriations for "education 
and organization work--all were quietly forgotton." 25 
Simpson knew that the success of the program depended 
on vast sums for education, research, fertilizer, 
seed, and an inspection program without graft and 
politics. This was asking too much. 
Yet, the accomplishments of the program have 
been substantial, considering the conservative oppo-
sition to the program. Nearly 100 million acres of 
all types of land had been distributed from 1917 to 
1957.26 However, there still exist in Mexico over a 
million rural workers who are eligible for ejido land, 
and remain landless. 
The promises of the revolution have not reached 
the farm workers. Farming technique is antiquated and 
25Eyler N. Simpson, The ~jido: Mexico's Way Out 
(Chapel Hill: The University o North Carolina Press;-
1937). 
26crow, ~· £!!•, P• 315. 
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income has not kept pace with prices. In 1929, the 
average annual income in Mexico was 123.00 pesos. In 
1940, the average annual income was 340.00 pesos, but 
the purchasing power of the peso had declined seventy-
~ 
seven percent since 1930. Even in 1950, agricultural 
workers averaged only one-sixth of the amount paid non-
agricultural workers. The ejido failed to raise the 
living standard of the Mexican farmer. 
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The reasons for the failure of the ejido are many. 
First, a change in land ownership alone did not increase 
production. Second, the Indians and mestizos who should 
have benefited from the program had neither the training 
nor the capital to farm successfully in the manner en-
visioned by the authors of the plan. Third, pressures 
from many sources prevented wide application of the ejido 
law and many haciendas with large acreage remain in Mexico. 
The hacienda has resisted dismemberment. If 
the large landowners had been willing and ready, 
voluntarily, to break up their own plantations, 
conditions in Mexico would have made it difficult. 
There was no one to fill the gap between the 
haciendado and the peon, who had no tools, no 
credit, and no personal ambition.28 
2?Tannenbaum, Mexico, The Struggle for Peace and 
Bread, £2• cit., pp. l74-l75.---
28Tannenbaum, Peace~ Revolution, ££• cit., p. 218. 
A Mexican critic pointed out the imbalance of 
farm land to pasture land. Ejidetarios were not given 
sufficient pasture land in most cases to make their 
holdings sufficient for livestock farming.29 
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Aside from the larger considerations, a specific 
look at the land will give a more vivid picture of Maxi-
co's agronomic position. The agricultural potential of 
Mexico has been deteriorating for centuries. Forests 
have been cut down and not replanted. Erosion was wide-
spread and contour plowing rare. Acreage yields in the 
production of corn and other crops were far below that 
of the United States and Canada. For example, Canada, 
prior to 1960, averaged 3?.4 bushels of corn per acre, 
Mexico, only ?.s.50 Other studies indicate that Mexico 
cannot add arable land to keep pace with her food re-
quirements. The land that is added is of poorer quality 
which reduces the average annual yield of basic crops. 
The Malthusian theory is not completely obsolete. Al-
though Mexico is predominantly agricultural, foodstuffs 
of animal origin such as lard, eggs, and dairy products 
29:Marco Antonio Duran, "Del Agarismo a la Revolu-
cion Agricola," Problemas Economico-Agricolas de Mexico, 
II (October-December, 1946), pp. 3-ss. 
SOFrank Tannenbaum, Mexico, The Struggle for Peace 
and Bread, .2£. cit., .E.. 183. 
are imported. The huge requirements o~ rural credit, 
research, and general agricultural education persisted 
during the period 1930-1960, although a real start was 
made for improvement in all these areas.31 
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After 1940, Mexico started a concerted drive for 
industrialization. The effectiveness of this program is 
tied to all the geopolitical realities of Mexican life. 
The industrial revolution in Mexico has not aided 
the basic agrarian situation. Conversely, shortages in 
raw materials are largely agricultural, such as wool and 
hard fibers, which are drawbacks to the industrial 
program. Other raw material shortages indicated by the 
Minister o~ National Economy in 1946 involved the follow-
ing industries: clothing, flour milling, vegetable oils, 
and paper.32 It appeared that even though the emphasis 
shifted from agriculture to industry in 1940, plainly the 
deficiencies of agriculture, especially as a potential 
domestic market for manufactured goods, limit the poten-
tial of industrialization.33 In this respect, Mexico is 
an exception to the general rule that an expanding popu-
lation means expanding markets for manufactured goods. 
31Ibid., P• 22s. 
32santord A. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University or California Press, 
1950), P• 304. 
33Ibid., P• 116. 
The lack of roads is the main drawback to in-
creasing the rural markets. \Vhen 2,500 villages can 
be reached only by burro and foot paths, no local 
market is possible. This condition improved somewhat 
by 1960, but the basic patternprevailed. 
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Mosk recommended a large scale program of build-
ing secondary roads, more hydroelectric plants for basic 
industry, greater selectivity in promoting industrial 
development, and urged that the government face the 
question of allowing the rest of the economy, particularly 
agriculture, to develop sufficiently first, so that the 
present rate of industrial development can be supported 
by other segments of the economy. It is almost axiomatic 
that in all continental countries an economy that is 
strong has a firm agricultural base. 
Another study revealed serious social deadweights 
to Mexican industrialization.34 The available labor 
supply is unskilled, and the educational level is low. 
The transition from village life to industrial life has 
great barriers. The Mexican villager will work in a 
factory only if it is a necessity; he will not seek this 
34Wilbert E. Moore, Industrt and 
Aspects of Economic Develolment (I haca 
Cornell university Press, 951), PP• 5, 
Labor, Social 
and New York: 
272-276, 308. 
type of work. With poverty and no skills, the result 
is low wages, low productivity. Mexican workers in 
industry gave evidence of high absenteeism and high 
turnover rates. Clearly, the farm village worker 
preferred agricultural employment. 
It is difficult to summarize the agrarian prob-
lem in Mexico. Plainly, all her problems are not agri-
cultural, but these are basic to all the others. The 
economy lags behind the birth rate, particularly in 
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farming villages. Mexico's problems are historical or 
traditional, geographical, racial, economic, and educa-
tional. The government has struggled with these problems 
during the past two generations. In relating the progress, 
Mexican authorities are very optimistic and point to 
percentage increases. The United States scholars are 
divided. Tannenbaum and Whetten are realistic and pessi-
mistic. They point out that half the people go bare-
footed, live in shacks, and do not have clean drinking 
water. Crow is encouraged by the progress made and cites 
the new roads, schools, and resourcefulness of the Mexicans. 
He closes his book with the sentence: "No one can doubt 
for a moment that Mexico today stands on the threshold 
of a magnificent achievement." One can only hope it is 
prophetic. 
The lack of economic opportunity in Mexican 
agriculture, and the increasingly difficult position 
of the mestizos were sufficient cause for almost a 
million workers to migrate to the United States and 
return each year from 1943 to 1954. The rapid expan-
sion of business in the United States contrasted 
sharply with the negative conditions in Mexico, and 
attracted a heavy migration. Mexicans intended to 
migrate temporarily, earn enough money to reurn to 
Mexico and invest in agriculture--thus improving their 
status from day laborers or tenant farmers to indepen-
dent farmers. Few migrants had any real desire to 
leave their homeland permanently. After arrival in 
the United States, they found large colonies of Mexi-
cans in the southwestern states, and some decided to 
stay indefinitely. More than ninety percent of the 
migrants did return to Mexico neverthless, as soon as 
they had earned two or three hundred dollars above 
living expenses. 
In Mexico the forces opposing emigration of 
Mexican workers to the United States, namely, nation-
alism, pride, and xenophobia, have not proved strong 
enough to deter heavy migration. From 1940 to 1954 
even the opposition of the Mexican government to the 
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abusive use of its nationals in the United States 
could not check the rise in the rate of entry. 
Finally, the increasing volume of illegal migrants 
prompted the United States to close the frontier to 
illegal migrants in 1954 and to legitimize the cross-
border traffic by applying the bracero program. The 
federal government of Mexico, altering its attitude, 
has favored the limited bracero program since 1954. 
The Rio Grande continues to divide two widely 
different systems. On one side the Mexican system 
pushed out the more ambitious underprivileged farmers. 
On the other, the American system attracted them as 
migrant farm workers. Heavy traffic continued across 
the border. 
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CHAPTER III 
MEXICAN ACCEPTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Prior to 1920, the adjustment problems of Mexicans 
in the United States were not given much attention princi-
pally because their numbers were small. A century previ-
ous, in 1820, there were only 4,818 Mexicans in the 
United States, a number which presented no difficulty. 
In 1900, the count was 103,000; in 1910 ••• 222,000; 
in 1920 ••• 476,676. At this rate the resident Mexican 
population was doubling every ten years.l By 1948, over 
800,000 Mexican immigrants had been admitted legally, and 
there is no way of knowing how many entered illegally and 
have taken up permanent residence in the many Mexican 
colonies of the large cities.2 The continued growth of 
the Latin-American population in the last thirty years 
has been cause for some concern. The mounting complica-
tion was not unforseen, and it had often been declared 
lJeremiah W. Jenks and W. Jett Louch, The Immigra-
tion Problem (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1~), pp. 
~227. 
2The Immigration and Naturalization System of the 
United States, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary 
(washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 26. 
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that "Their numbers are increasing rapidly, and the 
Mexicans are destined to become a major immigration 
problem."3 
Traces of present day animosity between those 
of Mexican descent and the "Anglos" in the Southwestern 
part of the United States have their historical roots 
in incidents which occurred long before 1920. The 
Texas war with Mexico in 1836 was brief but extremely 
cruel. The history of the massacres at the Alamo and 
at Fannin, Texas, leaves a deep impression on every 
Texan school child. During the Mexican war of 1846-
1848, the United States took about two-fifths of the 
total territory of Mexico which now forms the United 
States Southwest. This acquisition is difficult for 
Mexicans to forget. 
In the present century, the period from 1908 
to 1925 was one of unrest in Mexico. Cattle stealing 
and murder were common on both sides of the Mexican-
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United States border. The 1916 occupation of Vera Cruz 
and the Pancho Villa expedition did not add to love and 
understanding between the two neighbors. United States 
immigration relations with Ireland or Italy, for instance, 
3Jenks and Louch, £2• cit., p. 22? 
have not been clouded with war and hostility extending 
over one hundred years as is the case with Mexico. 
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One critical article appearing in Foreign Affairs 
in 1929, presented arguments not unique except in the 
intensity of anti-Mexican attitude. The following is a 
brief summary of the article: The extent to which a 
peon stays in the United States is a bitterly contested 
subject argued by friends and foes of restriction. One 
argument against Mexican laborers is that if they were 
withdrawn, only the submarginal land which is not pro-
ductive would be withdrawn from cultivation. Sugar 
beet workers in Europe are white, and if low-paid Mexi-
cans were not available, white labor could do the work 
in the United States, if sufficient wages were offered. 
The argument continued on other fronts: Of all immi• 
grants, Mexicans are the most difficult to assimilate. 
Fewer learn English, become citizens, and adopt American 
ways than any other foreign group. They learn to assimi-
late American charity first. The author quoted Dr. s. 
J. Holms of the University of California, nationally 
known biologist and eugenist, who declared Mexicans 
below par physically and intellectually and placed them 
on a level with the American Indians. The article stated 
further that control of immigration was a domestic ques-
tion, and in restricting Mexicans it was not necessary 
to restrict Canadians. A country which considers immi-
grants as "mere ractors or production is laying up 
trouble for itself.n4 
In other aspects, Mexicans have a different 
attitude from Europeans with whom Americans have more 
in common. When Europeans come to American shores, 
they have made a "crossing" which acts as a psycholo-
gical severance with their homeland. They soon become 
absorbed in American lire. Mexicans, on the other 
hand, have a feeling of being "here rirst" as far as 
the Southwest is concerned. They never leave the "fan 
of Spanish influence." Since Mexico oneecontrolled 
these areas, Mexicans have never considered themselves 
immigrants in the borderline states. As long as Mexi-
cans stay near the large colonies of their own race 
which dot the cities of the Southwest from San Antonio 
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to Los Angeles, they feel more secure from the discri-
mination experienced in states away from the borderlands. 
Spanish influence in the United States Southwest 
is very obvious. One authority on Mexico insists that 
the current idealization of all things Mexican in Southern 
4GlennF.. Hoover, "Our Mexican Immigrants," Foreign 
Affairs, 8:99-107, October, 1929. 
California, with imitations of Spanish architecture 
and fiestas, is a fake. 
The fake is designed to secure the support 
of the ricos who remain and give a commercial-
ized Spanish coloring to the region. This 
coloring does not signify an appreciation of 
the immigrant but rather serves to rationalize 
his exploitation.s 
The real feeling between the races emerges in 
the prevalent name-calling. For many years in the 
Southwest all Hispanos have been "greasers" to the 
"Anglos'' and all "Anglos" have been gringos to the 
Hispanos. The word gringo was once believed to have 
originated with a song the Yankees sang in 1846 during 
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the invasion of Mexico entitled "Green Grow the Rushes, Ol" 
The origin is more likely to be a corruption of_grieso 
or "Greek" a nickname applied to all foreigners. The 
word gringo is not nearly as insulting as the word 
"greaser" as the "Anglos" intend it. Mexicans who 
return to their villages somewhat enriched from their 
work in the United States are called gringos by their 
envious neighbors. 
The origin of the sobriquet "greaser" is today 
even more obscure. The term probably came from occupations 
5Edward McDonagh, "Status Levels of Mexicans," 
Sociological and Social Research, 33:449•459, July, 1949. 
the Hispanos once had of greasing ox carts, working 
in the hide and tallow trades, or shearing sheep.6 
Today the word conveys the derogatory impression 
"Anglos" have of the personal appearance and food 
of the Hispanos. Verbal insults are only a symptom 
of the real antipathy with which Latin-Americans had 
to contend in the Southwest. 
Some attitudes and impressions about the United 
States held by Mexican immigrants and considered valid 
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today are listed in Gamio's book as personal interviews. 
Newly arrived immigrants and "wetbacks" make a wide 
distinction between themselves and residents of the 
United States of Mexican descent. A resident Mexican-
American is nicknamed a pocho and is generally considerd 
a "rough neck." Women do not like pochos and say they 
would rather marry gringos, but they really prefer native 
Mexicans.? One mother said her children did not learn 
anything in school except English, whereas in Mexico 
they would learn to read and to figure. Both men and 
women admitted that they sometimes wept when they heard 
Gearey McWilliams, Faccories in the Field, The 
Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California (Boston:-
Little-,-Brown and Company, l939j, p. ll5. 
1Manuel Gamio, The Mexican Immigrant, His Life 
~~ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,~l), 
~5. 
the Mexican National Hymn. One man said that only a 
traitor would become a citizen of the United States 
and that Obregon was a traitor to Mexico because as 
head of the country he was trying to Americanize it. 
Many Mexican immigrants believed that Mexico was back-
ward on account of Catholic fanaticism. 8 One man said 
he hated the gringos ror their ways and could not 
understand them. 
44 
Intellectuals gave a little less emotional picture 
of adjustment. One college graduate believed that the 
mutual hatred between Mexicans and Americans was due to 
a lack of culture on the part of each who did the hating. 
Emigrants to the United States did Mexico no good. They 
learned only what was bad. Few absorbed the good points 
of American life. An early study of Mexican history 
made most of them proud, and they did not want to be 
Americans or become Americanized.9 
A survey which attempted to determine why Mexican 
nationals did not seek American citizenship listed the 
8rbid., P· 174 
9 Ibid., P• 185 
following five as the most important:lO 
(l) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
Cost of securing the necessary documents. 
Difficulty of speaking in a foreign language. 
Inability to furnish adequate proof of legal 
entry into the United States and the possi-
bility of deportation once naturalization 
proceedings begin. 
A deep loyalty to a country only a few hun-
dred miles away. 
No tangible benefit from naturalization. 
Those who succeeded in becoming assimilated were 
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those whose color did not indicate that they were Mexican-
mestizo (Spanish-Indian). Those with chestnut hair, 
light brown or blue eyes and some education learned 
American ways easily and were accepted in some levels 
of American society. This group noticed the great lack 
of formality in American social and business relation-
ships and were often surprised at the superficial rude-
ness they encountered. They admired the cleanliness, 
ease of travel, movies, and the modern things in the 
United States.ll 
Large groups of Mexican-Americans in the South-
west did not necessarily make the transition from Mexico 
to the United States easy for newcomers. Indeed, they 
were both competitors for economic position, and rival-
ries and emotions accrued in each group based on personal 
loyalties. 
l~cDonagh, £2• cit., p. 452. 
llManuel Gamio, The Mexican Immigrant, His Life 
Story, .2£• cit., pp. 22~68. 
Group attitudes have become solidified since 
1920 as Mexicans have become a more important part of 
the seasonal labor required to produce crops in the 
Southwest. 
In a test of opinion among 1700 students at the 
University of Oklahoma, Mexicans rated lowest of nine 
ethnic groups.l2 The university students were asked 
to choose traits describing the nine races concerned 
from. a list of forty-five. Of those traits considered, 
the five most often chosen to describe Mexicans were: 
(1) Possess a low moral standard 
(2) Will steal 
(3) Are dirty 
(4) Help to keep wages low 
(5) Are spreaders of disease 
It is not particularly easy to find surveys pre-
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senting a favorable picture of Mexican migrants or at 
least presenting both sides of opinion. One such survey 
revealed in 1928 that people in the southern part of the 
United States are generally more friendly to Negroes 
than to Mexicans. The same general survey found that in 
California and Kansas Mexicans were for the most part 
liked as laborers and were described as docile, non-
aggressive, and not inclined ''to, invade a higher social 
status.nl3 
12McDonagh, ~· cit., pp.449-459. 
13Emory s. Bogardus, Immigration and Race Attitudes 
(Boston: D. c. Heath and Company, l928),-pp.~,~63, 195. 
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Mexican immigrants in the United States have been 
characterized as patient, hardworking, concerned with 
their immediate problem of existence, lacking ambition, 
and relatively lacking in sociability. 
Mexicans, themselves, have no race prejudice and 
there is little of it in Mexico, yet they exhibit a 
hostility to the gringos and are suspicious of all foreign 
races. They are especially jealous of successful indi-
viduals of their own race. From their own political 
leaders they have come to expect graft rather than unsell• 
ish service, and this experience colors their outlook in 
the United States where many of them have "contacted 
unrepresentative samples of Americans in the limited 
association parmi tted them." 
The background and personal characteristics 
of the Mexican entering the United States mark 
the emigrant as one who may easily be exploited 
in a different setting, but also one slowly es-
caping from his docility, ignorance, and passi-
vity. The emigrant is just what one would expect 
in the light of his present and historical back-
ground.l4 
Whatever the opinions are concerning the qualities 
of Mexican immigrants, they have a basis in fact drawn 
14nonald R. Taft and Richard Robbins, International 
Migrations - The Immigrant in the Modern World (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1955~p. 594. 
rrom personal experience or rrom publications. The 
notorious "zoot-suit" gangs or Los Angeles during 
World War II made interesting news, but behind the 
suits were second generation Latin-Americans seeking 
social recognition in ••gangs" since ordinary society 
had been denied them.15 
At present, Spanish is the most prevalent 
roreign language spoken in the United States, but the 
reason is not its beauty. It is the lack or assimi-
lation of Spanish-speaking peoples due to isolation, 
discrimination, lack or educational facilities, segre-
gation in schools, and migratory patterns or the people 
who come from Mexico and Puerto Rico. Statistics show 
that Mexicans have the lowest school attendance record 
of any of the major population groups. 16 
In 1954, when the government made its concerted 
drive to rid the United States or "wetbacks," the dif-
rerences in the crime rate of the Texas Valley region 
did not go unnoticed. In June, 1953, Hidalgo District 
Attorney, Joe R. Almia, stated: "Present rigures show 
eighty-five percent of the relonies committed in our 
15 McDonagh, £E• cit., p. 451. 
16 Ibid., p. 455. 
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county are by aliens." "Wetback" prostitution flour-
ished along the border towns until the 1954 cleanup. 
At East Donna, which had the reputation of being a 
lery "wide open" town, nine hundred "wetback" prosti-
tutes were arrested and deported in the months between 
June and October, 1954.17 
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In areas where these facts are known it will take 
more than a few years of a well-.anaged bracero program 
to place immigrant Mexicans in a socially accepted 
status. Group attitudes change slowly .• 
The personal and group prejudice toward Mexicans 
presented many incidents and cases of discrimination. 
Dentists sometimes would not take patients of Mexican 
descent because it might hurt their chances with "Anglo" 
clientele. Schools had their share of such occurrences. 
On October 15, 1943, the Mexican government formally 
protested to the United States concerning the segrega-
tion of children of Mexican descent in Texas schools. 
After 1942 and the advent of legal braceros, Mexico 
had a much firmer basis for protesting discrimination 
which was so evident in the United States. Acts of cruelty 
17nown in the Vallet' Texas State Federation of 
Labor, 4l~tt!e?Ield Bui ding, Austin, Texas (privately 
published), 1955, pp. l - 2. 
and denial of rights had been going on in the Southwest 
for a hundred years, but before World War II and the 
beginning of extensive agreements for importing legal 
labor, little heed was paid to such events, which, on 
occasion amounted to small riots. A change was evident 
in December, 1944, when some three hundred American 
Federation of Labor members went on strike at Huron, 
South Dakota, over employment of braceros. A storm 
of protest appeared in the Mexican press and the 
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Mexican Ambassador made a call on the State Department.l8 
In 1943, Roberto Medellin of the Mexican Ministry 
of Labor announced that due to the "number of cases of 
extreme, intolerable racial discrimination" no more 
braceros would be permitted to go to Texas. The ban 
had little effect except to increase the flow of "wet-
backs" who could be worked for almost any wage. The 
Mexican weekly Manana said, "The Nazis of Texas are not 
political partners of the Fuhrer of Germany, but indeed 
they are slaves to the same prejudices ••• nl9 
In a pastoral letter, Roman Catholic Archbishop 
Lucey of San Antonio denounced a Catholic Church which 
exhibited a sign reading: "No_!! admite a Mexicanos." 
18McWilliams, £2• cit., p. 270. 
l9Ibid., pp. 270,271. 
A number of cases can be found where Anglo-
Americans have been guilty of aggravated assault on, 
or murder of, persons of Mexican descent, and have 
been released on small bail or fine. 
Hart Stillwell, a popular Texas novelist, wrote 
in The Texas Spectator for October 11, 1946, in part: 
We can bring ten thousand Tipica Orchestras 
to Texas and send five thousand Rotary Clubs and 
Kiwanis Clubs and others into Mexico, yet so long 
as the Mexican knows that he may be killed with 
impunity by an American who chooses to ki~l him, 
then all our talk about being good neighbors is 
merely paying lip service to a friendship we both 
know is a joke.20 
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On the surface it seems a mystery~ that "wetbacks" 
ever came to Texas and the United States. They were not 
welcome except for their labor. They were often paid 
less than the prevailing wage. If they complained of 
any injustice, real or imagined, their employers could 
threaten to turn them over to the immigration authorities 
from which "wetbacks" had no recourse. Cases have come 
to light in which laborers were not even paid for their 
work, but were told to move on or be reported. On their 
return trip to Mexico, the 11 wetbacksl' almost fugitives, 
were often robbed, beaten, or murdered for their small 
20Ibid., P• 273. 
savings, although money orders were used by them 
extensively. In 1946, the Mexican government un-
covered evidence of an organized murder ring opera-
ting along the border and specializing in returning 
"wetbacks" carrying part of their year's earnings.21 
Indeed, with all the odds against them, "wet-
backs" were truly objects of pity. Yet, it was worth 
the risk to an unskilled worker to earn twenty to 
thirty-five cents an hour in the United States which 
was more than the wage of a highly skilled worker in 
Mexico. 
After 1945, hostility toward Mexicans concen-
trated on the "wetbacks." In 1946, the American Legion 
found it necessary to protest the hiring of Mexicans in 
the Lower Rio Grande Valley at less than the prevailing 
wage since returning veterans were being prevented from 
obtaining jobs. "Wetbacks" often worked for less than 
half the legal rate, a wage which caused the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations to raise their voices against the under-
mining of pay rates on railroad section gangs and in 
agriculture.22 A c. I. 0. organizer of a Texas citrus 
21col!~' 118:24-26, August 17, 1946. 
22Editorial, Fortune, 43:58, April, 1951 
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and vegetable workers' union had objected to the 
presence of "scabs"--"wetbacks." Mexican children 
from ten to seventeen years old had been found by 
the hundreds in the Rio Grande Valley working in 
what the Children's Bureau of the United States 
Department of Labor calls "industrial agriculture." 
Antagonism to the hiring of Mexican "wetbacks" 
also came from Mexican-Americans displaced by the flood 
of cheap labor. Many American citizens of Mexican 
descent were forced to travel to look for farm work 
when illegal entrants displaced them by being available 
for twenty-five cents an hour. 
A specific example of this displacement was Juan 
Garcia, a Mexican-American, born in Texas, a property-
owning, taxpaying citizen of Hidalgo County, Texas. He 
did not prefer to travel 1000 to 1500 miles a year to 
find work paying him only seventy or eighty cents an 
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hour if he were able to find that rate of pay in his own 
county. "Wetbacks" in the area had forced the "prevailing 
wage" down and the only reason that resident labor was 
not available was that the wages offered were so low. 23 
23What Price Wetbacks, American G. I. Forum of 
Texas, 3101Nille Building, Austin, Texas (privately pub-
lished), 1953, P• 55. 
Considering this case, it is not fair to brand 
Mexicans as "lazy" when they have been the foundation 
of agricultural progress in the Southwest and have done 
the very hard work in constructing and maintaining 
railroads. Anglo-Texans often justified their employ-
ment of "wet backs rt by using this word in ref'erence to 
Texans of Mexican descent. Moreover, resident Texas-
Mexicans who were migrants but not by their own choice, 
can hardly be classed as "lazy." In Texas alone, 
approximately 65,000 citizens were uprooted like Juan 
Garcia. This was a "displaced persons" problem within 
the territory of the United States which could have 
been negated by careful controls. 
The United States Mexicans who migrated because 
at home they had been replaced for a season by braceros 
caused additional labor displacement in the region to 
which they migrated. Therefore, the chain reaction 
implications of hiring "wetbacks" were serious. Hence 
the growth of hostility to the bracero program. 
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As a sequel to the booklet What Price Wetbacks, 
the Texas State Federation of Labor distributed a publi-
cation entitled Down in the Valley. "The valley" refers 
to the Lower Rio Grande valley in South Central Texas. 
This pamphlet, displaying obvious bias, describes the 
bracero program, as nothing more than "legalized 
wetbackism. tt24 
Economic studies on the effect of elimination 
of "wetbacks" since 1954 in this same region of Texas, 
have not been completed. In most regions which use a 
high percentage of local labor for harvesting cotton, 
retail sales increase. In 1955, some increase was 
noticed since "wetbacks" were not present to as great 
an extent, and braceros were not used extensively in 
the lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas. The Texas 
Federation of Labor maintained a hostile attitude 
toward the bracero program saying that braceros were 
not really paid the "prevailing wage'' in that the 
-availability of the cheap labor they provide sets the 
prevailing wage, or, to be more exact, that the Depart-
ment of Labor has set the rate of fifty cents per hour 
for braceros as the minimum and, therefore, a wage 
fixed in this way automatically becomes the "prevailing 
wage.n25 
The government at various levels noticed the 
personal and group attitudes which gave rise to the 
24nown !!! 2 Valley, £E.. cit., p. 56. 
25Ibid., PP• 1-6. 
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numerous indidents of actual discrimination. Govern-
mental efforts to eliminate this racial feeling met 
with little success. 
In 1943, Texas organized a Good Neighbor Com-
mission to hear complaints, foster good relations with 
Mexico and contribute to a better understanding of 
Latin-Americans in Texas. To many, the work of the 
commission wasnot entirely satisfactory, especially in 
one case where a verdict of "no discrimination" was 
reported. The remains of a war veteran, killed over-
seas, were returned to Three Rivers, Texas, for burial. 
A funeral parlor there refused service to this Latin-
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American. The Texas Legislature considered abolishing 
the Good Neighbor Commission but realized that this was 
not the proper solution. While this incident was filling 
the front pages, Governor Beauford Jester of Texas was 
entertaining the Governor of the State of Coahuila, 
Mexico, in observance of Pan-American Week. The "Three 
Rivers Affair" was quickly "smoothed over" by Senator 
Lyndon Johnson of Texas (later Vice President) who 
arranged for the burial of the Latin-American veteran 
in Arlington Cemetary, Virginia, with full military 
honors. The people of Three Rivers and the funeral 
director reconsidered, but the parents of the deceased 
26 
veteran decided on Arlington. 
26New Republic, 120:7, May 2, 1948. 
As late as 1946, there were numerous signs near 
towns in South Texas reading, "Mexicans, do not stop 
here." Sometimes a considerable number of trucks 
would stop to unload about fifteen Mexicans each, for 
rest, water, and personal relief. They found neither 
welcome nor assistance. During the next few years, 
however, Texas towns realized the economic asset of 
Mexican workers and built shelters and special areas 
for Mexicans just passing through. 
During the 1940's, Texas had nearly a million 
citizens of Latin-American origin, and during the 
summer and fall as many as 400,000 "wetbacks" could 
enter that state for brief periods. Many Mexicans 
gathered in South Texas for early specialized crops 
and migrated north to the Texas plains for late cotton 
and irrigated farm crops. As the magnitude of this 
migration within Texas and its economic necessity 
5'7 
began to be acknowledged by the average citizens, they 
became a little more willing to accept the presence of 
Mexicans and have expressed a little more understanding. 27 
One last area of discrimination still retained in 
Texas is the poll tax. The state levies a charge of 
27Lewis Nordyke, "Texas Cleans Up a Mess," Sa tur-
day Evening Post, 219:27, July 27, 1946. 
$3.75 per person annually for the privilege or voting. 
A Mexican orten foregoes this right and buys food or 
clothing for his children. 
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The affluence of the period, 1952-1960, did not 
encourage great assaults by Mexicans on the discrimina-
tory practices they felt. Indeed, there seemed to be an 
acknowledged truce during this period. The hostility, 
not rorgotten, was submerged. It even took on an attitude 
of humerous forbearance. A care sign in Laredo, Texas, 
which read, "Negroes, Mexicans, and dogs not allowed" was 
-
matched by one across the river in Mexico, "We serve any-
one here, even Texans." 
What is the hope or change in racial attitude to-
ward Mexicans in the Southwest? First, a controlled 
bracero program must be instigated which does not displace 
resident Mexicans. Then, Meaicans who are United States 
citizens can send their children to school. When their 
economic and cultural status rises, they may not be so 
segregated and colonized. They can then use their civil 
rights intelligently. Secondly, braceros trom Mexico 
should be conditioned prior to leaving Mexico and while in 
the United States to fulfill their role without friction. 
The United States tailed to perrorm its foreign relations 
duty to these visitors from "abroad." In race relations 
-
and civil rights, the democratic experiment in the United 
States has far to go. 
CHAPDR IV 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES FACED BY 
MEXICAN MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930·1960 
In addition to m&QT personal adjustment aitua-
tiona, the Mexican migrants in the 1930 1 & had to con• 
tend with an unprecedented depression in the United 
States. The effect on legal emigration was pronounced. 
Only 1~,9~3 were admitted for permanent residence in 
1930 as contrasted with 38,980 in 1929. More women and 
children were noted in the 1930 group as they sought to 
join the heads of their families in the United States. 
At the same time, the depression caused great 
numbers of Mexicans in the United States to return to 
Mexico. The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturali-
zation made this comment in his 1931 Annual Report: 
From numerous sources it has been reported 
that the departures of Mexicans to their own 
country in the past year, ot which we have no 
complete records, have reached large proportions. 
Communities in the Far West and Southwest have 
aided in this repatriation to relieve their 
charity burdens, but from many parts of the coun-
try Mexicans and their families have gone back 
because·of continued lack of employment in this 
country, the attraction of home ties, and the 
belief that they can providentially obtain asist-
ance from relatives or others.l 
lAnnual Retort of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 193 , Wainington, D. c., p.-o; 
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Conditions did not materially change in the years 
immediately following. In 1932, the total Mexican imm1· 
gration for permanent residence amounted to 2,058 which 
was the lowest ever noted, and the increased exodus of 
Mexicans from the United States continued until 1939. 
The situation during these years also provided 
strong arguments tor extending the quota system to Mexico. 
The proponents ot the quota system tor Mexico pointed 
out the problema of dependency, sickness and crime caused 
by Mexican immigrants, their low standard of living, 
competition with United States labor, their acceptance 
of lower standards of working conditions, migratory 
tendencies, and failure to assimilate American culture. 
Those opposed to any control were the railroad, lumber 
and mining interests, large ranches, and industrial farms. 
They also argued that any limitation would bring on inter• 
national repercussions and contended that demand tor 
Mexican labor would regulate the flow. 
The United States Department of Labor in 1928 saw 
a need tor restriction of immigration from all the Western 
Hemisphere nations on the same basis that immigrants from 
the Old World were restricted in 1921 and 1924.2 
2Maurice R. Davie, World Immigration - With Slecial 
Reference to the United States (Hew York: The McMil an 
Company, 1949~pp. 218-219. 
As a result of lessened pressure to enter the 
United States. the Border Patrol's operations along the 
Mexican border during the early 1930's were relatively 
quiet. The number or apprehensions or temporary 
migrants from 1932 to 1936 averaged only about 11.000 
per year. Yet. with the return of prosperity, the 
number climbed to 30o.ooo in 1949 in the same area. 
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The Commissioner said. "The difficulties of the border 
patrol become more acute with the improvement of economic 
conditions and increased opportunities in the United 
Statea."3 
By 1936, those Mexican nationals who had returned 
to Mexico voluntarily were now making efforts to re-enter 
the United States. The Border Patrol was under increased 
stress by state health and welfare groups to keep those 
not entitled to re-enter from returning to the United 
States.4 Apprehension of illegal immigrants continued 
at a relatively low rate through 1940. No real attempt 
was made to stop all the "wetback•" who were going to 
work on farms for short periods. At this time. too. no 
!Annual Report. Commissioner General for Immigra-
tiou and la\ura11zat!on, 1936, Department of Labor 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 97. 
4rbid., P• 97 • 
.......... 
attention was given to determining how many illegal 
entrants rrom Mexico stayed in the United States 
indefinitely. 
Work was available for the migrants, but at a 
very low rate. An interesting caae study or how some 
Mexicans managed to stay in the United States revealed 
that they lived in perpetual depression in all its 
aspects. The study, made by the Works Progress Admini-
stration in 1941, included three hundred Mexican fami-
lies in Cryatal City, Texas, a winter concentration 
point tor some Mexicans not returning to their native 
cities in Mexico. All three hundred families had 
entered from Mexico without documents. After working 
in the spinach fields during the winter, they continued 
a tew weeks in the onion fields. Moving northward, 
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they worked in the sugar beet area from Michigan to 
Montana, and then returned to Texas ror the cotton crop. 
This cycle took ten or eleven months ot the year. Even 
though the employment appears to be fairly regular, the 
income per family was small. Total income tor each 
individual of the family averaged $561.00 includiag cash 
and goods in kind. As low as this appears to be, it was 
twice the income ot the pecan shellers in the San Antonio, 
Texas, area during the same period. Despite their 
relative prosperity, the Crystal City families were 
actually in need at the year's end.5 
These migrations made it impossible for the 
children or the Mexican families to go to school. The 
average eighteen-year-old ot this gro~p had not co~­
pleted the third grade. The families, averaging 5.5 
persona, were not easi~y eligible ro: relief, since 
they were not citizens. Fortunately, their work 
extended over the entire year. Few other Mexican migrants 
could find sufficient winter work to tide them over. 
Toward the end ot the "ordeal ot the thirties" a 
new apeeter emerged to plague the M~xicans. Economists 
call it "technological displacement." To Mexican tara 
laborers it meant that fewer men and women were needed, 
aborter work periods existed in each place, and the 
patterns of migration tended to change. Although the 
fullaffect ot mechanization was y~t to be felt, it was 
more and more in evidence by 1940. After 1920, the 
harvest combine displaced many Mexicans in the wheat 
fields or North Texas and the Midwest. After 1930, new 
machinery and methods made great reductions in the amount 
ot Mexican labor needed in the cotton and sugar beet 
Sselden c. Menefee, MeXican Migratorz Workers of 
South Texas (Washington, D. c.: Works Progress Admlni= 
stration, nivis1on ot Research, 1941), PP• 14•15. 
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haryest.6 Technological innovations continued at an 
accelerated pace. The thinning of sugar beets and 
cotton, formerly requiring much hand labor with a hoe, 
could be done with rapidl7 moving machines. One cottoa 
picking machine replaced thirty people. Sor~ing equip-
ment further reduced the need for hand labor. 
Despite considerable progress in mechanization, 
it was evident that such equipment had not eradicated 
the need for Mexican labor, nor will it do so in the 
near future. 
Harvesting ot small vegetable crops, such as 
apinach, oniona, and carrots, was revolutionized by 
moving the produce sheda into the fields; but machinery 
was not yet capable of performing the small taska of 
inspecting, tying, and packing these and like items. 
Further.ore, machinery was almost as expensive as cheap 
hand labor. For example, the complicated equipment 
available tor harvesting sugar beets did the work in 
fewer man-hours, but the initial cash outlay and main-
tenance costs often added up to the equivalent of using 
inexpensive migrant labor.? 
6paul s. Taylor, "Migratory Farm Labor in-the 
United States," Monthly Labor Review, 44:531-549, March, 
193?. 
?Loring K. Macy, Cha~es in Tecbnolostcal and 
Labor Requirements in CloBi:roauction: SRgar-seets;-
Report N'o. A•l (PJiil&de p · a: liatlonal esearch ho-
ject, Works-progress Administration, 193?), P• 24. 
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Several new characteristics o£ the Mexican work-
ing force appeared in the late l930•a.8 Usually a resi-
dent, bi-lingual native of t~ United States whose 
parents had been born in Mexico, acted as foreman or "go-
between," an arrangement which racilitated the use of 
large groups of Mexicans in the United States. This 
practice led to considerable abuse, for the "go-between" 
was usuall7 an agent of a large farm or company, and 
the workers were subjected to frauds and racketeering. 
Understandably, they became restless when they found 
the~elves victims of exploitation, useful only tor 
perforaing work considered low or dirty by Americans. 
Depression and technologieal displacement helped to 
conYert normally docile laborers into unruly strikers. 
Organizers appeared among the Mexican laborers. 
Usuall7 the labor leaders were arrested by state authori-
ties and returned to Mexico by the Immigration SerYice. 
Because ot the depression and low wages, many strikes 
took place in mines, on ranches, and on industrialized 
rarms of the Southwest and California. These strikes 
were often put down in a cruel fashion with the active 
aid of the police. 
SMcWilliams, Factories !2 ~ Field, !2•-!!!•• 
PP• 18?-195. 
Not all aigranta turned to violence and strikes 
as solutions to the problema or personal exploitation 
in the decade of depression. Some Mexicans discovered 
the magic of "going on relief." Iot interested in be-
coming Americanized in other respects, these opportun-
istic Mexicans nevertheless sought the tree assistance 
nor.ally available only to legal residents. "Going on 
relief" enabled the cross-border commuter to stay in 
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the United States, weakened the earlier habit of annual 
repatriation, and made the laborer a public charge. In 
California, relief given to Mexicans actually deterred 
farmer• from obtaining the large scale use of casual 
labor to which taey were accustomed. The only way to 
refill the reservoir of harvest labor was to s·et the 
Mexicans off relief. Thia aeant repatri~tion to Mexico, 
an expensive procedure, but not as expe~sive as keepi~ 
thea on relief. One train-load from Los Angeles to Mexico 
cost $?? 1 000--an expedition which provided an es~imated 
saving of relief funds to the amount of $34?,468.9 
As strikes and "going on relief" availed the Mexi-
can no permanent improvement, it appeared that he had no 
choice but to accept whatever jobs were available on 
-911cWilliau, Factories in the Field, ~· ill•• 
P• 193. 
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farms and in basie industries. These jobs were_tempo-
rary_"dead end" eaploJment with no chance of advance-
ment. Carey McWilliams has applied_the term "bicultural 
accommodation to this modus vivendi. At the end of the 
1930's, it appeared that the arrangement would continue 
for a long time. 
For Mexicans in the United States the "depression" 
lasted until the war economy ot 1942 created unusual 
labor shortages. The war and post war periods presented 
special problems to these imadgrants. 
The period troa 1942 to 1954 was one of compounded 
contusion in Mexican 1madgrat1on, because the United 
States pursued several contradictory policies on migra-
tion from Mexico. First of all, non-quota immigration 
coatinued at an expanding rate. Secondly, the United 
States ~led to abide by agreements with Mexico, many 
times amended, pertaining to importation of legal labor 
or braceros. Thirdly, the Congress refused to place any 
penalty o~ an employer who hired illegal imudgranta or 
•wetbacka." Io real incentive or req~irement prompted 
American employers to use legal labor. Protection for 
braceros eatablished by agreements with Mexico, made the 
use ot legal labor impractical for small growers, but 
favored larger growers with more capital. The agreements, 
therefore. afforded no deterrent to "wetbacks." 
Thousands of Mexicans no less qualified than the 
braceros came over the border illegally. The situa-
tion was aggravated in part by the refusal of the 
United States to provide either adequate border patrol 
or a concerted program of control within its territory. 
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Even before the United States waa involved in 
the actual fighting of World War II on December?, 1941. 
it gave large-scale support to the Allies. President 
Roosevelt made his "arsenal of democracy" apeech in 
1940, and the first peacetime Selective Service Act 
waa passed ia that year. By 1941. the farms of the 
Southwest felt the shortages of labor drawn ott by the 
expanding factories and the enlarging armed services. 
The first understanding with Mexico involving the 
importation of labor waa announced in the United Statea 
as an Executive Agreement on August 4• 1942. Then, as 
in 191?. it was a temporary war measure to admit aliena 
tor brief periods to perform apecified work aa permitted 
by Proviso 9, Section 3• r .. igration Act of 191?. During 
the war and post-war years, agricultural workers came 
mostly from Mexico and, in much smaller groups. trom 
Canada and the British West Indies. In 1943, there were 
about 150.000 alien tara workers imported by contract. 
3?,000 of whom were Mexicans, admitted by that agree-
ment.lO The United States government experienced 
considerable difficulty ~n negoti~ting and administer-
ing treaties with Mexico. In Chapter VII these diffi· 
culties will be examinad more closely. Other countries 
which allowed their nationals to work in the United 
States tor similar periods did not insist on formal 
agreeaents. 
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Pest-warDrDSperity in the United States created 
even greater needs for Mexican labor which were not 
provided for in the agreements with Mexico. Thia 
inadequacy was revealed in 1949 when American employers 
contracted for only 35,000 workers, but the Commissioner 
ot Immigration and Naturalizatioa estimated that several 
times that number of "wetback•" were coming over the 
boundary for indefinite periods. A new arrangement was 
negotiated on August 1, 1949,in which both governaents 
consented to take all measures to suppress "radically" 
the illegal traffic in Mexican workers.ll 
10Annual ReSort of the Attorney General of the 
United-States, 194 (WaiEingtons GOvernment Printing 
Office, 194!}, ~5. Notes In 1941 the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service was transferred to the Justice 
Department and placed under the supervision of the 
Attorney General. 
llAnnual Relort of the IDlllli,ration and Naturali-
zation Service, 19 9, Department o Just1c~n: 
GOvernment PrlntYng;Office, 1949), P• 16. 
Nonetheless, the "wetback" problem grew trom 
. "' -' . .. 
year to year, and, in 1950, t~e Commissioner or Immi• 
gration and Naturalization reported: 
From Texas, California, and the cotton areas 
of Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee, west and 
north as far as Alaska, coae reports of Mexican 
aationals.in agricultural work who are here 
illegally. So great was the influx that almost 
500,000 depor~able aliens were apprehended by 
Border Patrol in 1950 and were granted voluntary 
departure in lieu of deportation--since immigra-
tion officer personnel was totally inadequate to 
hold deportation-proceedings in any but the most 
aggravated cases.l2 
The District Director of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service in San Antonio, Texas, saw the 
oaly solution to the "wetback" problem as additional 
legislation making it an offense to_hire an alien 
obviously in the country unlawfully. Also, in 1950, 
the District Director at Loa Angeles reported: 
The increasing number of our apprehensions 
demonstrates .the growth of the army of Mexicans 
who throng the towns on· the Mexican aide of the 
border--penniless, hungry and desperately anxious 
'10 
to obtain employment on this side ot the line to , 
obtain some money to send their ram111es in Me:xico.l3 
12Annuai Report of ~ Immigration ~ Naturaliza-
tion Service, 1950, Department of·Justice (Washington: 
Government Pr~nting orfice, 1950), P• 2. 
l 3Ibid., P• 3. 
A new approach to the riddle of the "wetbacks" 
in 1950 attempted to place those already in the United 
States under legal contract. In effect, 96 1 239 "wet-
backs" were legalized in this way in 1950 alone.l4 
Certainly this move did nothing to discourage the flow 
ot •wetbacks" but rather encouraged it. 
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Public Law '78 enacted on July 12, 1951, provided 
tor a aew program to establish reception centers near 
the border and to provide housing, subsistence, and 
transportation for legally contracted braceros in 
accordance with the Migrant Labor Agreement with Mexioe 
in 1951. This law was a real effort to discourage 
illegal migrants. Recruitment and management of the 
program were under the United States Department of Labor, 
and entry and departure procedures were under the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. In 1952, 219,0'74 
braceros, legally contracted laborers, were admitted from 
Mexice. The one remaining deficiency was in apprehending 
and deporting those Mexicans who were already in the 
United States without benefit of documents. 
By 1953, however, it was apparent that even this 
program or contracting tor Mexican workers was not a 
14Annual Report or the Commissioner of Immigration 
and Naturalization, 1951; Department ot·Justice (Washing-
tOri: Government bfiitliig Office, 1952), p. 25. 
success insofar as its impact on the continued mass 
inYasion ot illegal entrants from Mexico. Especially 
bothersome, the Commissioner of Immigration and 
Naturalization noted, was a change in attitude of the 
"wetbacks" themselYes: 
The report of the Border Patrol reflected 
an increasing belligerence-on the part of the 
Mexican aliens apprehended. This same attitude 
has made the job of security officers increas-
ingly difficult. The number of aliens who 
escaped from custody increased during the past 
year, particularly along the Mexican border. 
In ·one instance recently nine detainees went 
over an 11-tGot fence enclosing the Chula Vista 
Camp in accordance with a well thought out plan. 
In the past Mexicans have been a fairly docile 
group of individuals requiring only minimum· 
safe-guards and limited detention personnel. 
However, aggravated economic conditions in Mexico, 
plus tougher Border Patrol entorceaent during the 
past three years, have had a cumulative effect 
upon the Mexican illegal entrant, especially the 
teen•ager• He now frequently resanta apprehensien, 
detention, and efforts to deport him, is abusive 
and displays little respect tor authority. ·This 
situation which is general along the border, has 
compelled the Service to adopt stricter security 
measures in detention facilities.l5 
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Despite the stiffening surveillance of the Border Patrel, 
despite the swelling numbers of Mexican nationals legally 
admitted to the United States as temporary agricultural 
workers, despite the competition rrom other laborers 
admitted on a temporary basis from Canada, the British 
15Annual Retort, Commissioner of Immi~ation and 
Naturalization, 19 !, Department ot Justlceashlngton: 
Goverament Pr1nt!ni:Office, 1953), P• 46. 
West Indies, British Honduras, and British Guiana, the 
"wetbacks" surged across the border. Evidently, the 
desire of Mexicans to journey "stateside" increased 
after their compatriots had returned home to relate 
?3 
the wonders and economic attractions en~ountered during 
their brief stay.l6 The money and goods which they 
brought were proof enough to in~uce thousands of other 
villagers to take the same path. 
What preventive aeaaures could the United States 
enforce? Border Patrolmen watched more vigilantly. In 
1953, apprehensions of Mexicans exceeded 8?5,000. Of 
these, 30,000 were working in trade er industry at the 
tiae of their arrest. Many o~hers escaped arrest and 
went inland by freight traias. One officer's report 
included this incident: 
One night at YWaa, Arizona, local law enforcement 
officers joined with the Border Patrol to clear the 
railroad yards there of a group of illegal aliens 
who had missed outgoing trains. There were an esti-
mated fifteen hundred illegal aliena in the railroad 
yards at one time, at Yuma that night.l? 
During 1953, twelve light planes were assigned to 
border patrolling. Groups crossing late in the evening 
16Ibid., P• 31 • 
........... 
l?Ibid., P• 51. 
or early in the morning were spotted, and ott1cera 
informed by radio could proceed by horse or jeep to 
apprehend er deter the offending aliens. Air 11ft 
and train 11ft were used to transport Mexicans back 
to points in the interior o£ t~eir country near their 
homes but away from the border. Because of drought 
in 1953 and the preceding years, the lower Rio Grande 
near McAllen, Texas, was nearly empty of water. In 
this area alone 333,0'19 aliena were arrested. They 
were taken to a detention camp in McAllen and shipped 
by bus back to Mexioo.l8 
'14 
Despite its exertions, the Border Patrol could 
not establish "etteotive control" over the line between 
Mexico and the United States after 1949. ~he Commisaiaer 
of the Immigration Service admitted that the personnel 
uader his command could not prevent "all illegal cross-
1nga or the border at the international line. Nothing 
short ot an impassable barrier could do that.wl9 
Especially elusive and troublesome were the smugglers 
who loaded Mexicans into airplanes and darted across the 
border. Airplanes used more and more as efficient tools 
tor trafficking in aliens were difficult to police. 
18rb1d., PP• 51~52. 
19Annual Re~ort, Co~ssioner o£ Immigration ~ 
Naturalization, 1W9, .2,2• cit., P• 3s:-
Although the task of patrolling the border had 
~ -
always been difficult at best, it became very serious 
after 1949. Nevertheless, the Commissioner o£ the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service confidently 
predicted that his officers could keep the border 
effectively policed if the governments of the United 
States and Mexico would resolutely agree to permit 
traffic only in the case of temporary laborers under 
contract. In short, he contended that a bracero pro-
graa, properly administered, weuld eliminate •wetbacks" 
~ . 
trea the scene. He disagreed sharply with legislators 
and those in the executive branch of the government who 
telt that effective control could not be maintained 
regardless et the number of personnel and the amount of 
equipment. He proved his point in 1954, after the 
iDitiation ot •Operation Wetbaek~ when bis agency con• 
ducted a nation-wide roundu~ of Mexican aliens and 
returned aore than a million of th~a to Mexico. (See 
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P• 96.) The Mexican government supported the bracero 
pregraa and was glad to regain control over her nationala. 
At the same time, she benefited ~rom the foreign exchange 
. -
that the "wetbacka" brought home. There w~s, therefore, 
no disapproval of this forced repatriation.20 Undoubt-
edly, many who had entered illegally from Mexico did 
20Ibid., P• 37. 
manage to elude the law and continued to live aa permanent 
residents in the United States. 
~e substantial increase or Mexican population in 
the Southwest during the last twenty-five years, has 
been due in some degree to the success of illegal migrants 
in escaping detection. Especially noteworthy has been the 
concentration of Mexican stock in Texas. In 1930, the 
Latia•American population or Texas was 683,688, of whoa 
266,046 were born in Mexico. In 1949, a socio-economic 
survey made under a Rockefeller grant, ~laced the number 
at 1,121,639, baaed on a scholastic population count. 
The "Spanish-name" count, made subsequent to the 1950 
oensus, resulted in a figure of 1,028,?90. Authorities 
agree that these counts are probably too low.21 A 1955 
estimate placed the number of Latin-Americans in Texas 
at 1,500,000. The gain in Latin-American population has 
aeen more rapid than the increase of the state's popula-
22 tion as a whole. 
In summary, therefore, the political and economic 
realities finally overwhelmed the "wetback" and per-
mitted the bracero to perform h1a true role, freed of 
21Texaa Almanac and State Industrial Guide, 1956-
195?; Dallas Morning News Publication (Dallas, Texa~ 
~. Belo Corporation, 1955), p. 155. 
. . . 
22rbid., PP• 115·116. 
the competition ot •wetbacka.• While no attempt baa 
beea made to distinguish the problems ot the •wetback.• 
bracero, permanent resident. or citizen of Mexican 
descent, all met the same political and economic 
hazards. except that the latter two groups of Mexicans 
had no fear of being returned to Mexico. As the 
Mexicaa was viewed only as a source of ineXpensive 
labor, fine distinctions of 1-.dgration status were 
ot little importance to the Mexicans or Americans. 
CRAPDR V 
THE "WETBACK" ERA, 1942•1954 
Fer aaa7 yeara, neither the Border Patrel ner 
anyone elae paid .uch atten~ion ~o_a few Mexicans 
drifting across the boundary without torma~~t7 to work 
in the fields ot Southwestern United States. This 
apatbJ was apparent trom 1900 to 1940. A few Mexicans 
normally filtered in at what was considered a ~sual rate 
and returned to their hoses after the harvests. They 
did no harm. They were a real help ~o the farmers, and 
a few ex~ra pesos meant much to them. Then a change 
crept in. More Mexicans began to enter until the United 
States ~overnment could no longer_ignore the problem of 
numbers. After 1940, "wetbacks" came to the United 
States at an increase from 2~0,000 per year by 19431 to 
one million per year in 1950.2 Moat entered illegally 
of their own accord, but many did so with the open con-
nivance or their employers in the United States.z 
lThe Iamigration and Naturalization Systems ot the 
United stites, Report ot~e Committee on thi Judlc!iry--
(Waablngton: Government P~intins_ Office~ 1950), p. 149. 
~ditorial, Fortune, 4~:58, April, 1951. 
3wilbert E. Moore, "America's Mifration Treaties 
During World War riA" Thoraten S8llin, Reapp~aiaing OUr 
Immigration Policy, The Annals· of the ~riean Acade!l 
ot Political and Soci&r-Sclenee,-r91§; PP• 31:S4. 
- -
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Atter 1940• so many American citizens were drawn 
into the ~ed ~orcas or into de~ense ~actories that 
the tar.. experienced a severe ahortage of ineXpensive 
labor. In the Southwest "wetbacks". supplied the readT· 
made lolution to the taraers' needa. After the end ot 
the war, the shortage or Aasrican labor persisted. 
Accordingl7, the flow of "wetbacks" continued. 
How could the rate of entry be reduced and con-
trolled? The Border Patrol with one officer per mile 
of border could not police t~ frontier effectivelY' and 
prevent pasaage of "wetbacks.• _Politics had its part 
in preventing iamigration authorities from actually con-
trolling •wetbacks.• For_inatance, ln 1951, appeared 
the case of Frank O'Dwyer. brother of the former mayor 
ot New York. who was at that time United States Aabas-
sador to Mexico. Be owned large vegetable ranches in 
El Centro~ California and was a well-known employer of 
"wetbacks.• A local labor union aaked the United States 
government to cancel a contract with the O'Dwyer concern 
becauae of its eaployment of •wetbacks.• Six weeks later 
no action bad been taken by the I~igration Service. but 
"the matter was being invest1gated.•4 
Tbe Imudgration Service did not try to round up 
all the "wetback•" it could while the harvest was at 
ita height, tor the rate ot deportation always rises 
much higher atter the season is over. '!'here have been 
manr "deal•" and pressure• tor non-enforcement ot the 
1a 5 w. ~he District Director ot the ImDdgration and 
Naturalization Service at El Paso, ~exas, told the 
President'• Commission on Migratory Labor in 1951 that, 
in the past, tarmers bad aent complaints to the Secre-
tary ot Labor concerning the non-availability ot labor 
tor the main purpose ot getting the Iamigration SerYice 
to "go eaa7" and not deport Mexicans until the cotton 
chopping or picking season waa over. A report ot the 
Idaho State Employaent Service tor 1949 included the 
following excerpts 
'!'be United States Immigration and Baturali-
sat1on Service recognizes the need tor tara 
workers in Idaho, and, through cooperation with 
the state employment service, withholds its 
search and deportation until such-times aa there 
is not a shortage ot tara workera.6 
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Court dockets were actuall7 ~oo tull to send second 
ottendera to federal prisons. The "wetback" traffic con-
tinued to eclipse the contract labor program.' 
· SReport ot the President's Commission on Migratory 
Labor, !lirato:r-tiDOr In Aier!can Ajrlculture-(taihlngtonc 
Government Priu ing Olt!Ce, 1951), PP• 65, 14. 
6Ibid., P• 76. 
'The Bew York 'l'imes, March 25, 1961. 
---
Organized truck tat.era, who had enough money to 
send representatives to Washington to apply what pres-
. . . 
sure they could, have been another source ot strength 
against enforcement ot the immigration law. On the 
other hand, United States domestic ta~ workers were 
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not organized and could not aend representatives to 
Washington to plead that •wetbacks" were replacing them 
and forcing them into other areas ot work and other types 
of eaploym.ent. 
•ewspapers in the Rio Grande Valley ot Texas accused 
immigration officers ot "aiding with Meaico" when they were 
" ' ".. ·-
actiYe in rounding up "wetbacka." In this same area about 
seventy-five percent ot all criae was attributed to these 
interlopers. Yet, Valley farmers, who were once ashamed t~ 
use •wetbacka," felt that they had a vested right to do so.s 
Illegal entrants have found ways to deceive employ-
ers concerning their true status. "Wetbacks" otten applied 
tor and received Social Security cards. Seldom did the 
government make collection from the eaployer or trom the 
•wetbacka" tor Social Security, but the card was used tor 
identification. Sometimes they obtained dratt cards tor 
SThe !!.! .!!!:! ..;;;T.-i._m .. e.-s, March 28, 1951. 
which they gave a spurious address. In California 
•wetbacks" haTe even been contracted through the State 
Employment SerTice.9 
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Migrants from Mexico to the United States had 
many reasons tor coming, .all of which amount to wanting 
improved economic status. Their duration ot stay varied 
troa a tew weeks tor seasonal harvests to sufficient 
tiae to prevent being deported. A case history follows 
which was a typical pattern ot a Mexican in Detroit. 
Michigan, who, in 1145• had been successful in staying 
in the United States: 
Juan Diego Pesario's tirst job in the United 
States was picking cotton in Texas. Atter the 
tall harvest he became a railroad construction 
worker (traquero) traveling to several·work camps 
near amall towns in the Prairie States. He toiled 
one winter in a Kansas City slaughterhouse but 
lett in the spring and went by truck with other 
families to a Michigan sugar beet tarm. At the 
end of the summer spent in the hot fields, he 
found that he·owed the village grocery more than 
he had earned. Broke. he and the pregnant strl 
he had lived with on the beet tar. rode into 
Detroit with another family in a •Jalopy.• His 
vicissitudes were m&D7 between jobs in a paving 
gang, in the foundry ·of the Ford Rouge plant, or 
lating railroad track. He experienced seasonal· 
layoffs, went on relief and even collected junk, 
but in some way by 1933 he had acquired, besides 
three children, a aecond•band truck. At this time 
he would gladly have returned to Mexico if the 
Welfare Department bad supplied hia with gasoline 
§Ibid •• March 28, 1951 
tor the truck, but somehow it just couldn't be-
done. He considered following the crops again, 
but learned that he would lose hia 'legal resi-
dence' in Detroit. Besides, Juan felt he got 
along better Junking or repairing trucks. rn 
1934, he had been laid ott from a Civil Works Ad-
ministration Job tor a month when miraculously 
he received a post card requesting him to report 
to the Ford Rouge plant. Be now earned II a day 
which looked bigger than his ., wage ot 1928. 
After 4 months he was back on reliet. Be would 
tave liked to apply tor- hi a 'first papers' as the 
welfare worker demanded, had he not been so aware 
ot hie illegal entry. Anywat he got a WPA Job 
and when his •work separation• papers came through 
in 193? he went into a fertilizer plant at t20 a 
week. In 1938, he was back at Ford's but laid ott 
in 1941 because he was not naturalized• However, 
by this time, Juan didn't care so much, because 
Jese, his oldest boy, was'aaking $35'a week as a 
crib clerk in Dombrowaki•s tool shop.lO 
There is no way ot knowing how manr Juan Diego Peaarioa 
there were in the United States, .but by the late 1940's 
the problem could no longer be ignored. 
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The President's Commission on Migratory Labor under 
the Truman Administration found that tailure to control 
"••tbacks" was due to lack ot an agreement between the two 
countries strong enough to devise a legal farm-labor pro-
gram discouraging to illegal migration and not so cumber-
some that it would accelerate the entry ot "wetbacks." 
The Commission also asserted that while it is easy to 
convict those who have helped •wetback•" enter the United 
l0Month1y Labor Review, 61:913-923, November, 1945. 
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States illegally, local feeling usually runs high against 
those who prosecute and convict rather than against the 
violators of the immigration law. 
An amendment to the 191? Immigration Law aimed at 
controlling "wetbacka" was rejected by Congress in 1951. 
It was aueh stronger than ~he one subsequently otrered 
in 1952 by Senator Douglas. The 1951 proposal would have 
required farmers to take affirmative steps to find out 
whether the laborers hired were in the United States 
legally. Also, the proposal of the previous year would 
have required farmers to ask local immigration officials 
about the status of the workers they intended to hire. 
The 1952 amendment did not have these two features, which 
were so objectionable to employers~ A conference com• 
mittee killed the proposal of 1951. 
In 1952, Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois urged 
Congress to adopt a new approach to the "wetback" problem. 
He proposed that Congress amend Section 8 or the I.adgra-
tion Act or 191? in order to penalize ·any American e~loyer 
ot "wetbaeks." His proposal read as follows: 
Any person who shall employ any alien not duly 
admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully 
entitled to enter or to reside within the United 
States under the terms of this act or under any 
other law-relating to the immigration or expulsion 
of aliena, when such person knows or bas reasonable 
grounds to believe that such alien is not lawfully 
within the United States, shall be guilty of a 
felony, and upon conviction thereot·sh&ll be 
punished by a tine not exceeding $2,000, or 
by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year, 
or both, tor each alien in respect to whom any 
violation ot this section occurs. 
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Senator Douglas considered the amendment necessary 
because illegal immigrants from Mexico numbered hundreds 
of thousands each year, and immigration_authorities were 
practically powerless to cope with them. During 1949, 
the Immigration Service estimated that there were about 
• J 
500,000 •we~baoks" deported, and there we~e about one 
million still living in the United States. The measure 
before the Senate provided tor a penalty for those wbo 
might bring •wetbaeks" into the United States, but this 
was not a sufficient deterrent, as many •wetbacks" came 
in or their own accord on toot and moved individually to 
farms ot their prospective employers. Senator Douglas 
further argued that their presence depressed wages in 
areas where they were used. As an example, he pointed out 
that in 1950 illegal Mexican laborers in the Lower Rio 
Grande valley received twenty-five cents per hour, one-
halt the rate paid. domestic labor. He read from page 79 
ot the Report 2£ !B! President's Commission~ Misratorz 
Labor entitled "Migratory Labor in American Agriculture" 
which indicated that in the Iaperial Valley in California 
the general trend toward higher wages in the West had been 
reversed by the presence ot "wetbaoks.• Senator Douglas 
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wished the Senate to go _on record as opposing cheap and 
illegal labor which lowered minimum labor standards and 
nullified the possible etticient operation ot the treaty 
with Mexico. 
Where else could a real aeasure ot control be 
placed except on the person hiring "wetbacks~··and thereby 
making it possible tor them to stay_ in the United States? 
The author or the aaendaent specifically designed it to 
reaedy this condition by placing the responsib~lity where 
he thought it rightfully tell--on the employer. Without 
the Douglas Amendment, the bill then under consideration 
would have permitted an employer to hire, without penalty, 
a person whom he knew to be in the United States illegally. 
This amendment was not intended to require an employer 
to ask whether the laborer were here legally, nor was it 
intended that an eaployer should serve as an enforcement 
agency for the immigration authorities, but it would 
require him not to hire a laborer, it he ~ hia to be 
in the country illegally, or learned, or had reasonable 
grounds to believe that it were so. Mexico did not desire 
to extend the Migratory Labor Agreement ot 1951 concerning 
braceros without some program ot "wetback" control. Sen&• 
tor Douglas pointed to the tact that in Texas, braceros 
could be employed tor as little as sixty cents an hour and 
in other parts ot the country tor about forty cents per 
hour. Senator Herbert H. Lehman ot New York urged the 
adoption ot.the Douglas Amenaaent for the effectiveness 
of the bill. 
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The amendment met fierce opposition from the farm 
bloc and conservatives.ll In his argument opposing the 
amendment, Senator William F. Knowland of California 
stated that harvest time was near, large numbers of 
workers were needed, Mexicans would purchase goods here, 
and they would learn new methods of agriculture. The 
proposed amendment, moreover, having failed passage in 
1951 would only delay the passage of the remainder of the 
bill then under consideration. Other speakers stated 
that the farmers must hire labor as cheaply as they could 
because of the yearly gamble on tne weather and the ur-
gency of the harvest when the season comes. Senator Know-
land also added that after the employer paid transporta-
tion and bond tor Mexican workers, the cost to growers in 
the Imperial Valley in California would be greater than 
the wages paid domestic labor, if such labor could be 
found. According to this group, it would be an unneces-
sary burden Upon the farmers if the government required 
thea to know the legal nationality ot the workers they 
hired. 
llcongreasional Record, Vol. 98, February 5, 1952, 
(Wasbington:~overnment Printing Office, 1952), PP• 803• 
813. 
Senator William Langer or North Dakota argued 
that if a farmer hired ten workers, nine or whom were 
in the country legally, and the tenth one, it later 
developed, was an illegal entrant, the farmer might be 
in a difficult position. This tenth person would be 
able to blackmail his employer into paying higher wages 
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or be turned oYer to the United States District Attorney. 
The farmer could then be tried before a jury on the 
questioa or whether or not he had reasonable grounds to 
believe that the workers he had hired were illegally in 
the country. It was also this reasoning which led to 
the argument that it would take "leas proof to send a 
farmer to the penitentiary tor trying to harvest a crop 
than it would to convict a professional crook for receiv-
ing stolen property." The provision would not only hinder 
a farmer at harvest time, but it would also place on him 
the responsibility of guarding the borders for which the 
Federal Government alone should answer. 
Senator Gordon ot Oregon argued that this amend-
ment placed no burden on a farmer to make inquiry about 
the status of a worker. No law could protect a farmer 
from blackmail. The law would require only that he not 
knowingly employ a person unlawfully in the United States, 
and that he give a reasonable interpretation to information 
which he might receive concerning the legal status ot 
a worker. The practical difficulty here was, that 
when a farmer had a tew people working in his fields 
and then learned positively that they were "wetbacka," 
he would be reluctant to interfere with his harvest. 
Senator Lehman of New York emphasized that the 
amendment would be no greater burden on a tarmer than 
that he be an ordinary, decent citizen, responsive to 
the laws ot hia country. He maintained that this 
measure of control was necessary since the Mexican 
government had been unsuccessful in its efforts to keep 
"wetbacka" froa leaving Mexico and since the United 
States goveroment itself bad not been able to atop the 
flow. 
There was heated objection to the provision 
imposing possible penalty on a farmer if he bad 
"reasonable grounds to believe a worker was not legally 
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in the United States." Senator Kilgore of West Virginia 
said that this was no cause for concern since legally 
admitted workers received a card ot identification. wwet-
backa" could not have such cards. In this way a fa~er 
could easily determine the legality ot a worker's presenve 
in the country. Plainly, th~ argument waa along self-
interest and emotional lines. The farmers wanted cheap 
labor supplied by "wetbacka.• Legal contract labor 
would be used only by large-scale growers who could 
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not rely on the uncertain numbers of "wetback" labor-
era or the length or'time they would be willing to work. 
The farm bloc states and wide-spread conservative 
support provided sufficient strength to defeat the pro-
posed amendment of Senator Douglas by a vote of sixty-
nine to twelve. The twelve liberal senators voting tor 
the Douglas Aaendment were:l2 
Cordon 
Douglas 
Flanders 
Humphrey Monreney 
Johnston (S.C.) Moody 
Lehman Morse 
Murray 
:lee ley 
Pastore 
Senator Douglas then sent to the President of the 
Senate a new amendment omitting the phrase "or has rea-
sonable· grounds to believe" and made it a felony to con-
tinue to hire a person known to have entered the United 
States illegally. The bill did not indicate that "em-
ployment"would be "harboring" an alien. Harboring an 
alien was made a felony by the main bill under considera-
tion, and the Douglas Amendment merely extended the pro-
vision to forbidding employment as well as ~arboring or 
transporting the alien to the United States. 
12Ibid., P• 811. 
-
The argument against the amendment as revised 
was that many Mexican workers in the Midwest migrated 
so many years ago that they could not be deported now. 
The revised amendment, ready tor the aboTe argument, 
included a provision making it a telony to employ 
"wetbacka" eTen though they were no longer subject to 
deportation. Senator Knowland described the measure 
as unfair to Mexicans in the United States and also 
untair to tarmsrs seeking those laborers who return 
yearly to the same tarma. 
According to Senator Douglas, the intent of the 
measure was "trying to eliminate the magnet by which 
large numbers ot Mexicans are drawn illegally across 
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the border," the magnet being the comparatively lucra• 
tive employment open to "wetbacks" in the United States. 
The real purpose ot the bill was to relieve the govera• 
Bent ot the burden ot deporting hal£ a ~llion "wetbacks" 
each year, but a more workable method ot discouraging 
their entrance was needed. 
Again, the Senate rejected the revised Douglas 
Aaendmant_but passed the main bill under consideration 
(S. 1951). Under the Senate Bill, immigration authori-
ties might issue warrants to enter private property to 
investigate when·reasonable grounds existed to believe 
that illegal entrants to the United States were present 
on the property. Search could be accomplished with-
out a warrant on vessels within the territorial waters 
of the United States. FUrthermore, immigration officers 
could search land within a twenty-rive mile limit from 
the border without a warrant, but not dwellings. In 
short, the Immigration Service received about the same 
general authority aa a game warden. 
The search warrant provisions in the Senate Bill 
were administrative and not judicial. Warrants could be 
issued by the Attorney General or any District Director 
or Assistant District Director or the Imudgration and 
Naturalization Service. In the House of Representatives, 
however, the administrative warrants provision was struck 
from the bill. The measure then read that warrants would 
be issued by a Federal Court, and the House passed it by 
a vote of 162 to 104. Congress completed action on the 
entire bill on March 13, 1952, and the President signed 
it into law on March 20, 1952. This was the law for 
the control of "wetback•" as it stood in 1960. 
The previous immigration law, in effect prior to 
the amendments signad into law on March 20, 1952, pro-
vided no penalty tor harboring or concealing an alien. 
The Supreme Court held in United States !!• Evans, 333 
u. s. 483, March 15, 1948, that since no penalty was 
proviaed, it was not a punishable offence to conceal 
or harbor aliens who had entered the United States 
illegally. The new legislation of 1952 corrected this 
loophole, but ii still was not a punishable offense to 
emplo7 an alien, even though an eaployer aight be 
cognizant of his employee's illegal status. 
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The Senate's refusal to place any responsibility 
on the farmers, was the culmination of the practice of 
laxity which had existed for years. General deteriora• 
tion and lack of strict enforcement of United States 
Immigration Lawa were accompanied by negligence in not 
requiring employers to live up to their contracts with 
Mexican workers. The Department of Labor made no actual 
scrutiny of the n~er of workers which farmers esti-
mated they neeaed. Large nuabers of foreign workers in 
a given area furnished the very compe*ition to domestic 
labor which immigration law was intended to prevent. 
Under the law enacted in 1952, immigration officials 
must obtain a warrant to search private property for alien 
laborers. Farmers complained bitterly about the tactics 
ot immigration officers who flew at housetop level search-
ing tor "wetbacks" although the same farmers did not pro-
teat when officials of the Department of Agriculture 
entered their land in search of stray Mexican cattle in 
the interest of disease prevention. In industrial 
cases it was accepted practice for inspectors to 
enter places of employment for the enforcement of 
safety and accident laws, as well as for administra-
tion of laws applying to chil~ labor, minimum wage, 
maximum hours, and sanitation. The sanctity of the 
farmer's home, it was argued, should be modified to 
subject him to the same provisions of control as any 
other producer of goods. 
Although Congress tailed to make it a crime to 
hire "wetbacks," an alternative was possible. The 
profit could be taken out of employing them. Farm 
employers could be required to maintain a decent stand-
ard of minimua_wages, and "wetback" employment would 
soon disappear.l3 Farmers said this was impractical, 
but a minimum wage in effect in harvesting the sugar 
beet crop was enforced as part of the government sub-
sidy program. Until the middle of 1954, the "wetback" 
problem was as great as ever, and was described by 
Edward G. Miller, Jr., Under-Secretary of State for 
Latin-American Affairs, as a "sorely vexed question."14 
13Report of the President's Commission on Migra-
tory Labor, .22. CIt:-;-p. 8'7. -
l~dward G. Miller, Jr., "Rewards of u. s. Mexi-
can Cooperation," Department of State Bulletin, March 
31, 1952, Vol. 27, pp. 49a-5o0: 
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As might be expected, the "wetback" episode and 
the involvement or two sovereign countriea, did not 
escape the attention or the United Nations in New York. 
The United Nations General Assembly requested the mem-
bers or the International Labor Organization to agree 
to end discrimination against toreign workers, a 
principle embodied in the Universal Declaration ot 
Human Rights.l5 !he Polish Representative to the 
United Rations declared a need for international con-
ventions to prevent the exploitation ot immigrantclabor 
and pointed to the treatment ot Mexicans in Texas. 
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Pedros de Alba, the Mexican Representative, said in reply 
that he had received a pledge from the United States and 
assurances had been given that there would be no discrimi-
na. tion.16 
Still, hundreds ot thousands ot "wetback•" plagued 
the labor front in the United States, and by 1954, it was 
obvious that only the most drastic action would have any 
effect upon the questions posed by their presence. Spo-
radic drives in local areas were not surticient to control 
the tlow ot "wetback•" and certainly such drives did not 
even discourage them. (See interview tabulations, Appendix V.) 
!&united Nations Bulletin, ?:655-65?, December 1, 
1949. 
16"Treataent ot Immigrant Labor," United Nations 
Bulletin, 7:553, November 1, 1949. 
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During May and June, 1954, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service staged one of its greatest drives 
calculated to rid the country of "wetbacks." This drive 
was dubbed "Operation Wetback." The Border Patrol was 
reorganiled and equipped with small units of highly 
mobile equipment,and a streamlined command permitted 
greater concentration on halting the "wetback" invasion. 
Over 1,035,000 arrests were made. Over 3,,000 "wetback•" 
were employed in industry at the time. This was the 
first instance of a really concerted effort of all 
governmental forces to see it the encroaching "wetbacks" 
could really be stopped. 
It would, indeed, be a sad commentary on the 
efficiency of governmental administration it the United 
States could defeat strongly armed enemies overseas and 
were not able to c~pe with the invasion of unarmed labor-
era from next door. One serious implication to be drawn 
from the success of woperation Wetback" was that before 
1954, the Immigration Service, tor the reasons mentioned, 
had not really tried to seal the border and completely 
clear the country of "wetback••" 
During the major operation in 1954, press and 
radio reports adjured these i~legal entrants to return 
to Mexico of their own accord. In California thousands 
9'7 
did so. When the operation shifted to Texas, 60,456 aliena 
returned to Mexico through ports of entry during the first 
thirty days to avoid arrest. Many others simply fled 
across the Rio Grande. Every means of transportation 
available was used to return Mexicans to their country 
by bus, rail, ship, and airlift. 
A second sweep of operations in such cities as 
Spokane, Chicago, Kansas City, and St. Louis, removed 
20,1'74 illegal Mexican aliena from industrial jobs.l7 
In California about ten percent of the •wetbacka" 
apprehended were working in indust~. "Their forced 
departure resulted in a drop in weekly unemployment claims 
in the state amounting to $325,000."18 
The Commissioner included the following comment in 
his 1955 report: 
'!'he so-called "wetback" problem no lo,nger exists. 
The decline in the number of "wetbacks• found in the 
United States even after concentrated and vigorous 
enforcement efforts were pursued throughout the year, 
reveals that this is no longer, as in the past, a 
problem in border control. The border has been 
secured. 9 
1?Annual Report of the Immi;:ation and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 1955, ~.cit., pp. -12. -
l8Annual Report of the Commissioner of Immigration 
and Naturalization, 1g54; Department o?-Just!ce (Wiihlng-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1954), PP• 31-32. 
19Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 1955, Department ot- ustlce \lishington: 
Government Pri~ng Office, 1955}, P• 15. 
"Wet~acks" had become such a part of Americana 
that moYies, novels, and television plays have used the 
subject. "Wetbaoks," a movie, was shown at the Pilgrim 
Theater in Boston on January a, 1951, a Banner Pictures 
release of a Bank McCune Production, in the Class B 
variety. "Wetback," a novel, was written by Claud 
- -Garner, published by Coward-McCann, New York, in 1947. 
- ~- -
The story concerns Dionisio Molina, the illegitimate 
son ot an American father and Mexican mother, who has 
a dream of becoming a citizen of the United States. 
After several difficult years, he was successful. The 
New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Report rated the 
publication as "not a great literary accomplishment." 
The American public prefers not to look at such an 
unseemly side of its social and economic life, hence, 
such works have little chance of popularity. 
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In 1954, over 213,000 braceros were admitted to 
the United States, and a new picture was created. The 
program would now have a chance to prosper and have the 
intended effect if only the image of the "wetback" could 
be kept out. 
It appeared that the day ot the impoverished, 
hungry tara worker, entering illegally to find a job, 
was a thing or the past. "Wetbaoksl by 1960, accounted 
for only five percent of the total apprehensions along 
the border. This small number consisted mostly of 
criminals and others who could not qualify tor the 
bracero program. 
Some have said that the bracero was just the 
same race with a new name. This may be so in some 
respects, but at least the race had been washed and 
shaved. Braceros gathered at Reception Centers in 
Mexico tor physical examinations and police check. 
The numbers sent to any one community in the United 
States were controlled. There were some shortcomings 
in the program, but they have been minimized. The 
history or the current agreement with Mexico concern-
ing the bracero program begun in 1942, has increased 
in importance since the defeat of the "wetbacks" in 
1954. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE BRACERO EMERGES 
Since 1954, the three aspects of Mexican migra-
tion, namely, legal immigrants tor permanent residence, 
illegal "wetbacks," and legally contracted braceros, 
followed a rather steady course, though not without 
severe criticism. Unlimited non-quota immigration from 
Mexico continued at a high rate of about 50,000 per year. 
"Wetbacks" were not a problem any longer, although the 
- -
situation was carefUlly watched. Braceros came in at an 
increasing rate. Strong opposition developed, but the 
total effect or the criticism was to cut the program down 
to real necessity and to keep it about where it had stabi-
lized, at less than one-half million entrants a year 
rather than to abolish it. 
Immigrants from Mexico tor permanent residence were 
mostly laborers and those with no perceptible occupations 
and no skills. They did not go to the ~arms, because the 
bracero program, displacing even native farm workers in 
the United States, left no employment open to them. 
Instead, Mexican immigrants ~ound jobs in industry doing 
very hard labor of an unskilled variety. They earned more 
100 
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this way than they co~ld on ra~s, and the work~ except 
for brief periods or unemployment, was more regular. 
This shift from farm to factory could be interpreted as 
a subsidy to industry as the bracero program was to 
agriculture. The current immigration rate from Mexico 
provides about 500,000 permanent industrial workers 
every ten years as a part of the tree American labor 
force. A question to explore here is: Where else in 
the world could the United States hope to find immi• 
grants willing to do the hardest labor at such low 
rates; who, for census purposes, are considered "white"; 
who form a relatively new force, not organized nor 
politically powerful within the United States; and who 
tend to remain on a comparatively static economic and 
social level? They were at the very back door ot the 
United Statesl A strong contention can be made that 
United States immigration policy in thia instance, as 
in all its history, was designed to serve the needs of 
a capitalistic economy. In any event, immigration from 
Mexico remains on a non•quota basis, but the time may 
not be tar ott when this, too, like the bracero program, 
will be subject to a quota. 
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Braceros have always been admitted on a "quota" 
basis. Theoretically, the Department of Labor receives 
requests trom districts for certain numbers of braceros, 
but it baa no way of checking all the requests to deter-
mine whether they are really on the basis of a shortage 
of farm labor, or whether the "prevailing wage" created 
- ~ 
the shortage. Thus, until 1958, the government did not 
actually try to limit or control the number of braceros 
entering the United States. Indeed, it was only as 
recently as 1958 that the Department of Labor took 
aerioua note of the numbers ot braceros requested, and 
this action was prompted la~gely by the recession, and 
the fact that 5,000,000 United States citizens were 
unemployed. 
In 1956, there were 416,833 braceros and in 1957, 
450,422.1 In 1957 also, 49,321 Mexicans were admitted 
for permanent residence in the United Stated, but only 
5,541 were naturalized.2 More and more Mexican migrants 
were turning to legal methods of entrance, and the strength 
of the bracero program was demonstrated by a sharp decrease 
in the number of "wetbacks." 
lAnnual Report, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 1951, Justice Department (iashlngton: Govern-
ment Print!Di Office, 1957), P• 5. 
2Ib1d., P• 71. 
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In 1954, there were over a million "wetbacka" in 
the United States. The complete decline of the role of 
the "wetback" in the agricultural economy of the United 
States, however, can be seen in the following table: 
Number £! Apprehensions £! Wetbacks, ~ ~ 1951 3 
1955 - 236,090 
1956 - 10,490 
1951 - 43,263 
While these figures do not reflect the number of "wetbacka" 
who escaped arrest, it is a certainty that the bracero 
program, in addition to stricter measures of enforcement, 
changed the pattern. This substantiated the inference 
that the Border Patrol was not permitted to enforce the 
law during the heyday of the "•etbacks," but since 
- -industrialized agriculture was largely satisfied with the 
bracero program after 1954, enforcement proceeded success-
fully. 
The compelling reason for the change from "wetbacks" 
to the bracero program was that "wetbacks" infiltrated in 
~ -
such uncontrollable numbers. Of course, there were some 
health and security hazards. Yet, another reason, other 
than quantit7, existed after 1954. New Social Security 
provisions made it mandatory for farmers to contribute 
to the old age and survivors insurance fund if farm 
employees earned over $100 a year. The required forms, 
supplied to the farmers, provided for a statement con-
cerning the employee's ethnic membership and country 
of birth. Now, farmers could not claim innocence of 
their workers• citizenship statua.4 
Although the period 1954-1960 brought about the 
end of the "wetback" invasion and the substitution of 
.~ 
the bracero program, these legal workers were far from 
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acceptable on the American labor front. Admittedly, 
braceros displaced some American labor which had to find 
its way into other localitiea for other low-paying jobs, 
usually industrial. Organized labor opposed any prograa 
which depressed the labor market and created a surplus 
to drive wages down. It was not difficult to see that 
only biased labor publications or in the liberal press 
were articles found severely criticizing the bracero 
program. Favorable aspects of the program, representing 
viewpoints of large growers and citrus vegetable associ-
ations, appeared in the Saturday Evening ~ and the 
~ Street Journal. Ali these articles presented factual 
truth, but from a fixed approach. 
tEdward c. McDonagh, "Attitude Toward Ethnic Farm 
Workers in the Coachella Valley," (California) Sociology 
.!!!2 Social Research, 40:1Q-18, SepteDJ.ber, 1955. 
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What was the bracero of the 1950's like? Usually 
he was in his thirties; married, with wife and children 
in Mexico; had about three years of schooling; read and 
wrote very little; did not attend church, though nomi-
nally a Roman Catholic; and desired to earn money for 
investment in Mexico, in land and farming equipment. 
By 1955, the mechanics of acquiring bracero labor 
had improved since the first program started in 1942. 
First, the Department of Labor issued certification of 
labor needs in the United States, and the requirements 
were forwarded to Mexico. The Mexican government made 
allotments to districts based on the availability of her 
nationals. Allotments were then divided for distribution 
to municipalities. Certificates were issued to workers 
who proceeded from their village homes to a migration 
center for physical exaaination. If there were no police 
records on an applicant, he would then be sent to a 
reception center in the United States. The difficulty 
on the Mexican side was that certificates issued at the 
municipal level were usually associated with the payment 
of graft, and workers who could not pay proceeded directly 
to the reception centers anyway. The migration centers 
were at Empalme, Chihuahua, and Monterrey.5 The favorite 
was the one at Empalme since it is nearer California 
where the pay for braceros is higher. 
5Robert c. Jones, Mexican War Workers in the United 
States, (Washington: Pan Amerlcan-nDion, 19481; PP: ~-7, 24. 
The wage for a Texas bracero in 1958 was about 
fifty cents, and in California, seventy-five cents to 
a dollar an hour. As low as this seems for the type 
of work required, it was Utopian compared to the seven 
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to twelve pesos a day the same worker received in Mexico. 
With the peso valued at about eight cents, a worker 
earned about one dollar a day in Mexico, if he could 
find the work, and he often worked for much less.6 
In the United States, braceros are usually em-
ployed in large groups by corporate farms or associa-
tions of growers, who could consolidate their estimates 
and establish one large labor camp. With this arrange-
ment, trucks took braceros out each day to individual 
farms and returned them in the evening. Records and 
overhead costa were problema of the associations and 
farmers were charged for the labor by the associations. 
One such camp housed 1200 workers in Merced, 
California, in 195?. Most or them were homesick for 
their wives and children in Mexico.? When interviewed, 
6Fred Eldridge, "Helping Hands from Mexico," 
Saturday Evening !2!!1 August 10, 195?, pp. 28, 63~64. 
?Le Berthon, "At the Prevailing Rate," Commonweal, 
6?:122-125, November._l, 195?. 
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these workers had just spent twelve hours in the hot sun 
picking tomatoes. 
While in a sense the imported braceros are an 
invading army, their status more clearly resembles 
that of prisoners o~ war. In the camps and fields, 
lest any run away, there are armed guards. Theo-
reticall7 these Mexican nationals have certain, not 
inconsiderable rights. In practice they have very 
f'ew.a 
In addition to other personal restrictions, due 
to their employment, there is little opportunity f'or 
religious eXpression. Many braceros are religious dis-
senters. Only about five percent have an opportunity 
to attend Mass while in the United States. The Catholic 
Church registered its disapproval of the bracero program 
pointing to the disruption of' family lif'e in Mexico, the 
uncertainty of church attendance in the United States, 
and the fact that about one-f'itth of those coming to the 
United States do not return to their villages, but pref'er 
to stay in Northern Mexico, hoping for a return trip to 
the United States.9 A very severe critic o~ the program 
was Archbishop Robert E. Lucey of' San Antonio, Texas, who 
has stated that the bracero program is an outgrowth or 
the "wetback" era encouraged by greed of' big industrial-
ized !'arms a~d careless law enf'orcement.10 
8ibid., P• 123. 
9Ibid., P• 122. 
lOnAnd Now Braceros, 
" 
America, 90:58'7, March 6, 1954. 
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The consequences ot banning braceros would be an 
increase of from one to two cents per can ot vegetables 
or fruit and a proportionate increase in fresh fruit 
and vegetables, a result that would be felt in every 
American pocketbook. Since large growers and associa-
tions contribute heavily to the political campaigns of 
local politicians, there is little hope of change from 
the predominantly conservative approach in politics.ll 
In his article "Helping Hands from Mexico" attempting 
-
to show that displacement of native farm workers by 
braceros is a positive good, Fred Eldridge said: 
The only seemingly practical way of improving 
the.lot ot these unfortunate people is to help 
them get out of agriculture altogether and into 
industry--to replace them with braceros. In this 
way both groups can live in decency. 12 
This view and the Eldridge article are severely criti-
cized by Le Berthon, whose opinion is that braceros do 
specific harm in driving the American standard of living 
down, and that the treatment of braceros often makes 
these temporary workers bitter toward the United States.l3 
Some incidents lend support to the Le Berthon view. 
llLe Berthon, "At the Prevailing Rate," £2, !!!•, 
P• 125. 
l2Eldridge, ~· ~., P• 64. 
13 La Berthon, £R• ~., P• 125. 
The braceros also had some complaints. They 
resented having to pay $1.?5 a day for meals when 
their diet consisted of beans and tortillas. Growers 
were secure in knowing that Congress would never set 
a minimum wage, but the Department of Labor concurred 
with the Government of Mexico that fifty cents an hour 
would be the abaolute minimum. However, in 1955, some 
contracting farmers managed to pay three dollars for 
ten hours' work. Soae of these eases involved a short-
period contract, and apparently the workers agreed to 
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the less-than-minimum wage after vague promises of con-
tract extension. A short-term contract usually made 
braceros more submissive since they could actually lose 
moaey on a short period of work.l4 Labor representatives 
discovered a case where braceros were forced to sign a 
payroll for the receipt of fifty cents an hour when, in 
tact, they had been paid only thirty cents an hour. 
Since the tenure of the braceros was so uncertain and 
since they were subject to transfer by the association, 
their employers had many advantages over them. A transfer 
entails delays and work interruption which the braceros 
tried to avoid.l5 
14 n n A. c. McLellan, Thirty Cents an Hour, American 
Federationist, 62:23•24, May, l95Q. 
15s. Romualdi, "Cooperation is Paying Dividends," 
American Federationist. 62:25-25, November, 1955. 
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The farmers, as employers, had some cause for 
complaint on their side. The cost ot bracero labor 
was, on the average, about ten percent higher than the 
former cost of "wetback" labor. The rise was created 
- -. 
by the necessity of record keeping, providing sanitary 
quarters, and paying transportation costs. To indi-
vidual farmers, the greatest expense was the construc-
tion of temporary quarters for the workers if they 
were not near a pool administered by a growers' asso-
ciation. This inconvenience led farmers to advocate 
establishment of public quarters at a central location, 
if the workers could be used tor a longer time in this 
way. 
Another complaint by employers during 1958 was 
that the Department of Labor reduced the number of braceros 
certified as needed, principally because of increased 
unemployment in the United States. The farmers were 
furious. They contended that as employers they could not 
induce unemployed assembly line workers to switch to farm 
labor and that a cut in authorization could lead only to 
another avalanche of •wetbacka.•l6 In 1960, the trend was 
toward closer government control and supervision ot braceros. 
16Jaek Hanieke, •uncle Sam Riles Farm Folks by 
Cutting Flow of Mexican.Braceros," The Wall Street 
Journal, 151:1, June 24, 1958. -------
Under a Labor Department directive, at least 
ninety percent or the workers in a crew must receive 
a minimum ot fifty cents an hour even if the day was 
on a piece-work basis. The Department investigated 
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a great number of cases of short wage payments in the 
spring ot 1958 in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas. Some 
Mexican workers reported an income or $6.70 a week after 
deductions. Among other abuses examined by the govern-
ment, was the complaint of workers taken out at 6130 
a.m., retUrned at 7:30 p.a., and given credit for only 
six hours' work. An issue of "portal to portal" pay 
had to be negotiated by a Foreign Labor Service Repre-
sentative or the Department ot Labor. 
Foreign Labor Service Representatives are the 
liaison between braceros, their employers, and the 
United States government. Although their duties and 
responsibilities are much greater than their numbers, 
these agents are not on an eight hour day during the 
summer months. Workers complaining of short pay and 
poor housing, farmers reporting that workers have quit, 
a worker refusing medical treatment, money due tor wage 
adjustment being forwarded to Mexico, and a great many 
other related demands filled the hours of the Fbreign 
Labor Representatives wherever braceros were employed. 
Transportation of braceros and other migrants in 
the United States bas merited attention since several 
unfortunate accidents have occurred involving crowded 
trucks delivering workers. Governor Stephen L. R. 
McNichols of Colorado asked his legislature tor a more 
strict law covering trucks hauling migrant labor within 
the state. The legislature was controlled by the 
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growers, and the measure failed. However, the governor 
ordered the police to apply the existing laws more 
rigidly in cases of overcrowded trucks hauling migrants. 
Thereafter, such vehicles were ordered turned back at 
the port of entry.l7 Governor McNichols is quoted as 
saying, "These are people~ not cattle, and they are going 
to be treated like people.• 
The agreement with Mexico imposed certain standards 
upon transference of braceros by truck. ~ese standards 
were extensive and explicit. During the closing days of 
~ . 
the 84th Congress, Senator Paul H. Douglas presented a 
measure to institute inspection by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission wherever migrants are carried by truck 
across state lines. No regulations were effected in 1957, 
and hearings held in the spring of 1958 gave little chance 
!?Roscoe Fleming, "Colorado to Police Transport-
of Migrant Labor," Christian Science Monitor, April 27, 
1957. 
of immediate or extensive appli~ation.l8 Through 1960, 
no regulations have been issued. 
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A noticeable transition in the West for the past 
twenty-five years was the increase in the size of indi-
vidual or corporate farms. A census taken in 1954 pro-
duced interesting results, listing 600,000 farms_less, 
or a drop of 11 percent from the previous census. The 
size of individual farms had increased from 215 acres 
in 1950 to 242 acres in 1954. Between 1950 and 1954, 
farms of over 1,000 acres had increased by seven percent, 
and tenant operated farms and sharecropping were on the 
decrease. The Department of Agriculture estimates that 
the value of real estate and machinery per worker on 
American farms increased from $3,400 in 1940, to $10,000 
in 1950, and $15,000 in 195a.19 
Implications of this trend did not go unnoticed 
in the United States Congress. Senator Douglas and 
Senator Wayne Morse tried to limit the size of farms 
benefitting from publicly financed irrigation projects 
to 160-aere, family-sized farms. If farms were kept to 
18Ibid. 
19Louis Levine, "Recent Trends Affecting Agricul-
tural Labor," Emp1oyaent Security Review, 24:15-18, 
March, 1957. 
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family size and away from corporate management and 
industrialization, Senator Douglas believed that the 
whole farm labor problem would become more manageable.20 
Without contusing cauae and effect, an estimate 
may be made of the result of the "wetbackR-bracero 
transition on family farming in the United States. 
Jeffersonian Democracy envisioned an agrarian 
economy based on the small family far.. The Industrial 
Revolution modified these concepts, but the family farm, 
as opposed to the large one-crop corporate farm, still 
had a majority in numbers. Defenders of the family-type 
tara point out the evils of corporate farming with its 
absentee financing and farm lobbyists. Advocates of 
family farming do not believe that the Jeffersonian idea 
can be strictly applied today, but point out the positive 
benefits of home ownership and tbe social and economic 
values of the family farm in contrast with the "hired 
hand" features of the corporate farm. 
The consequences of the trend to corporate farming 
have been explored by A. Whitney Griswold, the President 
. . 
of Yale University, in a provocative little book, entitled 
2°Letter 
August 1, 1958. 
, Senator Paul H. Douglas to Nelson G. Copp, (See Appendix II) 
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Farming in a Democracl• Three pertinent quotations from 
that book follow: 
Family farming is just as efficient as .factory 
.farming. It has been losing out in competition 
because of the cheap migratory labor available to 
the latter. Unprotected by minimua wage or other 
laws, •rootless and homeless,• thia labor baa 
shared leas in the .fruita or its toil than any 
other group in America. Remove this reservoir of 
cheap labor--in effect aaubaidy' at the expense 
ot humanity--and it ia doubtfUl i.f taadly taraing 
would sutter in the comparison of efficiency.· 
under existing circumstances, the .family .farm, 
"that economic unit upon which our democracy waa 
baaed in the beginning," is dtaappearing.2l 
It ia a conservative conclusion to draw ••••• 
that family .farming aa·we now define it ia not 
doomed by technology ••••• 
We know that family .farming cannot thrive on 
the terms of hillbillies and Okies·any more than 
it can amid factories in the ·rield. These ends · 
are not promoted by arbitrary rewards in a .free• 
for-all among pressure groups or by a rain of 
subsidies on the just and the unjuat. They are 
not promoted by agrarian particularism. They 
can be attained only by a national belief 1D full 
production, tull employment--and full democracy. 
Such is the prospect tor fi.~ly farming and demo-
cracy in the United States. 
These issues are also joined in the opposition to 
the use of corporate funds to purchase western land now 
under irrigation by_federal projects with federal capital. 
21A. Whitney Griswold, Fa.ming in·a Democracy 
(New York: H~co~rt, ~race, and COmpany,-1948), P• 199. 
22Ibid., p • 214. 
Large commercial growers are easily organized and will 
contribute to political campaigns and to funds used 
for lobbying. Owners of family-type farms are not 
readily organized and consequently wield little politi-
cal influence. 
Braceros are of real assi~tance only to large 
growers operating "factory farms." Work contracts and 
international agreements require housing, water, and 
cooking facilities which a small grower cannot afford. 
A solution uaed extensively in a one crop area is for 
growers' associations to contract for braceros, house 
them in a consolidated area, and ship them out each day 
in trucks to individual farms. This arrangement is 
satisfactory in concentrated areas, but not in diversi-
fied farm areas or where farm. are sma11 and scattered. 
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"Liberals" and "conservatives" have taken issue 
with policies on the further use of western irrigated 
lands, the extension of agreements with Mexico concern-
ing the bracero program, the method of the Department of 
Labor in setting fair wage rates for braceros,and the 
supervision of the political activity of growers' associa-
tions. The razor's edge is one's own value judgment of 
the multilateral problem. 
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Agricultural braceros, tempora~ immigrants, have 
been more of an asset than a liability. Yet, a parallel 
arrangement attempted on a more permanent basis in indus• 
try failed. The policy of admitting individuals to the 
United States on a permanent basis, intended to fill a 
long range labor need, did not take into account that 
the social and economic strata of the country are not 
static. Permanent workers of low-level skills improve 
their status. The following references illustrate these 
conclusions. 
In 1909, the number of Mexicans working in the 
sugar beet fields of Northeastern Colorado amounted to 
9.4 percent of the total. In 192'7, Mexicans totalled 
59 percent. Reasons for the increase were social and 
economic pressures and immigration policy. 
Aa a result of this extension of·sugar beet 
production in northeastern Colorado; the cutting 
ott of Japanese immigration in 190'7, the reduc-
tion of the supply or Ge~an-Ruasian laborers 
because of the World War, restrictive immigration 
legislation and the transformation of former Ger-
man and Russian laborers to owners has changed 
the nationality of the sugar beet workers.23 
23nMexican Labor in South Platte Valley, Colorado,• 
Monthll Labor Review, 29:53'7-54'7, September, 1929. 
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In 1929, the Bethlehem Steel Company established 
a colony of Mexican nationals at Bethlehem, Pen~sylvania, 
consisting of 912 men, 29 women, and ? children.24 San 
Antonio, Texas, was used as a port of entry in trans-
porting them from Mexico, and the Kexican Consulate General 
in that city, wishing to aid his countrymen, cooperated 
with the project. The workers received physical examina-
tions in Texas, and the eompanr paid for their passage 
to Pennsylvania. The work contract stipulated that 
- . 
company houaing would be available at tl.lO a day and 
that the minimua wage would be thirty cents an hour. 
The arrival of these workers in Bethlehem was a 
shock to the city. Exaggerated statements circulated 
about strike breakers. The Kexican Consul at Phila-
delphia investigated and found conditions satisfactory. 
Other employees, after being informed of the labor short-
- . 
age, accepted the new employees, since the Pennsylvania 
State Employment Office agreed that it was impossible to 
supply enough unskilled labor locally. 
Kany of the Mexicans acattered immediately and 
looked for new jobs. By mid-summer, there was a twenty-four 
24
"Mexican Labor Colony in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania," 
Monthly Labor Review, 33:822-826, October, 1931. 
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percent loss. By 1930, only torty-six ot the original 
group remained. In their experience with Mexican workers 
the company learned that they were good for work on the 
hot blast furnaces, but could not stand exposure to cold 
weather; that as the proportion ot families increased, 
their steadiness as workers increased; that the only 
discrimination they experienced was in pay; and that they 
took little part in politics. 
During the late 1920's greater use was made ot 
Mexicans on railroad track maintenance crews, in steel 
plants, and in meat packing plants in the Chicago area, 
but little success came from the importation of groups 
ot Mexicans tor specific levels ot work on a permanent 
basis in these industrial establishments. 
The failure or the industrial bracero experiments 
was due to social and economic causes. The Mexican immi-
grants displaced other workers in the United States.25 
Organized labor made vigorous complaints about this dis-
location ot local labor. The unpopularity ot the program 
and the depression caused its abandonment. An industrial 
bracero program used during World War II ia maintaining 
railroad tracks had no chance ot revival in the post-war 
years. 
25nrncrease in Mexican Labor in Certain Industries 
in the·United States," Monthly Labor Review, 32:83, Janu-
ary 31, 1932. 
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In 1960, the ia~ues involving Mexican migration 
seem to be well joined. In its simplest terms, the 
question is one of emphasis and group values. In the 
past decade, business has been in the ascendancy, with 
little thought of the future ethnic and cultural changes 
that the present policy will bring. Yet, the inter-
national relations aspect of further controls and limi-
tations on the flow of Mexican nationals to the United 
States for temporary or permanent stay may bring further 
complications. The philosophy ot the United States immi-
gration policy, though not stated, had a de facto exist-
ence in the continued agricultural bracero program. 
CHAP'l'ER VII 
TREATIES WITH MEXICO AND THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 1942-1954 
A. Bases of the Agreements 
The uncontrolled entry of "wetbacks" between 1942 
and 1954 compelled the United States and Mexico to nego-
tiate treaties which both parties hoped would discourage 
this illegal influx. The rationale and bases of these 
agreements may be summarized as follows: 
1. Because of the low level of living or the individual 
Mexican migrant he is in no position to bargain with 
a prospective employer and his-rights must be protec-
ted by international agreement. 
2. The uncertainties of seasonal employment and the haz-
ards of travel are so great that undue hardship is 
bound to exist for some. To prevent embarrassment and 
expense to both governments great numbers or workers 
cannot be permitted to go abroad without suitable in-
surance covering them in the event of death and accident 
and also a guarantee of a minimum amount of employment. 
3. American workers and their level of living are entitled 
to the protection that only the requirement of official 
certification of need for additional labor by the State 
Employment Service can give. 
4. The orderliness of American social life is entitled to 
the protection which only an·orderly processing by the 
Immigration Service can give. 
5. A minimal amount of screening by Mexican police and 
American health authorities is essential to mass popu-
lation movements which do not transmit an undue volume 
of social pathology and physical contagion.l 
!Eastin Nelson and Frederic Meyers, Labor Require-
menta and Labor Resources in the Lower·Rio Grande Villey of 
Texas \Austin: The uri! vera Tty "01' Texas, --r§so), pp • 25-28.-
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Because of the past experience of her nationals 
with discrimination and poor working conditions in the 
United States, Mexico insisted that considerable meas-
ures of protection be inserted in the agreements con-
cerning the importation of Mexican labor into the United 
States. The official position of Mexico was that she 
was not anxious to see her nationals leave for any great 
length of time and did not want to create a labor short• 
age in her own country. She also was trying to discover 
means of stopping or at least controlling the tremendous 
flow of •wetbacks" to the United States. The United 
States wanted a flexible agreement which would not place 
a burden on prospective employers. Under such an arrange-
ment there would be no necessity for Mexicans to enter 
illegally. Both sides intended to create measures for 
control of "wetbacks." 
The various agreements, amendments, and extensions 
for that purpose will now be examined to present a history 
of the evolution of the present agreement which, from all 
indications, will continue to be amended in the future, 
but will form the basis for the bracero program for many 
years. This is perhaps the first time the treaties from 
1942 to 1951 have been listed and summarized outside of 
the State Department of tbe United States. 
B. The 1942 Executive Agreement 
The first legal importation of Mexican labor 
during the emergency of World War II was purauant to 
the Executive Agreement of August 4, 1942.2 In its 
"general principles" this agreement provided that 
Mexicans contracting to work in the United States 
would not be subject to military service; that no dis-
crimination would be shown in the use of Mexicans so 
imported; that these Mexicans would enjoy guarantees 
of transportation, living expenses and repatriation in 
accordance with Mexican Labor Law; and that such labor 
would not be used to displace other workers in the 
United States or reduce rates of pay in a localit7 
where such rates had previously been established. 
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This 1942 Agreement provided that the two govern-
ments would be the contracting parties. Mexico insisted 
on this as a means of placing responaibilit7 for execu-
tion of the provisions of the agreement. The "employer" 
as uaed in these contracts meant the Farm Security Admini-
stration of the Department of Agriculture of the United 
States of America. The •sub-employer" was the operator 
2nTemporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural 
Workers," Agreement Between The United States of America 
and Mexico,~ugust 4, 1942; \lishington: Unitearstates 
Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 4. 
of the farm where the workers were to be used. The 
contracts between the employer and the Mexican workers 
were made under the supervision of the Mexican Govern-
ment and had to be written in Spanish. The employer 
must then enter into contracts with the sub-employer 
who would guarantee the observance of the provisions 
of the agreement. 
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The employer would meet all transportation and 
living expenses from the place of origin to the desti-
nation of the worker in the United States, as well as 
necessary incidental expenses. The worker would carry 
with him about seventy-two pounds (35 kilos) of baggage. 
The United States tried in vain to persuade Mexico to 
let the worker's family accompany him. Not being able 
to be with his family was one reason why a worker often 
became dissatisfied, left his employment, and asked to 
be repatriated.3 The sub-employer was then required to 
reimburse the United States Government for the trans-
portation expense. The transportation issue became more 
serious a few years later when a large cotton crop was 
ready for harvest in the northern part of Mexico, and, 
SWayne D. Rasmussen, A Historf of the Emer~ency 
~Labor Suppl{ Profram, 1~43-4?, -wiihlngton: ~tid 
States Departmen of gr!culture, 1951), P• 32. 
therefore, abe insisted that all_ labor recruitment be 
from the interior. No doubt, Mexico also realized that 
workers from the interior would not be as likely to 
attempt to re .. enter the United States at a later date aa 
those nearer the border. Arter 1946, the regulations 
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on transportation were unnecessarily burdensome, accord-
ing to American employers. 
The "Wages and Employment" provisions of the 
agreement provided that the wages would be the same as 
those paid to other agricultural laborers in the same 
region. In no case was the wage to be leas than thirty 
cents an hour, and piece rates were to be such as to 
enable a_worker of average ability to earn the "prevail• 
ing wage." However, the agreement did not exactly define 
the meaning of the term "prevailing wage." No clarifi-
cation occurred until the Report of the President's 
Commission on Migratory Labor in 1951 which included the 
following explanation, though not a definition, of 
"prevailing wage" as it applied to all the preceding 
agreemanta: 
The president of the Hew Mexico Farm and Live-
stock Bureau candidly described the method of 
setting the •prevailing wage' as follows: 
The prevailing wage is really set by the 
farmers tor the various types of jobs on the 
farm, and it will vary, depending·upon the 
type of work the man does ••• we·have a meeting 
at.the beginning of the season; ·the farmers 
have a meeting and they determine, roughly, · 
what they are going to pay. It doesn•t·mean 
that they will hold to it; it will vary, as a 
matter of fact. 
This wage, as decided upon by farm employers, 
usually weeks in advance of the work period, is 
accepted by the public employment aervices as 
the going wage until the season opens and employ-
ment actually gets under way.4 
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No government agency determined or fixed the wages. 
neither government agencies, nor employers, nor workers 
could give the President's Commission an accurate idea of 
the meaning of "prevailing wage.• !here was evidence that 
"occasionally" Mexican workers under contract were paid 
less than domestic workers for the same type of employment. 
The term "prevailing wage" was in reality practically 
meaningless. Since the employers setting the wage did 
not consider •hether the amount agreed upon was sutt~cient 
to attract the necessary labor, it could not "very well 
serve as the price to equate the supply of and demand tor 
labor.•5 The vagueness of t~e term becomes all the more 
evident when foreign workers are brought into a locality, 
4President's Commission on Migratory Labor, ~· cit., 
PP• 59-61. 
5Ibid., P• 60. 
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a situation Which in itself tends to set a wage pattern. 
Certainly this method of setting wages is a far cry from 
the ideal of establishing a wage by negotiation of work-
ers and employers on an equal footing. 
As early as 1936 soae thought had been given to a 
"minimum prevailing wage" for industry in the Walsh-Healy 
Act. In the employment of Mexican contract labor for 
agricultural use, however, the phrase has a different 
meaning. Rates of pay are usually set by collective 
bargaining, bot by action of the employers alone. The 
wage considered in this Act was for actual employment, 
to attract employees, not for work to be performed later 
as in contract employment. Also, under the Walsh-Healy 
Act, the prevailing wage is determined officially and 
formally for a particular job under consideration. In 
agriculture there is no such official determination 
available as a guide for workers or employers. 
The President'• Commission on Migratory Labor in 
1951 noted that in some localities, not specified in the 
report, there was a falling wage rate and also a short-
age of labor, a combination which seemed incongruous. 
The reason undoubtedly was that the arbitrary wage agreed 
upon was not sufficient to attract the number of laborers 
1~ 
needed and had a direct relation to the desire to import 
alien labor.6 The associations ot farm employers had set 
one-sided wage rates thus creating their own "labor 
shortage.• 
Other important phases besides wages were also 
covered by the Agreement ot 1942 in great detail. Mexico 
provided that members ot a worker's family could be em-
ployed at less than the rates set in the agreement when, 
beca~se ot age or sex, they could not do a full day's 
work. Minors under fourteen years of age were strictly 
prohibited from work, and all minors were to have the 
same opportunities to attend school as other agricultural 
laborers' children. 
Workers under contract were to be used in agricul-
ture only, and any change in type of employment required 
the approval of the worker and the Mexican Government. 
No collections or assessments were to be made against the 
workers, and they might purchase goods where they wished 
and not be compelled to trade at a store owned by the 
employer. 
6Ibid., P• 61. 
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Housing facilities for Mexicans had to be identi-
cal with those enjoyed by other agricultural workers in 
the same locality. Another provision stated that: 
Workers admitted under thts understanding 
shall enjoy as regards occupational diseases 
and accidents the same guarantees enjoyed by 
other agricultural workers under United States 
legislation."'~ 
This was a meaningless stipulation at that time since 
there was no workmen's compensation or anyt~ng comparable 
tor agricultural workers under existing laws. but was 
necessary in the light of its future application to the 
possible recruitment of industrial labor. Mexicans had 
the right to elect their own representatives to deal with 
employers, but such representatives had to be working 
members of their groups. The braceros would be paid 
three dollars a day for subsistence in periods of unemploy-
ment, exclusive of Sundays. One would think that this 
provision would insure their regular and continuous employ-
ment. A rise in the cost of living would naturally require 
reconsideration of a contract. At the expiration ot his 
contract, the continued stay ot a Mexican in the United 
States would be illegal "from an immigration point of view." 
The exception provided was "physical impossibility," a 
term not more clearly defined. 
'libid., p. 4. 
The 1942 Agreement cover~d security for the 
earnings of the Mexican workers. They would place 
their money in a Rural Savings Fund, and it would be 
transferred to the Banco de Credito Asricola. If 
workers wished to purchase agricultural equipment in 
the United States, the money was transferred to this 
bank for the payment of such implements. The Farm 
Security Administration agreed to recommend priority 
on these items. 
The number of laborers required was not known 
at the time the agreement was made, but the United 
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States Department of Agriculture would furnish the 
information to the Government of Mexico from requests 
made by prospective employers as to their probable needs. 
The Mexican government required advance notice of 
the number of workers in order to determine the number 
which might be allowed to leave Mexico without detriment 
to its national econo~. 
The same provisions were intended to apply to non-
agricultural workers. The agreement could be renounced 
by either government after ninety days• advance notice. 
It was drawn up in Mexico City and signed there on July 
23, 1942. By an exchange of notes, it became effective 
on August 4, 1942. 
It should be remembered that this agreement was 
signed when the United States was at war with powerful 
enemies. There had been private contracting of Mexican 
labor before World War II~ but the war had complicated 
entry and other matters which then required mutual gov-
ernmental action by Mexico and the United States.s 
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Recruitment in Mexico began under the supervisory 
control of the War Food Administration of the United 
States Department of Agriculture with the purpose of 
preventing the abuses which had accompanied private 
recruitment by American employers. The workers were 
examined in Mexico~ given an identification car~~ and 
sent to employment centers in the United States. These 
workers, being only temporarily admi~ted, were exempt 
from the head tax and literaey.test required under the 
United States immigration laws.9 
~he Agreement of 1942, though revised many times~ 
has become the basis for a more comfortable relationship 
between the United States and Mexico and serves today aa 
the foundation of the bracero program. 
SBulletin of the Pan American Union, July, 1948~ 
P• 411. ---
9wilbert E. Moore, "America's Migration Treaties 
during World War II, Reappraising OUr Immigration Policy" 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 
\Philadelph!i:~merican Academy of-political and Social 
Science, 1949), P• 33. 
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c. The 1943 Revision 
Mexico did not believe that the Agreement of 1942 
was adequate protection for her nationals in many respects. 
A revised agreement of 1943 replaced the 1942 Agreement 
and included a number of changes.10 The United States 
did not seriously contest those concerning wages. However. 
one alteration upon which Mexico insisted, was that lodg-
ings would be "without cost to them {the laborers)." The 
War Food Administration asked for clarification. The 
American Embassy in Mexico asked the Mexic~n government 
to modify the language, but had no success. The provision 
was accepted, provided that other matters could be made 
the subject of discussion and re-negotiation.ll 
The Mexican government insisted upon insertion of 
portions of Article 29 of its Mexican Federal Labor Law. 
The article stated that the employer should pay all trans-
portation expense in compliance with immigration require-
ments from the point of origin to the point of destination. 
He might not make any deduction from the laborers' wages 
· lOTemporai{ Migration of Mexican Agricultural Work-
ers, Agreement Be ween the United States of America ana--
lreiieo, Revis!nf the A~ment of Au~ust 4; 1942 (WaSEing-
ton: Governmen Print ng O~fi c~, 19 .. 4) • - -
llRasmussen, ~· cit., P• 207. 
fo~ these expenses. The employer or cont~actor must 
give a bond, or deposit cash with the Bank of Worke~s 
or in the Bank of Mexico sufficient to equal repatria-
tion costs of the wo~ker and his family, and transpor-
tation fo~ their return to the point of origin, in an 
amount enti~ely satisfactory to the ~espective labor 
authorities of Mexico. The bond would be cancelled or 
the money returned only when the employer had covered 
such expenses, or the worker had refused to return to 
his country, or the employer had furnished proof that 
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he did not owe the laborer anything. The bond was not 
required of the United States government as the employer, 
since it had undertaken certain responsibilities in the 
transportation ot the laborers, but ~athe~ it was an 
obligation of the sub-employer or the farmer. 
The amended agreement required that the contract 
be "legalized" by the municipal authorities of the 
locality where entered into and must be "visaed by the 
Consul of the country where their services are being 
used." The provisions were mandatory for the contract 
to be valid and could not be waived by the worke~a. 
Mexico, of course, being a sovereign nation, has the 
right to do what she believes is correct to provide 
measures of protection for her nationals. 
Another concern was safeguarding the funds con-
tributed by the Mexican workers to their Rural Savings 
Fund. Various agencies of the United States government 
agreed to take charge of the deposits until they could 
be transferred to the Wells Fargo Bank and the Union 
Trust Company of San Francisco for the account of the 
Bank of :Me xi co. 
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There was also a revision of the "Wages and Em-
ployment" section of the 1942 Agreement in which the 
original section on minimum wage and piece work had not 
been clear. The revision stated that wages should not 
be less than thirty cents an hour even on a piece work 
basis and repeated the ambiguous and indefinite phrase 
that wages for piece work should be such that the worker 
of average ability could earn the "prevailing wage." 
The pay would be the same as that for similar work of 
other agricultural workers under the same conditions in 
the same area. It also said that the Mexican government 
must authorize all changes of locality of the workers. 
Mexican workers had no guarantee that housing 
would be "hygienic lodgings adequate to the physical con-
ditions of the region• called for in the agreement. 
Housing furnished by employers was without cost to the 
workers, as were medical and sanitary services, and would 
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be identical with that furnished to other agricultural 
workers in the regions where the braceros were employed. 
I£ the workers were unemployed for a period not 
to exceed seventy-five percent of the duration of their 
contracts (Sundays excluded), they would receive three 
dollars a day for subsistence from the employers. For 
any of the remaining twenty-five percent of the time 
they were unemployed, and if such unemployment was not 
due to their unwillingness to work, they would receive 
lodging and subsistence from the employers without cost. 
However, the matter of controlling workers under these 
circumstances was always a problem, which 
became serious in California in the fall of 
1943 when the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service in Los Angeles refused to deport such 
workers·unless they were working outside agri-
culture. This meant that the Office of Labor 
was losing control over the workers.l2 
In 1945, the provision of the work contract which pro-
vided for payments of subsistence when the worker was 
not actually working had been revised to assert that the 
payments would be made immediately and that the employers 
should not require the workers to wait until the end of 
each payroll period. Subsistence payments had been the 
12Ib1d.~ p. 221. 
subject of ~any complaints by Mexican workers •. During 
April, 1946, weather conditions in Colorado prevented 
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the sugar beet growers from using their Mexican laborers. 
The Department of Agriculture assumed part of the lia-
bility for the time lost by the workers under this 1943 
Agreement. In November and December of 1946, the growers 
again asked the Department of Agriculture to assume more 
of the liability because of severe snowstorms in the 
Rocky Mountain States. However, the Department was 
unable to comply.l3 
A new stipulation was that the Mexican Consuls, 
assisted by the Mexican Labor Inspectors, would have 
free access to the farms where Mexican contract labor 
was present. The employers and sub-employers agreed that 
the Mexican Consuls and the Assistant Labor Inspectors 
would be granted the privilege of seeing that there had 
been compliance with all the clauses of contracts made 
under the 1943 revision. 
In 1942 and 1943, many precautions were taken to 
prepare for the orderly contracting of Mexican agricul-
tural workers. At that time, the governments concerned 
forsaw the possibility of recruiting non-agricultural 
workers also. 
13 ~., pp. 209-213, 221. 
13? 
D. Non-Agricultural Workers 
According to the 1942 Agreement, a later arrange-
ment would give non-agricultural workers the same pro-
tection accorded agricultural workers. Provisions for 
exclusion from military service, non-discrimination, and 
payment of transportation costs were identical for both 
aroups. 14 
Contractual procedure would be initiated by the 
United States government, acting through the Chairman of 
the War Manpower Commission or his representative, to 
make a contract of employment with th~ workers under the 
supervision of the Mexican government. The Chairman of 
the War Manpower Commission would then enter into con-
tracts with employers in the United States. The United 
States would advise the Mexican government from time to 
time of the number of non-agricultural laborers which 
might be required. The United States government, con-
tinuing to act through the Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission, would bear the expense of physical examina-
tions at Reception Centers in Mexico administered in 
14Recruiting of Mexican ~-Agricultural Workers 
Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico, 
Department ot State-Fuhifcation #210~(Wash1ngton: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1944), p. 3. 
collaboration with Mexican Public Health authorities 
- . - , 
as well as transportation costs to and from the places 
of employment and any expenditures due to immigration 
regulations. Eventually these expenses would be passed 
on to the prospective employers. 
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"Wages and Employment" provisions were practically 
the same as those in force for agricultural workers ex-
cept that since non-agricultural workers would not be 
paid a subsistence allowance, they would be guaranteed 
employment seventy-five percent of full time for each pay 
period and ninety percent of full time for the whole con-
tractual period. If the worker were unable or unwilling 
to work, this provision would not apply. 
The Agreement, allowing termination with ninety 
days' notice by either government, became effective April 
29, 1943. 
Recruitment in Mexico of non-agricultural workers 
by the War Manpower Commission was primarily for the 
railroads to provide maintenance-of-way crews. However, 
the Railroad Retirement Board regulated certain details 
of employment. 
Mexico set the 1943 limit on the number of non-
farm workers who might be eaployed in the United States 
at 50,000, later raised to ?5,000. She also set a 
maximum number which might leave the country for United 
States employment in order not to dislocate her own 
economy through loss of her pool of experienced railway 
workers. !he action was due in part to difficulties of 
supervision by Mexican Consular officials and Mexican 
Labor Inspectors after the men reached the United 
Statea.l5 Immediately after the agreement went into 
effect, April 29, 1943, more workers were available. 
Between May and August, 1943, there were 15,000 Mexican 
nationals employed as maintenance-ot-way workers on the 
railroads of the United States Southwest.l6 
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Mexican workers entering the United States under 
the 1943 Agreement to work on the railroads, were subject 
to the Railroad Retirement Act. At the time of the 
Agreement, there had been no intention of deducting from 
Mexican laborers' pay tor retirement purposes. The 
Railroad Retirement Act required the deductions, and, 
therefore, United States authorities did so. On November 
15, 1946, the United States gave notice to terminate the 
15Moore, ~· ~., pp. 34-35. 
16Glenn W. Miller, American Labor and Government 
(New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1948), p:-4?6. 
agreement and offered to repay the Railroad Retirement 
benefits to the workers in a lump sum. The Mexican 
government accepted the offer and assumed the obliga-
tion of distribution to the individual workers. 
140 
Both governments understood that the lump sum 
payment would bar forever any rights that Mexican workers 
might claim under the Railroad Retirement Act. The 
Mexican government would be precluded from any rights 
or benefits under that act, in its own behalf or in 
behalf of the workers. If any worker should reenter the 
United States and resume his employment on a railroad 
without withdrawing his retirement benefits from the 
Mexican government, the Mexican government would reim-
burse the Railroad Retirement Fund to the amount of the 
workman's prior contribution.l? 
In terminating the agreement for entrance of non-
agricultural workers, the United States government 
expressed appreciation for the assistance of Mexican 
workers in the war effort. The total number of Mexican 
agricultural and railroad workers legally contracted in 
lqMexlcan Non•Agrieultural Workers, Termination of 
Agreement of Apri129,l943, and Refund of'Deductions trom 
Salaries unaer the ~ilroaa Retirement Aii, Department-or-
State Publication, #3049 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1948). 
Mexico under the Agreements and transported to the 
United States had amounted to 325,000 by 1948.18 
They had been_employed in various sections of the 
United States. They were only a fraction of the 
actual number who had entered the United States, 
but the "wetbacks" were mostly seasonai and had 
stayed for periods shorter than six months, the con-
traetural period for those who had entered legally. 
The success of these arrangements then led 
Mexico and the United States to consider certain 
supplementary provisions to the 1943 Agreement which 
would continue their relationship to their mutual 
benefit. 
E. The 194~ Supplement 
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On April 2, 194~, Mexico and the United States 
effected certain supplementary provisions in connection 
with the 1942 Agreement as revised in 1943, since neither 
wished to change the original agreement.l9 The supplement 
lSSulletin of the Pan American Union, July, 1948, 
~· ~., P• 411. 
- 19Temporart Migration of Mexican Agricultural Work-
ers, Agreement Be ween the United States of America ana--
iiiico, Department of State Publication #3085 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1948), P• 3. 
covered procedures for making special selections of 
experienced workers for the sugar.beet harvest, because 
the work was particularly arduous. 
Another stipulation was that the "point of origin" 
of the contract would be the place in Mexico where the 
worker signed his contract and that no change in the 
place could be made later in the contract. 
A procedural question had arisen over precedence 
in repatriation. When one group in an area had been 
there longer than another, which would be returned first? 
A supplemental provision stated that the group longest in 
the United States would be returned first. 
Other benefits for the workers were also included. 
A worker would receive the cost of his food for all days 
except Sundays and on days on which he had less than tour 
houra• employment, provided the circuumtances were beyond 
his control or that he was physically unable to work. 
Food provided on the farms must be at cost and must not 
exceed $1.50 per day. The Consuls of Mexico and delegates 
assigned by the Inter-departmental Co~ttee of the United 
States could have the right whenever they might consider 
it necessary, to "examine the fulfillment of the workers• 
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contracts, to study the san;t~rf system, as well as the 
class and cost or the food ••• n20 If a Mexican worker 
were not returned to Mexico within fifteen days after 
the termination of his work contract, he would receive 
fifty cents per day in United States currency up to the 
date of his return. These payments would be the obliga-
tion or the United States Department or Agriculture and 
would be in addition to subsistence and other benefits 
under other portions of the agreement. Thus Mexico and 
the United States strove to give every comrort which 
circumstances would allow, as a reward to Mexicans ente~­
ing the United States legally under the bracero program. 
F. The 194? Amendments: 
Legalization of the "Wetbacks" 
A 194? Amendment to the 1943 Agreement on importa-
tion of workers from Mexico, concerned the employment of 
Mexicans in the State ot Texas who had entered that State 
illegally.21 As a consequence ot the unilateral action ot 
Mexico in rorbidding her nationals to enter Texas under 
work contracts, thousands had entered illegally and found 
20ibid., PP• 2, ?. 
21Mexican Agricultural Workers, Fe,al Employment !! 
Certain Workers-~Entered the State o exas Illegally, 
Supplementary Agreement Between the United States and Mexico 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 194?). 
employment in the Rio Grande Valley and over most of 
Southern Texas. Representatives of the United States 
and Mexico held conversations in 1945 and 1946 to 
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devise a system under the Agreement of 1943, for recruit-
ing Mexicans already illegally in the United States. 
They reached no mutually satisfactory understanding.22 
In 194?, Mexico desired the "legalization" of 
"wetback•" or Mexicans who had entered illegally, since 
-it appeared to be a way tor her to regain control over 
her nationals. Moreover, it was an answer to the request 
of the United States for the admission of more legal 
labor. Mexico did not want to lose any more of her labor 
supply and American employers were glad to see a legal 
measure which would give them experienced workers without 
the paysent of transportation costs from the interior of 
Mexico. 23 
A statement was made that the Government of Mexico 
was not responsible for the "tactual situation" of the 
presence of a considerable number of Mexican workers 
illegally in the State of Texas. As an exceptional 
22Rasmussen, ~· ~., p. 220. 
23Report of the President's Commission on Migra-
tory labor, 2£• £!!•, p. 52. 
measure, the two governments decided to make contracts 
and legalize the "wetbacks" in Texas only that they 
aigbt continue to work there with 
the understanding that this attitude will not 
constitute a precedent nor can it be invoked 
in the future, since the Government of Mexico 
remains firm in its determination not to per-
mit, under the protection of existing conven-
tions, that persons of Mexican nationality be 
contracted to work in States of the United 
States in which there may exist discrimination 
against Mexicans, a problem which, on the other 
hand, in so far as Texas is concerned, seems 
to be on the road to a favorable solution, in 
view of the repeated proofs of friendship and 
of good will which the Honorable Beauford 
Jester, Governor of said State, has shown 
towards Mexico.24 
Mexico inserted in the agreement that the act would not 
serve as a precedent for future legalization of illegal 
"wetbacks.n2S 
145 
About 55,000 illegal aliena from Mexico had their 
status legalized at that time. The number imported in 
1947 under the 1943 Agreement was only 19,632, but with 
those remaining from previous years, the total under con-
tract reached 31,000. Therefore, the majority of Mexican 
nationals in the United States during 1947 were legalized 
"wetbaeks." 
24Legal Employment of Certain Workers Who Entered 
the State of Texas Illegally, ~· ~., P• 2. 
25Report of the President's Commission on Migra-
tory Labor, op. cit., P• 52. 
In a separate document, the United States and 
Mexico agreed that in addition to those coming under 
the agreement regarding Mexicans illegally in Texas, 
certain other Mexicans illegally in the United States 
should be placed under contract according to the pro-
visions or the existing agreement for Mexican Contract 
Agricultural Labor.26 About 119,000 illegal Mexican 
residents or the United States could then be placed 
under contract. 
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Farmers making the contracts had to comply with 
provisions for endorsing the contracts in Mexican terri-
tory by an official or the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service of the United States, as an indication that the 
American farmers had complied with the United States 
immigration laws and had received authorization to eon-
tract for Mexican workers. Therefore, a representative 
of a Mexican Inter-departmental Commission was empowered 
to sign the contracts in Mexico. The Mexicans would be 
returned to Mexico through specific border ports of 
Mexicali, Ciudad Juarez, and Raynosa. Transportation 
costs to and from the border points to places of employ-
ment were, as usual, charged against the employers. 
26Mexican Agricultural Workers, Legal Em!loyment of 
.Certain Workers Who Entered the United States I legally,--
Department ot state Publication #3232 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1949). 
Both delegations signing the agreement pledged 
their governments to use "all methods of vigilance" to 
-
impede the illegal migration of Mexican workers. 
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Farmers who continued to use illegal entrants as workers 
would be denied the right to contract for the use ot 
legal Mexican labor. A plea was included by the Mexican 
Delegation for the United States to study legal measures 
under which "United States employers who contract or use 
illegally migrated Mexican workers may suffer adequate 
sanction.tt27 
~he root of the whole matter was that those who 
employed "wetbacka" would have to be punished if the 
·-
"wetback" invasion were to be stopped. At that time, it 
was practically impossible to keep "wetbacks" from enter-
ing and staying in the United States since they would 
accept any kind of subsistence level employment. One 
logical measure of control, in addition to other neces-
sities, would be to make it a crime and establish appro-
priate penalties for the employment of foreign nationals 
known to have entered illegally. ~e American Congress 
refused to adopt this type or contro1.28 
2?Ibid., p. 3 • 
28congressional Record, ~· .!!_:!:.·, pp. 803-813. 
Mexico promised its control as rar as possible 
on the sale of bus and railroad tickets to groups of 
Mexicans when they appeared to be proceeding to the 
United States border. In this way, an accumulation of 
Mexicans at the United States' rrontier would be pre-
vented. Residents of the border towns of Mexico might 
not be put under contract for work in the interior of 
the United States, but would be given an identification 
card known as card form 5-C, permitting them to enter 
nearby towns across the border but not to contract for 
work. 
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This Agreement became effective on March 10, 1947 
replacing two earlier modirioations dated June 2, 1944, 
and January 9, 1945. In agreeing to the contracts, the 
United States emphasized that she could not agree to 
police the contracts to insure compliance, but would 
do all in her power to insure that workers mi.ght have 
the same remedies (use of the courts) available to 
citizens of the United States in the same field of 
employment. 
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G. The 1948 Agreement 
The new Agreement or 1948 remedied one criticism 
directed at previous treaties by providing that eon-
tracts would be made directly between the employer and 
the worker, within speciried areas, and included a con-
tract form as a pattern.29 
The procedure ror acquiring workers began when 
an employer obtained a certirication from the United 
States Department of Labor to the effect that workers 
were needed in a speeiric area and that workers were not 
available at the prevailing wage. Then the employer 
would get a written authorization from the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service of the United States for a 
certain number or workers. When these preliminaries 
had been attended to, the United States authorities would 
inform the Mexican government, three months in advance, 
of its actual labor needs. 
The workers, themselves, would then receive advance 
notice or the exact type of work, the climate where they 
would be sent, and the wages to be paid. The employer 
29Temtorary Migration of Mexican A'ricultural Work-
ers Agreemen Between the United States o America ana---
liiico, 1948 (Washington: GOvernment Printing oftice;-1948) 
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would post sufficient bond to cover their transportation 
costs and would also pay for food, lodging, and other 
incidentals including shipment of thirty-five kilograms 
(about seventy-two pounds) of baggage. United States 
Public Health and Mexican authorities both participated 
in giving workers the necessary physical examination in 
Mexico. However, if the worker did not pass the addi-
tional physical examination at the United States border, 
he was returned to the place of contract without expense 
to the worker. 
Provisions regarding wages and workmen's compen-
sation were almost the same as in the previous agreement. 
Another section states that should the employer incur 
expense due to the negligent act of a third person, he 
would be subrogated to the rights of the worker for any 
amount paid in the behalf or benefit of the worker by the 
employer. Mexican Consuls, their representatives, and 
agents of the United States Employment Service were given 
access to the place of employment for the protection of 
the worker and also to maintain good relations between 
employer and worker. The United States Immigration and 
Naturalization Service might withdraw the authorization 
previously granted an employer for violation of the 
Individual Work Agreement by the employer or the worker. 
Since there is no statutory authorization or 
enabling act, the Department of Labor refrained from 
attempting to set a weekly or hourly wage rate for the 
Mexican contract workers. Obligatory savings of ten 
percent would be withheld from the worker's pay and 
the amount would be remitted to him in the form of a 
check upon termination of his employment. The check 
would be validated by the United States Immigration 
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and Naturalization Service as he crossed the border into 
Mexico and would be payable through any bank in that 
country. 
Both governments reiterated promises to take 
necessary measures against the flow of illegal "wetbacks" 
and to insure their prompt repatriation. The agreement 
might be terminated by thirty days• notice from either 
party. 
The Agreement of 1948 was for agricultural workers 
only. It did not mention a specific number of contract 
workers, but Mexico limited the number to 75,000. Although 
the numbers which might be admitted were limited, many 
objections were raised in the United States against the 
renewal of what had been intended as a war measure. Some 
thought the influx would hurt the chances of American 
laborers looking for jobs on farms, and that such agreeaents 
might become permanent and would lower American living 
standards. Neither Mexican nor United States farm 
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labor representatives were present in the negotiations, 
and it was argued that the agreements reflected interests 
ot large growers particularly in regard to the three-
fourths time ot employment and the specified hourly wage. 
Opposition also existed in Mexico where it was 
contended that the agreement violated the labor standards 
ot the Mexican Constitution. According to that document, 
wages should be set by conailiation with workers and 
employers. It was also felt that workers' rights were 
being violated, because they did not receive consideration 
according to Mexican practice concerning double time for 
overtime, wage payments, deductions, accident compensation, 
medical attention, housing, jurisdiction, inspection, 
arbitration, legal aid, and bonding required of foreign 
employers. 
Objections by organized labor in the United States 
were just as vociferous. The National Farm Labor Union 
observed that in the past large growers had used Mexican 
nationals to help break legitimate farm strikes.30 
!Onsummer Brings the Mexicans," Commonweal, 48:2?5-
278, July ... 2, 1948. 
According to the agreement, growers would contract to 
pay a certain wage, and Mexican workers had no way of 
knowing the conditions which would indicate whether 
it was the proper wage for the area. The actual cost 
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of living was never a consideration with United States 
farm workers, and it was argued that it should not 
necessarily be considered with Mexican workers. Organ-
ized labor opposed the provision that employers could 
pay at the piece rate scale if they so desired. Mexican 
workers contracted for the "prevailing wage," usually 
-based on the wage of the previous year. If an employer 
asked for Mexican labor because of non-availability of 
local labor due to the wage, the employer could utilize 
that very situation to prevent the local labor from 
attempting to increase the wage. 
Organized labor further contended that the state-
ment concerning medical attention for Mexican workers was 
insufficient. They claimed that other guarantees covering 
housing, accident compensation, and compensation for occu-
pational diseases supposed to be in accordance with pro-
visions for other workers, were mere hollow assertions, 
since agricultural workers in the United States were 
generally excluded from such benefits. 
Furthermore. adequate grievance procedure for 
Mexican workers had not been provided under either the 
Agreement of 1948 or 1943. If representatives of Mexi-
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can workers were very active they were labelled "agitators" 
and sent home. The United States had no agency to enforce 
the declaration of no discrimination against Mexican 
workers. The new agreement did not continue terms of 
the 1943 Agreement for Mexican Labor Inspectors. The 
two governments could change the contracts without con-
sulting the workers or employers. The employer, not 
the worker, had the right to terminate the contract before 
the expiration of six months, and the worker could not 
transfer to another employer of his own volition, but 
the employer could, within certain limits, transfer the 
worker to another location.31 
As a result of these inequalities, Mexican workers 
as a rule did not want to sign up for a full six month 
period. Illegal "wetbaeks" were swarming in to fill the 
gap. Jails could not hold all the second offenders. Bid-
ding for "wetback&" became so keen that Texas farmers 
accused the growers in New Mexico of luring their "wetbacks" 
away with promise of higher pay.32 
31rbid., P• 278 • 
............ 
32Newsweek. Vol. 32 (October 25• 1948), P• so. 
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There£ore, it seems clear that the Agreement or 
1948 was not realistic, considering the inflation in 
Mexico, the drought in Northern Mexico, and the immedi-
ate short period labor needs of farmers working small 
tracts. 
The 1948 Agreement made no mention of legalizing 
the status of "wetbacks." This omission brought about 
some difficulties on the operation of the contract 
system. In October, 1948, a great number of Mexicans 
had accumulated at the border seeking admission to the 
United States. One large group of Mexican workers 
gathered in Juarez, Mexico, across from El Paso, Texas. 
Many had spent their last funds for transportation and 
food, yet, they were confident of finding work in the 
United States. Mexican and United States officials 
hastily conferred about establishing a recruiting center 
in Juarez. There was some delay. The workers grew rest-
less. Cotton in Texas was opening, and soon frost would 
threaten the sugar beet crop in Colorado. Mexico still 
delayed in taking any action to alleviate the confusion. 
Agents from hundreds of miles away were waiting for 
permission to contract for the workers. 
Thousands of braceros had gathered at the 
race track, often used by Villistas and other 
revolutionaries in besieging the strategic 
border city. They were hungry and bitter--
and ripe for a desperate move.33 
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At last, farm agents were given certificates of authori-
zation by the Immigration Service to employ the Mexicans. 
President Truman arrived in El Paso in October, 
1948 on his famous election campaign tour, and farm agents, 
sugar company officials, and the Immigration Service 
presented their problem to him. After President Truman 
lett El Paso, word went around that the Mexican workers 
would be permitted to cross the bridge into the United 
States with or without sanction by Mexico. Farmers had 
their trucks waiting a few hundred yards from the river. 
The Great Western Sugar Company representative obtained 
the use of a special train and had it ready in the El 
Paso depot yard. His "office" was behind a billboard near 
the Immigration headquarters.34 Recruiting was completed 
in Juarez without the authorization of the Mexican govern-
ment. Many of the United States farmers knowing the 
hunger of the Mexicans, had provided bread, bologna, and 
33nThe Wetback Invasion," Art Leibson, quoted in 
Wetbacks-~A Preliminart Re~ort, .. by George I. Sanchez and 
Lyle Saunders, {Unpubl she ), University of Texas Library, 
Austin, 1950. 
3f.rb1d., P• 14. 
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other appropriate food. For twenty-tour hours, workers 
walked across the bridge to El Paso, and the Immigration 
Service looked the other way. Truckloads of Mexican 
workers left the city without interference. Other 
workers stampeded across the railroad bridge near the 
Immigration Headquarters. In Juarez, troops attempting 
to hold back the masses were overpowered. In about 
forty-eight hours more than 7,500 Mexican workers had 
crossed over into the United States, were processed and 
turned over to the farmers and recruiting agents. This 
"processing" merely amounted to the technical arrest of 
a worker by the Immigration Service and then his "parole" 
to the Texas Employment Commission. The workers were 
then sent directly to the farms with the help of the 
Border Patrol officers to get them away from the border 
and into the fields.35 One of the conditions of the 
parole verified by the United States Commissioner or the 
Immigration Service was that the laborers would be paid 
according to the terms or the international agreement 
then in effeet.36 
On October 18, 1948, Mr. R. A. Cortez, National 
President of the League of United Latin American Citizens 
35Newsweek,Vo1. 32, (October 25, 1948), p. 80, and 
The New York Times, March 25-29, 1951~ (a series of arti-
C!is-oy n!iawyn Hill on the "wetbacks") 
36nThe Wetback Invasi~n," Art Leibson, 2E• ~· 
(LULAC), sent a telegram to President Truman protesting 
the El Paso affair, since Mr. Cortez believed that this 
act by the Immigration Service would bring peonage to 
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the illegal entrants and lower wages in the United States. 
The following is the text of the telegram sent to 
President Harry s. Truman, Attorney General Tom Clark, 
and Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico by Mr. R. A. 
Cortez on October 18, 1948: 
OUr organization has been endeavoring to 
uplift the economic and social standards of 
Americans of Latin-American descent for 
twenty years (stop). The action of the United 
States immigration authorities as reported by 
the press in allowing an avalanche of illegal 
Mexican labor signifies the lowering of wage 
standards almost to a peonage level and will 
force thousands of native born and naturalized 
Americans to uproot their families, suspend 
the education of their children and migrate to 
other states in search of a living wage (stop). 
To nearly three million Hispanic Americans in 
Southwestern and Western United States this 
action represents a violation of our fundamen-
tal American principles and a retardation of 
our progress (stop). We protest most emphati-
cally; we ask for an investigation of the vio-
lation of our Federal laws and we demand the 
immediate deportation of all persons who are 
in the United States illegally.37 
The following is the reply received by Mr. Cortezz 
!?George I. Sanchez and Lyle Saunders, Wetbacks, 
! Prelimina~ Retort !2 The AdvisoH Commi ttee,._Study 
of sbanisE ;peak ng People; (The U~verslty of Texas, 
UnplJ. !!shed), p. 34. . . 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Washington 25, D. c. 
Office of the Commissioner 
Dear Mr. Cortez: 
October 26, 1948 
56265 333 
To expedite a reply the Attorney General has re-
quested that we respond to your telegram of October 18, 
1948, in which you express concern regarding reports 
which recently appeared in the press to the effect that 
this Service 'allowed admission' of, or 'let down the 
bars' to illegal Mexican farm l~borers. 
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At the outset I should like to state that it was 
inaccurate and misleading to refer to the situation 
which arose the week before last at El Paso as 'letting 
downor'the bars to illegal immigration.' The facts of 
the matter are that pursuant to the International Agree-
ment of February 21, 1948, relating to the importation 
of Mexican agricultural laborers to be used exclusively 
in such employment after certificates of need for their 
services have been issued by the United States Employ-
ment Service, the Mexican Government agreed to establish 
a recruiting center at Juarez to supply workers urgently 
needed in New Mexico and in the intermountain states. 
Various employers bad been granted certificates 
of need and their applications to import specified num-
bers of agricultural laborers under the immigration 
laws had been approved. These employers had proceeded 
to El Paso for the purpose of recruiting workers, but 
dangerous delay elapsed without any recruiting center 
having been established in Juarez. In the meantime an 
almost total loss of the sugar beet crop was being 
threatened by the delay as well as the loss of millions 
of dollars' worth of cotton which was open and ready 
for picking. At the same time thousands of Mexican 
agricultural workers, many of them on the verge of star-
vation, had assembled for the purpose of being recruited 
under the program by United States' growers. Finally 
the news having spread to the workers that employers 
were waiting in El Paso to commence employing them, they 
proceeded to flock across the river in large numbers. 
The Border Patrol, with all of its facilities greatly 
overtaxed, continued, as it had done for some weeks, to 
apprehend them in large numbers and return them to 
Mexico. Eventually the situation became so critical 
from the standpoint of both the need of the employers 
and the need of the workers, that it was decided, 
strictly as a temporary emergency measure, to parole 
the arrested aliens and defer their removal to Mexico 
until the crops in question have been harvested. 
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The conditions of the parole were that the aliens 
be paid.prevailing wages, that the employers comply with 
all other terms of the international agreement relating 
to conditions of employment, and return the workers to 
Mexico at the termination of their contracts. Inciden-
tally, the paroling of the aliens was discontinued on 
October 18th, the needs of the employers as certified 
to by the United States Employment Service having been 
filled. I may add that teams of Border Patrol officers 
of this Service are being d8tailed into the areas where 
these aliens are employed for the purpose of inspecting 
conditions of employment and to ascertain that the 
agreed upon wages are being paid; also to prevent the 
aliens from drifting into other areas and into other 
types of employment. At the termination of their present 
employment the aliens are to be returned to Mexico. In 
fact, on October 22nd, 200 of these aliens were returned 
to Mexico and they will continue to be returned at the 
rate O'f from one to several hundred per day until all have 
departed. 
As to complaints which have been received since 
the appearance of the press reports concerning the situa-
tion at El Paso on the general subject of illegal Mexican 
immigration and its effect upon domestic workers, it may 
interest you to know that during the first three months 
of the current fiscal year the Border Patrol, on the 
Mexican border alone, apprehended and returned to Mexico 
80,322 Mexican nationals who bad entered or were attempt-
ing to enter illegally. In addition, substantial numbers 
were apprehended in other parts of the country and re-
turned to Mexico. During the last two fiscal years, 
Border Patrol apprehensions numbered 193,852 and 194,954 
respectively and, again, these figures do not include 
substantial numbers of Mexican nationals apprehended in 
the interior of the country and returned to Mexico.38 
38Ibid. p. 34. _, 
Sincerely yours, 
Watson B. Miller 
. {Signed_) 
Commissioner 
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The reply received by Mr. Cortez from Commissioner 
Watson B. Miller, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Washington D. c., apparently intended to affirm the in-
tention of the United States to comply with the agree-
ments to stop the "wetback" traffic. However, the 
incident at El Paso was only a minor emergency requiring 
summary action which had been caused by (1) Mexico's 
failure to place a recruiting station at Juarez as 
promised; (2) the existence of a critical situation among 
the nearly starving Mexican workers; and (3) the possible 
loss of millions of dollars of crops if they had not been 
gathered immediately.39 The incident termed an "invasion'' 
was also known as the"October Incident" or the "El Paso 
Incident of 1948."40 In Washington, Mexico protested 
that the incident was a treaty violation and in the El 
Paso Valley immigration officials began again to round 
up "•etbacks" who had just arrived and to hustle them back 
to Mexico, but the emergency or finding sufficient laborers 
had been met by an extraordinary illegal process and had 
passed. 
Generally, the wages received by Mexican workers 
39rbid., p. 34. 
40Report·of the President's Commission on Migratory 
Labor, ~· ~., P• 52. 
admitted at El Paso did not meet the requirements of 
any agreement since they varied from twenty to thirty-
seven cents an hour. When this became evident, Mexico 
gave notice to terminate the Agreement of 1948. During 
all of 1949, only 35,000 Mexicans were imported legally 
from the interior of Mexico. 
H. The 1949 Agreement 
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In August, 1949, a new agreement filled the void. 
It differed from its predecessors in minor details and 
gave preference to the legalization of "wetbacks" already 
in the United States over further legal contracts for 
labor from Mexico. 41 The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service immediately saw this legalization as a threat to 
the enforcement of immigration laws and opposed it. The 
Agreement allowed an alien to be "deported to the border" 
where United States authorities would give him an identi-
fication slip. Slip in hand, he would then step across 
the line, subject himself to token deportation and return 
as an ordinary alien. Thus purged of his illegal status, 
he could sign a contract allowing-him to stay in the United 
States for the duration of his employment.42 "Wetbacks" 
41International Executive Afreement, Afreement of 
Au,ust 1,.1949 Govern!~ the Mi!da ion of Mex can Agri~ 
cu tura'I worl!irs, Pamph eriaaue joint!Y by the Comm s-
sioner or Immigration and Naturalization and the Director 
of the United States Employment Service, August, 1949. 
42Report of the President's Commission on Migra-
tory Labor, £2• cit., p. 53. 
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who were apprehended at the time the agreement went into 
effect, were transported to a border town where workers 
were ordinarily contracted and returned to the United 
States. The Mexicans called this "walking around the 
statue."43 
Periodically, Mexico agreed to extend the date 
within which "wetbacks" could legalize their status in 
the United States, and at this time it was extended to 
October 20, 1950. This action explains why few legally 
contracted workers entered the United States under the 
1949 Agreement and why most of the laborers during this 
period were legalized "wetbacks." "In 1949, 19,625 
Mexican farm workers were contracted in the interior 
of Mexico, and in the same year, a complimentary number 
of 87,220 •wetback&' was legalized.n44 
In the 1949 Agreement, both governments promised 
to take all necessary measures to curb the illegal traffic 
in "wetback•" and the United States agreed to inform Mexi-
co as to the number of "wetbacka" found in the United 
43The !!! ~ Times, March 28, 1951. 
4~eport of the President's Commission on Migra-
tory Labor, !£• ~., P• 53. 
States. However, the real effect of extending the date 
for legalization was to place a premium on the illegal 
invaders and increase the flow. 
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The United States agreed to send the Mexican 
government notice of the number of workers needed sixty 
days prior to the date of contracting. Within thirty 
days, the Mexican government agreed to notify the United 
States of the actual number available at the contracting 
centers. Hew contracting centers would be set up b7 
Mexico at Hermosillo, Sonora; Chihuahua, Chihuahua; and 
Monterrey, Nuevo Leon. 
Agents equipped with certification of need from 
the United States Employment Service and written authori-
zation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
would be allowed to contract workers in Mexico at the 
specified centers. The Mexican Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs required three copies of certification of which 
one copy was sent to the appropriate Mexican Consulate 
General in the United States. Mexican authorities proa-
ised-to furnish the workers as they went through the con-
tracting centers with complete information on wages, 
working conditions, climate, name and address of employer, 
and other data concerning their employment. Only quali-
fied and experienced agricultural workers would be eligible. 
There was a modification in the duration of the 
contract. It could not be for less than four months 
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nor more than six months except in "cotton agricultural 
operations" which could be for three month•! duration 
and in the sugar beet agricultural operations where it 
could be for six weeks. Those who had their "im.igra-
tion status adjusted"·-former "wetbacks" now legalized--
received preference for employment in the sugar beet 
industry. Workers might extend their contracts, but 
they could never remain in the United States for more 
than one year. 
Mexican workers would receive the prevailing 
wage for similar work perfo~d by domestic agricultural 
workers within the same area. It was also stated that 
the United States Employment Service would not make 
certification on any job order which provide~ a wage 
rate insufficient to meet the workers• needs. A sub-
standard wage rate caused by the presence of illegal 
workers in an area would be sufficient cause to reject 
requests for certification of need for contract workers. 
Where Mexican contract laborers were employed temporarily 
at specialized tasks, such as, operating vehicles or 
machinery, they would be paid a higher wage in accordance 
with the local scale. 
The agreement declared that Mexicans would not 
be sent to areas where discrimination against them 
existed. Alleged acts of discrimination were investi-
gated, and if the matter could not be settled at the 
lower echelons, it could be referred to diplomatic 
channels. If adjustment could not be made at the 
Washington level, termination of.the speciric contract 
under consideration would follow. 
Grievance procedure remained almost the same. 
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Complaints could be initiated by the workers, employers, 
or officials concerned with the program. The procedure 
was carefully outlined and required a joint investigation. 
Employers and workers continued to be bound by provisions 
of their contract& while conciliation procedures were in 
progress. They were also bound by the joint final deter-
mination of the Mexican Consul General and the United 
States Employment Service. Ir litigation ensued and a 
worker won a case, an employer would be liable for 
attorney's fees not to exceed $50.00 in any one case. 
In another section several points concerning 
transportation costs were clarified. An employer would 
pay the costs of passage of the worker from the point 
of contract in Mexico to the place of employment in the 
United States, and also food, lodging, and other incidental 
expenses en route. He also was responsible for the 
cost of return fare to the worker's home, but this 
was modified to stipulate that if employed in the 
area of Laredo or Brownsville, Texas, his expenses 
would be paid no further south than Ramos, Arizpe, 
Coahuila; in the area of El Paso, Texas, no further 
than Chihuahua, Chihuahua; and in the area of Nogales, 
4rizona, no further than Hermosillo, Sonora. Workers 
who abandoned their contracts would be returned to 
Mexico under procedures established by the Un~ted 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
The Agreement of 1949 could be amended by mutual 
consent and could be terminated by either party with 
thirty days' notice. Another agreement had been 
reached by the force of hard labor in the diplomatic 
field. 
16? 
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I. The 1951 Agreement 
In July, 1951, the 82nd Congress enacted Public 
Law 78, an amendment to "Title V - Agricultural Workers" 
of the Agricultural Act of 1948.45 It dealt specifi-
cally with Mexican agricultural workers and provided 
for their recruitment and housing in the United States 
until they could be employed. It stated that the United 
States would assume payment of transportation and sub-
sistence for the workers, but that reim~ursement from 
prospective employers would be required. 
The Act and the resulting Agreement with Mexico 
in August, 1951 supplied corrections of many shortcom-
ings and criticisms leveled at previous agreements. 
According to the Act and the Agreement, the Secretary 
of Labor must first determine and certify specific 
conditions: (l) that sufficient workers were not avail-
able at the time and place required; (2) that the 
introduction of Mexican workers would not adversely 
affect wages and working conditions of others similarly 
45united States Department of Labor, Information 
Concerning Entri of Mexican Agricultural Workers to the 
United states, greement Between Governments of unitea-
states and Mexico ooncern1ng Mi~rant Labor, A~roved 
Au~st ~1; PUblic Law 78, 82ri Con~ress; In vidual 
Wo~ Contract (Washington: Governmen Printing office, 
im). 
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employed; and (3) that reasonable efforts had been made 
to attract domestic workers "for such employment at 
wages and standard hours of work comparable to those 
offered to foreign workers." No person known to be 
using "wetback" labor would be permitted to contract for 
legal Mexican workers. According to the Act, the term 
"agricultural employment" included all related activity, 
such as "horticultural employment, cotton ginning, com-
pressing and storing, crushing of oil seeds, and picking, 
canning, freezing, drying or other processing of perish-
able or seasonable agricultural products."46 
The Agreement of August, 1951,was very comprehen-
sive and indicated that more attention had been given to 
its drafting than the previous agreements and that mis-
understandings occasioned by loosely drawn documents 
coupled with experience in their application made the 
revision necessary. First, a series of definitions ot 
terms was given, then an outline of procedure. Mexico 
agreed to set up Migratory Stations at various points in 
the interior. Mexico required thirty days' notice as to 
the number of workers needed. Fifteen days after receipt 
of the notice, Mexico would notify the Secretary of Labor 
46 ~., P• 111. 
of the number available in the Migratory Stations to 
be contracted and sent to Reception Centers in the 
United States. The Secretary of Labor would notify 
the Mexican government two weeks in advance of the 
date upon which he desired the Migratory Stations to 
start operations. Each government would take all nec-
essary action to eliminate delay after the recruiting 
began. They also agreed on permanent Migratory or 
Recruiting Stations in Mexico and Reception Centers 
in the United Sta.tes. Workers would not remain at 
Reception Centers for more than five days. After 
reaching that point they could be reje~ted only for 
reasons of health or national security. Costs of 
transportation and subsistence from Migratory Station 
to Reception Center continued to be paid by the United 
States to be recouped from the employers. 
1?0 
Those ineligible to contract for Mexican workers 
were those who (1) had failed to meet obligations on 
previous contracts; (2) had employed illegal Mexican 
labor after certification had been issued to that area; 
(3) bad employed illegal Mexican labor after thirty days 
from the date of this new agreement; (4) had tried to 
employ workers for the use of another employer classed 
as ineligible; (5) would contract for Mexican workers 
in an establishment operated by two or more persons, 
any of whom is not eligible to contract for Mexican 
workers; or (6) owned premises on which the Secretary 
of Labor found facilities for sanitation, housing, or 
water inadequate to terms of the agreement. The 
Secretary of Labor could permit certification of an 
employer, but he might not permit Mexican workers to 
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be available if such employer had hired any Mexican 
national whom he knew or had reasonable grounds "to 
believe or suspect or by reasonable inquiry could have 
ascertained" was not lawfully in the United States. 
When it was determined that an employer was utilizing 
illegal laborers, action would be taken within three 
days to remove legally contracted workers from his 
premises and to take the illegal workers into custody. 
Special precautions were included that no intermediaries 
or agencies operating for profit might participate in 
contracting for Mexican workers. 
The Mexican government has been very sensitive to 
any act which might be construed as discriminatory 
against its nationals in the United States. According 
to the new agreement, the Mexican Ministry of Foreign 
Relations would furnish the Secretary of Labor with a 
list ot communities where it considered that discrimination 
against Mexicans existed. lt the Secretary of Labor 
found the allegations correct, he would refuse certi-
fication for that area. If he did not agree with the 
Mexican Ministry, and a certification of need for 
Mexican workers was desired, the local Mexican Consul 
might request the chief officer of the local law 
enforcement agency to pledge for the community that 
no acts of discrimination would be perpetrated. The 
Mexican government would then permit employment of 
Mexicans in those areas where a pledge was furnished. 
If acts of discrimination were alleged thereafter, the 
Mexican Consul might request a joint investigation with 
the Secretary of Labor. 
Under the agreement, preference would be given 
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to workers of United States citizenship. If it were 
determined that sufficient workers in the United States 
were available for work being done by Mexican nationals, 
the Secretary of Labor would immediately notify the 
local Mexican Consul and the employer that certification 
would be withdrawn and the contract terminated. Terms 
of the work contract could not be changed by employers 
or workers without consent of the two governments con-
cerned.47 All contracts would last for not less than 
47rbid., p. 4. 
six weeks nor more than six months, a clause entered 
to satisfy a previous objection by the Mexican workers 
themselves. 
Wages were again to be the prevailing wage for 
domestic agricultural workers in the area or the rate 
stated in the contract, whichever was greater. No 
certification would be issued for an area in which the 
Secretary of Labor had found the wage rate adversely 
affected by the employment of "wetbacks." 
Legally contracted workers would be guaranteed 
employment for three-fourths of the time after their 
arrival at their place of employment in the United 
States, and their transportation would be charged to 
their employers. Mexican workers could not be used 
by the employers to fill any vacancies occurring on 
account of strikes or lockouts. All employers were 
required to keep employment records as prescribed by 
the Secretary of Labor. 
As to personal injury or occupational disease, 
Mexican workers would be protected by applicable state 
laws in most cases. In the absence of state law re-
quirements, employers would carry an insurance policy 
satisfactory to the Mexican government or furnish 
indemnity bond to secure the payment of benefits. 
1?3 
Work contracts provided a minimum schedule of payments 
for personal injury or death ranging from twenty-five 
dollars for loss of a finger to a thousand dollars in 
case of death. Employers must notify the representative 
of the Secretary of Labor and the nearest Mexican Consul 
in the event of serious injury, illness, death, or 
refusal of Mexican workers to complete their contracts. 
Employers must permit representatives of the 
Secretary of Labor and officials of the Department of 
Justice to visit the places of employment. Visits by 
Mexican Consuls would be coordinated with those by the 
representatives of the Secretary of Labor and would be 
in accordance with right granted under the Consular 
Convention between the United States and Mexico, signed 
August 12, 1942. Refusal to give access would consti-
tute a violation of contract and was sufficient cause 
to revoke the certification of authorization by the 
Secretary of Labor. 
Should an employer desire to terminate a contract 
before its normal date of expiration because of matters 
beyond his control, he would notify representatives of 
the Department of Labor, the United States Department of 
Justice, the Mexican workers involved, and the appro-
priate Mexican Consul. If the Mexican Consul objected 
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to the decision to terminate the contract for reasons 
beyond the employer's control, he might arrange with the 
Secretary of Labor for a joint investigation in accord-
ance with Article 30 of the Migrant Labor Agreement of 
1951. 
If the workers were no longer needed, the work 
contract could be terminated and the workers returned 
to their reception center at the expense of the employer. 
Work contracts could be extended with the consent or the 
worker, the Mexican Consul and the Secretary of Labor, 
for a period not to exceed a total of one year. No 
worker would be allowed to remain in the United States 
for a period exceeding one year at any one time. 
Mexican workers could be transferred only with 
their expressed consent, with the issuance of a prior 
certification, with notification of the Mexican Consul, 
and without entrance of an objection within ten days by 
the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations. If a transfer 
involved a change in employer, additional requirements 
must be met, namely, that the worker had not been employed 
for less than six weeks, that the new employer should be 
eligible and would sign a work contract as provided by 
the agreement, that the original employer had paid all 
sums due, and that the Mexican Ministry of Foreign 
Relations raised no objection within ten days after the 
local Mexican Consul had been notified. The Mexican 
Consul and Secretary of Labor also had to approve any 
settlement of a claim. 
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Enforcement procedures for the various provisions 
of the contract were much more specific than those of 
previous agreements. Mexican workers had the right to 
elect their own representatives for negotiation on anr 
appropriate matter with the employer. Contract viola-
tions by either workers or employers would be brought 
to the attention of the Secretary of Labor. The repre-
sentative of the Secretary would then inform the other 
person involved in the contract, and if the accused 
person would not take corrective measures, the Mexican 
Consul and the Secretary of Labor would conduct a joint 
investigation. If the investigation revealed that the 
employer was at fault and corrective measures we?e no.t 
taken, the Secretary of Labor might take steps to cancel 
the authorization upon request of the Mexican Consul. 
The employer would then be requested to pay all his 
obligations under the contract, and the three-fourths 
payment guarantee would apply to the whole contract. If 
the workers were at fault and refused to make necessary 
corrections, the employer might terminate the contract. 
The Mexican worker would be returned to the Reception 
Center at the expense or the employer, but he would not 
be entitled to the three-fourths guarant~e, nor be 
eligible for further work under contract. 
In the event of a complaint by a Mexican worker 
or by the Mexican Consul to the Secretary of Labor, a 
preliminary investigation would be made by the Secretary 
of Labor. The Secretary would inform the Mexican Consul 
of his findings, and if desired, a joint investigation 
could then be made. Upon complaint by an employer that 
the work of Mexicans under contract was not satisfactory, 
the procedure would be the same. If the authorities 
determined jointly that the employer's complaint was 
justified, the contract would be terminated without cost 
to the worker who would be returned to an appropriate 
Reception Center. Complaints would be investigatedd 
within ten days. 
If the Regional Representative of the Secretary 
of Labor and the Mexican Consul were not able to reach 
an agreement after joint investigation, a matter would 
be referred to Washington for Joint determination by a 
representative of the Mexican Government and the Secre-
tary of Labor. If either party to the original dispute 
was not satisfied with the decision, he might give written 
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notice within five days after receipt of the decision 
and request a review. If either should request a review, 
a final decision would be made at the same level in 
Washington. The status guo would continue as far as 
practicable while the investigation was pending. The 
United States guaranteed that the employer would per-
form his duty under the work contract and that wages 
and transportation costa would be paid. The employer 
would agree that the Secretary of Labor's determination 
on wage and transportation costs would be binding. Any 
amount found in default by an employer, due to a Mexican 
worker, would be paid by the United States Government 
within twenty days or as promptly as possible. 
Work contracts were minutely detailed concerning 
duties and rights of the persons involved. A worker 
could be given a furlough, but his travel to and from 
Mexico would be at his own expense. Sums due a Mexican 
worker would be paid to his beneficiaries in the event 
of his death. The employer would agree to protect the 
laborers from all immoral and illegal influences of pro-
fessional gamblers, vendors of intoxicating liquors, and 
others engaged in deleterious activities. 
Both governments repeated their desire to take all 
possible measures for the elimination of "wetback" traffic, 
and set the Agreement to last for six months beginning 
August 11, 1951. However, the success of the treaty 
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has been such that with some changes it is still in 
operation. It is much more complete and explicit than 
its antecedents and demonstrates the results of practice 
and experience. 
J. Amendments to the 
Migratory Labor Agreement of 1951 
A minor change went into effect at the request of 
the Mexican government, when Article 6 of the Agreement 
of 1951 was amended to read "appropriate" instead of 
"nearest" in reference to the Migration Station to which 
workers would be returned at the end of their employment. 48 
After due consideration, the Governments of Mexico 
and the United States extended the agreement to May 11, 
1952. On May 19, 1952, an extension was granted to keep 
it in force until December 31, 1953. At that time, there 
were a number of modifications especially in the require-
ments for keeping records as demanded by the Work Contracts.49 
48Treaties and Other International Acta, Series 2531, 
Mexican Agricultural Workers, Agreement Between the United 
States of America and Mexico, Amending and Extending Agree-
ment of August 11, 1951, entered into force April 9, 1942. 
49Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 2586, 
Mexican Agricultural Workers, Agreement Between the United 
States of America and Mexico, Department of State Publica-
tion #4884. 
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Opposition to the agreement continued on both 
sides of the Rio Grande, and complaints of unfair treat-
ment and discrimination continued to rise. Neither 
government was ready for a long range agreement, but a 
provisional extension was drawn up on December 31, 1953 
which read in part as follows: 
The Government of Mexico is willing to have 
the Agreement continue in force provisionally 
until such time as the conversations lead, in 
the spirit of sincere and loyal friendship that 
exists between the two Republics, to a concord-
ance of opinion on the points that have been 
the subject of exchange of views, or until one 
of the parties informs the other of its desire 
to terminate the Agreement.50 
A long sought-after amendment was approved on 
July 16, 1954, when it was decided to allow workers to 
enter for the cotton harvest on a term basis shorter than 
the previous minimum of six weeks. A minimum work con-
tract of 160 hours would now be permitted, thus author-
izing a work period of four weeks or less.51 
SoTreaties and Other International Acts, Series 2928, 
Mexican Agricultural Workers, Agreement Between the United 
States of Amerlca·and Mexico, Provisionally Extending Agree-
ment of August 11, 1951, as amended, Department of State 
Publication #5446. 
51Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 3043, 
Mexican Agricultural Workers; Agreement Between the United 
States of America and Mexico, Amending Agreement of August 
11, 1951, as amended. 
On August 6, 1954, an amendment was devised 
including several procedural matters and the authority 
of the Mexican Consular Service to represent the Mexi-
can workers. with speeia~ reference to the Enforcement 
Procedure of Article 3o.52 
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An amendment on November 19, 1954, provided for 
deductions by the employer from his employees' wages for 
insurance covering injuries and illnesses from non-occu-
pational causes, and for life insurance. The amounts of 
the deductions and disposition of the funds collected 
would be responsibilities of the Mexican Social Security 
Institute.53 
A Joint Migratory Labor Commission established on 
April 14, 1955, by the two governments offere~ a number of 
suggestions which affected the whole program. Persistent 
references were made to the necessity of controlling 
illegal entry of "wetbacks." The Commission advocated 
several procedures for Mexico contibutory to that end. 
52Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 3054, 
Mexican Agricultural Workers, Agreement Between the United 
States of America and Mexico, Amending Agreement of Au~ust 
11, 1951, as amended, Department of State Publication U5670. 
53Treaties and Other International Acts, Series .3242, 
Mexican Agricultural Workers, Recommendations by Joint 
Migratory Labor Commission, Agreement Between the United 
States of America and Mexico, Department of State Publica-
tion #6021. 
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The suggestions were that Mexico prevent unlawful riding 
on freight trains destined for the northern border, 
undertake a program of publicity and persuasion for that 
purpose, take all possible steps to diminish departures 
to the United States, and improve the strength of her 
own border patrol. Other recommendations were that pro-
cedures be simplified and that no Migratory Station be 
established within 160 kilometers of the border.54 
Further amendments extended the basic agreement, 
defined the authority of the Department of Labor to 
revoke certification, and set standards for transporta-
tion, inspection of trucks carrying workers, and simpli-
fied procedure for returning medical and mental cases.55 
54Ibid., PP• 2, 4. 
55Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 
3454, Mexican Agricultural Workers, Agreement Between 
the United States or America and Mexico, Extending 
Agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended, 
Department of State Publication #6252 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1955) 
Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 
3609, Mexican Agricultural Workers, Agreement Between 
the United States of America and Mexico, Department or 
State Publication (literal print), (Washington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1956) 
- Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 
3848, Mexican Agricultural Workers, Agreement Between 
the United States of America and Mexico relating to 
Article 7 of Agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended, 
Department of State Publication (literal print), 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957). 
See Appendix I, Letter, Kennedy M. Crokett, 
Officer in Charge Mexican Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, June 27, 1957, to Nelson G. Copp. 
The Agreement with Mexico as amended is a matter 
of continuing negotiation in which many communications 
1~ 
of a confidential nature fly unhindered across the common 
boundary of the United States and Mexico for the conduct 
of their business. This voluminous interchange on seem-
ingly minute points insures the future success of the 
whole bracero program. 
CHAPTER VI I I 
A CRITIQUE ON POLICY 
What is the basis for any country's admitting 
immigrants? Pursuing the philosophy of freedom in its 
largest sense and as a personal, natural, and legal 
right, a human being should be permitted to go anywhere 
at any time. Yet, all organized societies institute 
restrictions which presumably are ror the good of that 
society. Consideration of national defense, economics, 
and nationalism limits permanent migration. There is 
less restriction on temporary migration and even less on 
travel for business or pleasure. The complexity of 
pluralistic societies requires these restrictions. 
The United States was settled originally by 
Europeans who sought economic, religious, and govern-
mental freedom. In the nineteenth century, the United 
States absorbed enough Irish, English, and Germans to 
assist appreciably limited sections of those countries 
with internal economic and political problems. In the 
twentieth century, the United States, due to its unem-
ployment position and relatively advanced industrialization, 
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could not materially aid those countries of Europe having 
an exportable population, particularly Greece and Italy, 
by admitting their surplus population. 
This logic should not overlook the current philo-
sophy of the European Common Market and the policy of 
unrestricted migration within the member countries of 
Europe. None of the planners of this program, however, 
envisions a wholesale change or general migration. Again, 
the advantages of modern travel facilities will encourage 
temporary migration for legitimate and mutual needs. The 
United States' policy of cooperation with the European 
Common Market in lowering tariffs will mean more trade 
with Europe, diminish the need for permanent migration 
from the continent, and thereby encourage population 
stability. 
The immigration policy of a specific country is 
based on that nation's racial, cultural, and economic 
traditions. As summarized in Chapter I, these bases 
have particular significance in the United States. 
Economic requirements have been the backbone of immigra-
tion policy. Cultural considerations have always been 
secondary. However, since 1921, national origins or 
race have been controlling elements in United States 
immigration policy. As a natural progression of the 
traditional policy, temporary migrants, exemplified 
mainly by Mexican "wetbacks" and braceros, filled the 
requirements of inexpensive unskilled labor in the 
United States. Also, it is clear from the statistics 
quoted below (p. 190) that the United States pursued 
the historical immigration strategy of aiding business 
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by admitting immigrants who were unskilled or semi-
skilled. Temporary migrants were the result of necessary 
and logical adjustment to the Quota Acts. Except for 
the large proportion of Mexicans admitted for permanent 
residence, the policy had traditional consistency and 
flexibility in that numbers admitted for temporary 
residence could be adjusted quickly to meet ever changing 
economic demands. The bracero program proved that large 
seale temporary migration could be controlled. Temporary 
migration for definite purposes solved specific labor 
shortages. Permanent migration offered no such solution. 
During any serious economic crisis, the question 
of a quota for permanent immigration from Mexico arises. 
The only restraint on emigration from nations of the 
Western Hemisphere to the United States, as far as numbers 
are concerned, is the limitation imposed by the good 
judgment of United States Consuls in granting visas for 
permanent immigration. Braceros, as temporary migrants, 
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need no passports. Discretion and, no doubt, advice from 
Washington control permanent emigration from Latin-
American countries to the United States. 
Based on current United States immigration laws, 
if Mexico were placed on a quota, immigration from that 
country would amount to only a few hundred a year. At 
present the average number of emigrants from Mexico for 
permanent residence is 50,000 a year. About 95 percent 
of these are unskilled and do heavy, dirty work in 
foundries and factories. Several hundred thousand 
braceros are admitted each year for temporary periods 
ranging from six weeks to six months. The immigration 
policy in the first case is a subsidy to industry, and 
in the second case, the braceros act as a subsidy to 
industrialized agriculture. 
Considering the total United States population 
(about 179,000,000) and its current rate of growth, the 
total Mexican immigration is not large or alarming. 
Fewer than two percent of those admitted permanently 
actually become naturalized citizens. They are leaving 
the "back door" open to return to Mexico in times of 
stress. The law of supply and demand is allowed to 
influence Mexican migration, and the "quota" system in 
operation is economic need. This type of control is 
effective though outside a formal quota system. 
Furthermore, establishing a quota now would be an 
affront to Mexico and the other Latin-American 
countries with whom the United States wishes to 
establish firmer bases of friendship. 
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A history of the policy of the United States 
toward Mexican migrants has followed a fairly consistent 
pattern depending on the administration in control in 
Washington. During the period 1932-1942, the United 
States was preoccupied with internal problems of 
economic recovery. The "Good Neighbor Policy" met 
with some success. The number of "wetbacks" coming to 
the United States illegally for temporary work was not 
large or disturbing. The initial agreements with Mexico 
fo~ the importation of legal braceros indicated a soft 
attitude. The United States granted most of Mexico's 
requests. The liberal administration of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) showed little interest 
in rigid controls which would have operated to the 
advantage of the large growers only. 
The administration of President Harry s. Truman 
(1945-1953) was largely a continuation of the internal 
economic pollcies of his predecessor. While new treaties 
were negotiated with Mexico for additional braceros, there 
was no determined effort to bring the "wetbacks" under 
control. Though there were some exceptions, the "wet-
backs" were employed mainly by smaller growers. It 
was from these United States farmers that President 
Truman received support in his upset election in 1948. 
The El Paso Incident (See pp. 155-6) is representative 
of his attitude and policy. This was the laissez faire 
era in Mexican migratory labor policy. 
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President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), a 
moderate Republican, represented a more conservative 
approach to farm problems in the United States. In 
addition to this circumstance, the "wetback" invasion 
had reached a point where it could no longer be treated 
casually. In 1954, the Commissioner of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, General J. M. Swing, con-
ducted his "Operation Wetback" to end the "wetback" 
problem (Seep. 75). With "wetbacks" no longer in 
competition, braceros took over. As necessary as this 
action appeared, the result was an aid to large growers, 
and either by design or accident the trend toward larger 
corporate farms accelerated. 
In 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected president. 
He knew very well the political lessons taught by the 
New Deal. Only by a coalition of two seemingly divergent 
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forces--labor and agriculture--would his party be strong. 
Yet, just as President Eisenhower could not reverse any 
of the basic tenets of the New Deal, President Kennedy 
could only continue, at this writing, the policy of the 
Eisenhower Administration concerning Mexican migrant 
labor. The truce President Kennedy inherited in 1961 
was an appropriate end of the thirty-year period under 
study. 
The immigration policy of the United States may 
be analyzed further through"the statistics of a repre-
sentative year such as 1955.1 During that year, a total 
of 23?,?90 persons were admitted for permanent residence. 
This number was a fourteen percent increase over the 
previous year, due largely to the Refugee Relief Act. 
Of this number, only 19,223 were professional people, 
managers, or proprietors. The remainder, or more than 
ninety percent, were laborers, craftsmen, and domestics. 
The largest group, 120,503, were listed as having no 
occupation. In the same year, there were 2,300,000 
1Annual Report of the Immifratio~.and Naturali-
zation Service, Department of Jus ice (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1955), P• 55. 
aliens in the United States. A record high of 620,946 
non-immigrant aliens were admitted during the year for 
temporary residence. 2 These numbers do not indicate 
that the immigration policy of the United States is 
restrictive or selfish. 
Though apparently no writers have analyzed the 
policy, the immigration program of the United States 
complements the foreign policy pursued in the post-war 
era. During the period 1945-1960, the United States 
disbursed many billions of dollars to foreign countries 
under the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, Point Four, 
and other foreign military and economic aid programs. 
These activities were designed to diminish the threat 
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of communism by rehabilitating the economy of the 
recipients. An immigration policy of the United States 
which would siphon off the most productive workers of 
foreign countries would not be compatible with the for-
eign aid plans of strengthening the economies of the non-
communist world. Here again, an expansion of the policy 
of temporary migration for economic, military, educational, 
and cultural purposes serves the national and international 
interests of the United States to a greater extent than a 
more liberal policy of permanent migration. 
2Ibid., PP• 4, 6. 
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The institution of the foreign contract agricul-
tural worker has evolved from diverse economic urgencies 
in the countries concerned and was secure only as long 
as it was profitable to the growers. Any fundamental 
change in policy by the Departments of Labor in Mexico 
or the United States, by growers' associations, or by 
labor unions, could affect the program. As long as the 
economy of the United States is expanding, there will be 
a shortage of unskilled seasonal farm labor which perma-
nent immigration cannot satisfy. The trend is to use 
foreign agricultural labor for this purpose. The "trial 
and error" period has now passed, and fixed precedents, 
procedures, and policies have emerged. 
The greatest threats to the braceros are forces 
quite beyond their control, one of which is lack of agree-
ment among the agencies administering the bracero program. 
The conflict is three-sided. The Mexican 
Government, anxious to further improve its 
citizens' welfare, is pushing for increased 
benefits for braceros and greater economic 
protection for them while they're in the U. s •. 
The American Government, represented by the 
u. s. Labor Department, is eager to raise wages 
of all farm workers, including braceros,even if 
this means creating some sort of "minimum" .farm 
wage. American farmers, who in the main foot 
the bills for the program and will bear the 
burden of higher wages, are bitterly protesting 
the Government's moves and accusing Washington 
of wrapping them up in costly reams of red tape. 
The braceros, for the most part, don't seem to 
care one way or the other, just so long as they 
continue to work.3 
!Jack Hanicke, "Three-Sided Squabble Threatens Pact 
on Flow of Mexican Farm Hands into U. S. 11 , The ~ Street 
Journal, July 8, 1959. 
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As the 86th Congress prepared to adjourn in 1960, 
two bills were pending in the House of Representatives 
which gave some portent of the future of the braceros. 
H. R. 121?6, if enacted, would prevent the Secre-
tary of Labor from setting any minimum standard of wages 
and hours for farm workers (including braceros). This 
action would be a return to conditions of the "wetback" 
era and would invite the same evils. At the same time, 
the measure would extend the present bracero program, 
established by Public Law ?8, for two more years. This 
bill had the support of the large growers. 
H. R. 11211, the other bill pending in the House 
of Representatives, would effect a twenty percent reduc-
tion in the bracero program each year thereby eliminating 
it in five years without any serious dislocation on either 
side of the Rio Grande. This bill was advocated by labor 
unions and the National Consumers' League.4 
H. R. 12176, 86th Congress, 2d Session, May 11, 1960 
(referred to the Committee on Agriculture); H. R. 11211, 
86th Congress, 2d Session; March 16, 1960 {referred to the 
Committee on Agriculture); Letter by Vera Waltman Mayer, 
General Secretary, National Consumers• League, Washington, 
D. c., to the Editor, Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 
1960. ----
Through June, 1962, neither of these bills were 
passed, but the Bracero Treaty of 1951 had been extended. 
For all the criticism of the bracero program, 
it can be considered a success. It provided necessary 
farm labor when needed. The administration of the pro-
gram improved. Mexicans benefited by their increased 
wages, and Mexico's dollar exchange became more favor-
able. The American consumer benefited by lower prices 
for food products. 
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Remediable criticisms include the failure to try 
to teach braceros something about farming methods while 
they are in the United States. This could be a part of 
United States foreign aid. The United States has also 
failed to propagandize the world on its success with 
Mexican foreign relations concerning the bracero program, 
and does not tell the full story of the migration as a 
part of United States immigration policy. 
In his very humble way, the bracero has made his 
contribution to American civilization and immigration 
policy. As of 1960 his story is not yet complete, 
nevertheless, the "wetback"-bracero saga has been a part 
of larger political and economic realities in the United 
States and the world. 
The period of the setting of this thesis (1930-
1960) can easily be called the most interesting in the 
history of mankind. The superlative "greatest" should 
be avoided in history; however, the period includes the 
most profound economic depression, a shattering world 
war, human cruelties without precedent, the advent of 
useful atomic energy, great advances in biological and 
physical science, the toppling of empires, and also the 
coronations of two popes and two rulers of England. 
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During the thirty-year period, far reaching 
changes came about in the thinking of man. In the 
United States, a complete evolution in foreign policy 
saw a change from isolation to world leadership. Civil 
rights in the United States drew much attention, and 
human rights in the world demanded recognition. The old 
colonialism died. New bases were sought to combat what 
the West viewed as a new kind of Dark Age--communism. 
The United States believed it had the best answer in its 
own revolutionary New Deal. 
The internal political economy of the United States 
was dominated by the philosophy of the New Deal during the 
period 1933•1960. The advent of the New Deal is usually 
divided into three periods. The first, 1933-1935, was a 
time of great economic crisis, and many purely emergency 
measures passed the United States Congress. The period 
1936-1938 was a time of consolidation for the New Deal, 
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and President Roosevelt, after his great election victory 
in 1936, turned to making the New Deal program a perma-
nent part of the United States social and economic pastern. 
The Revolutionary War (1776-1783) was primarily a politi-
cal revolution. The Civil War (1861-1865) was primarily 
a social revolution. The New Deal, which can be classed 
as the third great revolution in the United States, was 
economic, instituting monetary controls, labor-management 
equilibrium, protection for the consumer, and federal 
responsibility for the economic welfare of the people of 
the United States. 
The third phase of the New Deal, started in 1938, 
was limited by World War II. This phase had as its pur-
pose the export of New Deal ideas to other countries.* 
Again this was largely a revolution of method in govern-
ment, economic policy, and applied technology. But the 
profound conservatism of some countries would not permit 
the application of such revolutionary ideas. Some of 
these countries have since gone over to communism or 
reverted to a kind of state capitalism with the executive 
exercising dictatorial powers. The United States in the 
*Note: A revival of the plan to export the New 
Deal can be seen in President Kennedy's Alliance for 
Progress program relating to Latin-America which began 
in 1961. 
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post-war period had no choice but to become an instigator 
of revolution in behalf of the principles of political, 
economic, and social freedom at home and abroad. Inter• 
nationally, the major question in 1960 was whether the 
conservative revolution exemplified by the United States 
in the New Deal program or the radical revolution advo-
cated by Russia would win the world. 
The preceding two hundred years saw the European-
ization of the world. In its multi-phase form, the move-
ment was completed by the communization of China in 1948. 
Since World War II, the United States has assumed the role 
of world leadership in the West. Americanization of the 
world became more evident as an incidental part of United 
States activity in foreign aid. The process was more 
evident in method or technique than in culture. 
This "coming of age" of the United States was also 
exemplified in the willingness of that country to permit 
lerge scale temporary migration of people to its territory. 
The United Nations in New York, large contingents of for-
eign students at American universities, business confer-
ences, cultural exchanges, and foreign contract laborers 
all became a part of the educational process initiating a 
revolution in method, which, in time, me.y render changes 
in the fundamental cultures of many foreign nations. 
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Expanding temporary immigration bore fruit. Yet, there 
were no logical nor compelling economic reasons for ex-
panding permanent immigration to the United States as of 
1960, since this would be inconsistent with the economic, 
political, and foreign policy of the United States. 
199 
EPILOGUE 
EPILOGUE 
And now unfolds again the tale which once we told, 
a fiction, though a synthesis of accurate details. 
The years press on to 1960, 
and Carlos Garcia becomes a mestizo bracero. 
In late October is the day of his return. 
At home his father, Paulo Garcia~ awaits him. 
He, himself, had been a mestizo wetback" once in 1940. 
The work is the same today, 
and the pay only a little more. 
The father was unhappy that his son had gone, 
but gladness fills his heart at sight of him, 
and eagerly he listens as his son recounts 
his journey to the land across the river. 
Papa, I remember when I was a child and you told me 
about the time you had to steal across the border 
to find work on the American haciendas. 
You went to earn money to buy a second-hand tractor. 
But we did not have enough money to buy other equipment 
which we found was necessary to go with the tractor. 
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We could not work our land together with the grandfather's. 
We could not work it as the Americanos do in Texas. 
Grandfather is dead. The money was gone long ago. 
There has been little improvement in our farm. 
But now there is a new agreement 
between Mexico and the Estados Unidos. 
I was sure to earn more moneythan you did. 
At least, that is what the men in the village said. 
I went to the pueblo, Santiago, 
and waited for my certificate. 
I paid a little bribe and got it quicker. 
Then I was sent by train with many others 
to the large Reception Center at Chihuahua near the border. 
A doctor there examined each of us, 
and I had an x-ray of my chest. 
There were always many lists and waiting, 
but we were treated fairly well. 
A train took us to large fruit orchards in California. 
Others, not so lucky, went to cotton farms in Texas. 
These days many things are different, my Papa. 
We had a contract, and we did not have fear. 
Instead, we were excited to see the new land 
where there are many wide highways and large irrigated 
orchards, 
and where everyone lives in a northern style home. 
We lived in small cantonments like the army. 
We had toilets and showers. 
Sometimes there was not hot water, 
but we could keep our clothing clean. 
Trucks hauled us to the fields each day. 
We were paid a regular wage, and it was guaranteed. 
It was not as much as the organized workers were paid, 
but it was so much more than I could earn at home 
that I could not complain. 
The Mexican Labor official could examine the payroll. 
He sometimes quarreled with the American owners, 
but that is no affair of mine. 
I received your letters regularly, 
and I am glad you knew where I was all the time. 
Still, we were very lonesone in California. 
It is nice there, but it is not home. 
Unless you were a regular worker in a factory 
and lived in the Mexican colony, 
life there was very difficult. 
We had no trouble coming back across the border. 
The governments had planned it all, they said. 
Yes, some things are different, 
but some things are as you told me. 
Sometimes I felt that the gringos really hate Mexicans. 
We seldom talked to one of them. 
In California we need more than fresh haircuts, 
new shoes, clean clothes, and our best smiles 
to make us acceptable, 
even to Mexicans who have become Americanos. 
The labor unions say bad things about us. 
And, as you know, we are not more popular 
in our own villages when we return. 
Maybe others will want to go next year 
as long as there is work in the EstadosUnidos, 
but most of us found it a little embarrassing, 
and, as for me, I would rather stay home. 
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No, Papa, I will not go back next year, unless I have to. 
After paying my expenses, there is not much left. 
Unless the government in Mexico City can help us farmers, 
I do not see that we will earn enough in the Estados Unidos 
to make any difference in the way we farm. 
We need big irrigation projects like the Americanos, 
tractors, good seed, and much fertilizer. 
In California the owner's son knew about such things. 
I felt ashamed 
that I had not even completed the fifth grade. 
We have a long way to go, Papa.· 
I love our village and our farm, 
and with modern methods we will have a better life. 
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APPENDICES 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
WASHINGTON ZS, D, C. 
In reply refer to 
MID 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
WASHINGTON 
,, ;· ... 
' :-.~. ~. 
·':·, .... 
Dear Mr. Copp: 
Reference is made to your letter of June 3, 1957 requesting 
information concerning communications, proposals and agreements 
during the past five years relating to Mexican agricultural wrkers 
employed in the United states. 
The Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951, as amended, contains the 
provisions under which the wrkers tmder reference are being made 
available to United States employers. The Agreement and its several 
amendments and extensions are obtainable in printed form from the 
Superintdent of Documents, United states Government Printing 
Office, washington, D. c., at nominal prices. The dates of signa-
ture and Treaty Series Numbers are given below for your convenience: 
August ll, 1951, TS No. 2331; 
January 10 and 31, 1952, February 8, 1952, March 31 and 
April 9, 1952, TS No. 2531; 
May 19, 1952, TS No. 2586; 
March 10, 1954, TS No. 2932; 
August 6, 1954, TS No. 3054; 
November 19, 1954, TS No. 3127; 
July 16, 1954, TS No. 3043; 
December 23, 1955, TS No. 3454; 
December 20, 1956, TS No. 3714. 
The Department of Labor, ~shington, D. c., also publishes a booklet 
entitled "Information Concerning Entry of Mexican Agricultural 
Wbrkers into the United States•. 
Because negotiations with the Mexican Government on this subject 
are of a continuing nature involving the current conduct of foreign 
relations, it is regretted that research into the Department's records 
should be limited to the United States Government's official purposes. 
Mr. Nelson G. Copp, 
77 Gainsboro, Apartment 4, 
'RnA+.nn 1 'i _ Ms.saa.ciliusetts .. 
i 
.. 
' I 
1 
; 
# 
BERT S. KERR, OKLA. 
'LLEN FREAR, JR., DEL. 
SSELL B. LONG, LA. 
EDWARD MARTIN, PA. f 
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL. 
RALPH E. FLANDERS, YT. 
GEORGE W. MALONE, NEV. 
P'RANK CARLSON, KANS. 
WALLACE F. BENNETT, UTAH 
WILLIAM E. JENNER, IND. 
:JRGE A. SMATHERS, FLA. 
NTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX. 
JL H. DOUGLAS, ILL. 
IERT GORE, TENN. 
ELIZABETH E. SPRINGER, CHIEF CLERI( cOMMI.;.:TEE ON FINANCE 
August 1, 1958 
, 
Mr. Nelson G. Copp 
77 Gainsboro, Apt. 4 
Boston 15, Hassachusetts 
Dear Mr. Copp: 
_., .... "' 
Wher: I first presented the amend.me:1t to mal<;:e the knov1ing employment 
of a wetback punj_shable, I v1as able to secure the Senate's approval, 
because Senator Ellender had introduced a separate bill to this same effect 
and could not with very good grace oppose an amendment alone:; tl:ese lines. 
The matter was taken out of the bill in conference, however, and, so far 
as I know there has been no later effort to revive it. 
Two other steps, however, have been taken seeki::.1.:::; to minimize these 
problems. One is the increase of the border patrol to prevent ille::;al 
entry. Second and more important j_s the expansion of the legalized pro(;ram 
administered by the Department of labor for the importation of Mexican 
workers. The expansion of this latter program r...a.s tended to reduce the 
use of illegal entrants. 
I still believe that the problems. which result not only from ille;al 
entry but also from the lo.w wae:;es and low standards of workin , and li vin,; 
conditions bf our m.ie;rant workers both Mexican and United States nationals 
need much more attention than they are given. These are truly the for ~:otten 
people. I ha·re therefore worked for provisions which would ;c;ive the 
Interstate Conunerce Corrunission control over/the interstate transit of 
mi_;rant workers, who have in the past suffered from dis _;;raceful accidents 
resultin:<; in part from their bein~: transported like cattle from state to 
state. I have also worked with the few other Ser~tors like Senator Morse 
'ivho believe in maintainin_; the 160 acre limitation provisions of oUr-
reclamation law. These are aimed at encoura::;ing family size farms ~and 
disco1Jra,_;ing lar,'_';e-scale corporate fannin::; on lands irriu;ated in substantial 
part at public expense. If we can thus reduce the necessity for farm 
employrnent by casual workers, we can perhaps ma.ke more manageable ,this 
whole problem. · 
' I 
I have written you at some length because there are so few who take. 
an interest in this matter. 
You wj_ll be glad to know that the State of New Yo;rk earlier this .·.,.~ 
year :passed a number of bills tia:vir.~ to do wi th .. the l:i:censin,:_j of f'arrn labor 
camp conmissaries, keepin~ of payroll records'\'l;>f _;roup leaders, the 
revocation of ;rowers 1 ··:-e-;istrations under ce:r:tt:dn circumstances., and the 
requirin;~ the operators' of farm labor camps to' comply with th.e· State 
Sanitary Code prior to the admission or housing of mi;~atory' laborers. I 
hope to put some mention of these stateacts in the Congressional Record 
soon ~$order to give ~~little more curre~y to their substance and to 
enab~~)t,~ps~ ;t.~i;_.-;io~sel:f' who are interes~&d:rr .. t.he problem to encoura,;e 
oth~~ -'A-~tl¥sv to-', a~ ·!li~~wi se • ' ·~ ' j, \,': "•-}:' 
\, ~it'h' b~~t·~'is~~s,.. ·~· - ~--,_al ly ~~ 
. ,- ~"~.,-
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Appendix III 
The following figures indicated the emigration to the 
United States from Latin-America by decade, and what 
percentage this was of the total arriving in the United 
States from all sources.l 
Decades 
1821-30 
1831-40 
1841-50 
1851-60 
1861-'70 
18'71-80 
1881-90 
1891-1900 
1900-10 
1911-20 
1921-30 
1931-40 
1941-49 
Number of Emigrants 
to the United States 
from Latin Amarica 
12;000 
33,000 
62;000 
'75,000 
16'7,000 
404,000 
42'7,000 
39,000 
362;000 
1~144;000 
1,51'7;000 
160,000 
283,000 
Percent of 
Total Immigrants 
from All Sources 
l~ncyclopedia Britannica, 195'7 Edition, Vol. 15, 
p. 468. 
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Table A 
Number of Mexican Nationals Admitted 
to the United States by Decades 
rears 
1821-1830 
1831-1840 
1841-1850 
1851-1860 
1861-1870 
1871-1880 
1881-1890 
1891-1900 
1901-1910 
1911-1920 
1921-1930 
1931-1940 
1941-1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Number Admitted for 
Permanent Residence 
4,81? 
6,599 
3;2?1 
3,078 
2,191 
5,162 
1,913 
971 
49,642 
219,004 
459,28? 
22,319 
60,589 
6,153 
9,079 
17,183 
30,645 
43,702 
65; 047 
Total Legal Emigra-
tion from Mexico to 
the United States 
49,154 
1,059,80'7 
Table B 
Total Number of Mexican Nationals 
Actually Naturalized in the United States 
During a Ten Year Period 
1948 1,895 
1949 2,22? 
1950 2,323 
1951 1,969 
1952 2,496 
1953 2,728 
1954 3,710 
1955 10,166 
1956 6,958 
1957 5,541 
"SOurce: Annua'"I Report, Commissioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, United States. {Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 195?) 
20? 
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Appendix V 
Tables Nos. 5-13 presented on the rollowing pages are from 
a pamphlet by Lyle Saunders and Olen E. Leonard, entitled 
The Wetback in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas, (Austin: 
The University of Texas, July, 1951), and contain a compila-
tion of information pertinent to "wetbackstt which resulted 
from a special project sponsored by the University of Texas. 
Table No. 5 
Usual Occupation in Mexico of 160 ttwetbacks" 
Deported from Texas, 1950 
Occupation 
Jornalero (Day Laoorer)* 
Unpaid Family Worker 
Bricklayer 
Farm Operator 
Truck Driver 
Carpenter 
Ejidatario (Farm Worker)* 
Mechanic's Apprentice 
Domestic Servant 
Miner 
Sales'lltan 
Factory Worker 
Helper on a Truck 
Weaver 
Welder 
Chauffeur 
Seamstress 
Barber 
Tree Grafter 
Railway Worker 
Painter 
Wood Seller 
Shoemaker 
Miller 
Butcher 
Policeman 
Blacksmith 
Taxi Driver 
Waitress 
Tractor Driver 
Repairman 
No Information 
Total .~~---------
Males 
70 
4 
9 
9 
.,., 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
145 
Females 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
rr-
*It seems that some ejidatarios were lumped together with 
the jornaleros. 
Source: Personal interviews with "wetbacks" held in the 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
Appendix V {Continued) 
Table No. 6 
Number of Hectares of Land Owned or Operated in Mexico 
by 160 "Wetbacks" Deported from Texas in 1950 
Number of Men* 
Owning 
Given Number 
Number of Hectares of Hectares 6 
None 117 
One 1 
Two 1 
Three 1 
Four 4 
Five-Nine 
Ten-Fourteen 3 
Fifteen 
Twenty-Twenty-four 2 
Twenty-five-Twenty-nine 1 
Thirty-Forty 2 
Ejidatarios 11 
No Information 2 
Total 160 
Total Hectares Owned • • • • 192 
Total Hectares Operated. • • 180 
Number' of Men* 
Operating 
Given Number 
of Hectares 
105 
1 
2 
3 
7 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
11 
3 
160 
*The fifteen women included in this sample are included 
with the men under the category "None." 
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Source: Personal interviews with "wetbacks" held in the 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
Appendix V (Continued) 
Table No. 7 
Length of Time Spent in the United States 
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by 2,475 Mexicans Illegally Entering the United States 
From 1920 to 1950 
Percent 
Length of_ Time Number of Total 
Under one day to four days 351 14.2 
Over four days and less than one month '724 29.3 
Between one and six months 1,026 41.4 
Between six and twelve months 161 6.5 
Between one and five years 182 '7.3 
Between five and ten years 22 0.9 
Over ten years 9 0.4 
-
Total 2,4'75 100.0 
Source: Records of the u. s. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, Hidalgo, Texas, 1950. 
Appendix V (Continued) 
Table No. 8 
Length of Time Spent in the United States 
by 153 Wetbacks Deported From Texas in 1950 
Length of Time 
Under one day to four days 
Over four days and less than 
Between one and six months 
Between six and twelve months 
Over one year 
Total 
one month 
Number 
40 
60 
42 
4 
7 
153 
211 
Percent 
of Total 
26.1 
39~2 
2'7.5 
2.6 
4.6 
100.0 
Source: Personal interviews with "wetbacks" held in the 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
Appendix V (Co~tinued) 
Table No. 9 
The Responses of 136 "Wetbacks" 
Deported From Texas in 1950 
To a Question Regarding the Time 
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They Had Expected to Remain in the United States 
Percent 
Time Ex:eected to Remain Number of Total 
Only during the cotton harvest 41 30.1 
"A few weeks" 23 16.9 
"A few months" 51 37.5 
A year or more 2 1.5 
"As long as possible" 10 7.4 
"As long as work lasts" 6 4.4 
Long enough to earn a specified amount 3 2.2 
ot money 
Total too.o 
Note: Twenty of this number expected to re-enter the 
United States as soon as possible while ninety-two stated 
that they did not expect to re-enter. Twenty-four were 
undecided. 
Source: Personal interviews with "wetbacks" held in the 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
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Table No. 10 
The Response of 160 "Wetbacks," 
Deported From Texas in 1950, When Asked 
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(a) 
(b) How 
Why They Had Come to the United States, and 
They Had Learned of Work Opportunities in the u. s. 
Response to (a) Number 
Little work in Mexico 64 
Better wages in the United States 50 
Adventure, travel, to escape job, wife~ 13 
etc. 
"Poor crops at home" 7 
Seasonal work in Mexico is over. 5 
"It's easier to live in the u. s." 4 
To get in the U. s. Army. 2 
Husband or father is on contract. 2 
Total 147 
Response to (b) Number 
Word of mouth 116 
Had been to the United States previously 20 
Newspapers 4 
Radio 2 
Total 142 
Percent 
of Total 
43.5 
34.0 
8.8 
4.8 
2.7 
1.4 
1.4 
100.0 
Percent 
of Total 
81.7 
14.1 
2.8 
100.0 
Note: of the total sample of 160, 13 failed to reply to 
question (a) and 18 failed to answer question (b). 
Source: Personal interviews with "wetbacks" held in the 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
Appendix V (Continued) 
Table No. 11 
The Responses or 160 "Wetbacks" 
Deported From Texas in 1950, 
When Asked: "If You Could Earn $100 or More 
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in the United States, What Would You Do With It?" 
Percent 
Responses Number of Total 
Buy food, clothes, etc., for family in 33 20.6 
Mexico 
Buy land in Mexico 17 10.7 
Send it, or part of it, to relatives in 16 10.0 
Mexico 
Set up a business in Mexico 14 8.9 
Buy farm animals in Mexico 11 6.9 
Attempt to legalize status in the United 9 5.6 
States 
Buy or make the initial payments on a 8 5.0 
house in Mexico 
Buy food, clothes, etc., for self 8 5.0 
Establish an occupation in the United 7 4.4 
States 
Save most of it for futue needs 5 3.1 
Put it in the bank "to make interest" 5 3.1 
Pay debts in Mexico 3 1.9 
Buy beer, whisky, etc. 3 1.9 
Don't know 2 1.2 
Make improvements on house and land in 2 
Mexico 
Provide a better education for the children 2 
in Mexico 
Buy an automobile and take it back to 2 
Mexico 
Others, and those who did not reply 13 
Total 160 
1.2 
1.2 
8.1 
100.0 
Source: Personal interviews with "wetbacks" held in the 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
Source: 
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Table No. 12 
The Responses of' 160 "Wetbacks" 
Deported f'rom Texas in 1950, 
When Asked: (a) The Number of' Times 
They Had Entered the United States 
(b) The Mode of' Transportation Used 
From Residence to the International Boundry 
(c) Who Had Accompanied Them to the Border 
Percent 
Responses to (a) Number of' Total 
Once 69 44.0 
Twice 43 2'7.4 
Three Times 26 16.6 
Four Times 9 5.'7 
Five Times 4 2.5 
Six Times 3 1.9 
"Many Times 3 1.9 
Total 15'7 100.0 
Percent 
Responses to (b) Number of' Total 
Bus 82 53.9 
Train 58 38.1 
Bus and Train '7 4.6 
car 2 1.3 
Truck 1 0.'7 
"Hitch-hiked" 1 0.'7 
On Foot 1 0.7 
Total 152 100.0 
Percent 
Responses to (c) Number of' Total 
came with Friends 64 41.8 
Came with Relatives 30 19.6 
Came Alone 59 38.6 
Total 153 100.0 
Personal interviews with "wetbacks".held 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
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Table No. 13 
The Responses of 15? "Wetbacks" 
Deported from Texas in 1950, 
When Asked How They Had Crossed the River 
Percent 
Method of Cross ins Number of Total 
Swam 48 30.6 
Waded 81 51.6 
Boat or "launcha" 19 12.1 
With aid of an inner tube, tree 5 3.2 
trunk, etc. 
Over the bridge in Laredo with 4 2.5 
falsified papers 
Total m 100.0 
Note: The cost of the trip across by boat 
usually 10 pesos; one person paid 8 pesos, 
paid ?, four paid 5, and one paid 3 pesos. 
paid ten pesos. 
was 
three 
Ten 
Two of those who came across by miscel-
laneous methods paid nothing, one paid 8 pesos, 
one paid 10 pesos, and one paid 20 pesos. 
Source: Personal interview with "wetbacks" held in the 
McAllen, Texas, Detention Center, July, 1950. 
216 
21'7 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
One of the greatest disadvantages of a writer of 
contemporary history is the lack of official documen-
tation. Many documents constituting private corre-
spondence between governments remain confidential .for 
many years. (See last paragraph, Appendix I.) While 
the governmental correspondence and notes negotiating 
the treaties were not available, the treaties have 
been published and may be compared. A study of the 
treaties indicated the difficulties the governments 
encountered in administering these unusual arrangements. 
Despite the disadvantages of closed government 
files, there were many other sources of material. Many 
books by recognized authorities gave excellent back-
ground information. Some of the facts presented in 
this thesis were so sensational (at least in the South-
west) when they occurred that there was w:tdespread 
newspaper and magazine coverage of the events. The 
Mexican migrant was a lively and controversial subject. 
Feature articles on the general problem of migrant farm 
workers continued in United States periodicals and 
books. Several theses in education, sociology, econom-
ics, and history have used parts of the general problem. 
There was a tremendous amount of published literature 
available on this current subject. 
In addition to the usual commercial type of lit-
erature, there were many other methods of obtaining 
original source material. Thousands of people now 
living, including the writer, witnessed these events. 
Mexican workers were interviewed. (See Appendix V.) 
Debates in Congress over the public laws and treaties 
concerning the Mexican workers presented divided view-
points. (See Chapter V.) There was so much material 
available that the major problem was to select repre-
sentative data which gave a true picture of the gen-
eral situation existing during the thirty year period 
chosen for the study. 
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f1VIJETBACKS 11 AND BRACEROS: 
MEXICAN MIGRANT LABORSRS AND AlVlERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 
1930-1960 
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The 11 wetb.:a.ck" and bracero episodes of 1930-1960 had 
their origins :i.n th~ ~~uota Act of 192l. The Act, as amended, 
limited immigration to 150,000 annually and establj_shed 
quotas based on the national origins of the population of 
the United States. It thereby cut of'f large-scale immigra-
tion from Southeastern Europe. 
The 11 wetbe.cks" who gained their name from their surrep-
titious and successful attempts to ford the Rio Grande and 
thus slip illegally into the United States, occasioned no 
serious problem in the 1930 1 s; during the depression years 
only a few Mexicans crossed the border and sought work in 
Arrer:tcan fields at harvest time. The American involvement in 
World War II, however, impelled a substantial displacement 
of' American farm workers; the "wetback" traffic accelerated 
proportionately. The War's end did not check the swelling 
influx of illegal entrants. The number grew steadily, prior 
to 1954, until it approximated 1,200,000 annually. Most 
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members of the migratory labor force, remaining in the United 
Stetes only during the crop-growing season, returned each 
year to their homeland. Not more than a smalJ. percentage 
e.ttempted to remain permanently north of the border. 
Many individual reasons accou~~ed for the entry of Mexi-
cans into the United States, but all added up to the hope for 
economic betterment. In Mexico, economic growth did not keep 
pace with population increase. Even the ejido progrQm failed 
in its attempt to raise living standards by providing village 
ownership of land for 9easants. Arable land was limited, and 
barely half the haciendas (large feudal estates) were broken 
up during the program. Wages and educational standards re-
mained low. Thousands of' Mexicans sought nothing but a few 
hundred dollars to improve their way of life and their farms. 
Their earnings, however, remained meager and insufficient; 
the MAxlcan government, aware of the hostility encountered by 
its nationals in the United States, dll:d not encourage their 
seasonal migrations. 
In the post-war years, great opposition to "wetbacks" 
arose in the United States, because their employment displaced 
citizens of Mexican descent and lowered "prevailing wages" for 
seasonal farm work. Their numbers could no longer be ignored, 
but controls were difficult to enforce. In 1952, the United 
States Congress failed to rrJ.ake it a crime to employ "wetbacks." 
Internal pressures prevented the Border Patrol from enforcing 
existing laws. The treaties between lviexico and the United 
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States authorizing the legal entry of braceros did not pro-
vide sufficient penalties to discourage 11 wetbacks. 11 
In 1954, the Eisenhower administration in Washington 
instituted "Operation Wetback," which returned more than a 
million Mexicans to their homeland. With this determined 
effort, the border was secured, and the bracero treaties 
henceforth had an opportunity to prevail. 
The bracero program was not popular with church authori-
ties or organized labor in the United States, but the inter-
este of large growers were so strong that in 1957 nearly half 
a million braceros were contracted for temporary employment. 
Each year during 1948-1960, about 50,000 additonal Mexicans 
entered the United States as permanent residents. These 
laborers, largely unskilled, sought year-round employment; 
their availability supplied, in effect, a subsidy to industry. 
The braceros, on the other hand, filled available farm jobs; 
their labor provided a subsidy to agriculture. 
Immigration has played an important part in the growth 
of the United States from an undeveloped territory. During 
the period 1930-1960, the United States pursued the tradition 
of using economic need as the basis for permitting temporary 
and permanent immigration. Temporary foreign farm labor 
became a permanent adjustment to the policy which had cut off 
immigration from Southeastern Europe. These economic consid-
erations, paramount in the immigration policy toward Mexico, 
are in some degree contradictory to the cultural and racial 
preference implied in the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
of 1952 .• 
